01 JAN 2010 _________________________________________ *NY-To-Paris Flight Diverted to Maine *At last minute, DHS extends certification for pilots to carry firearms *Colgan pilots fault airline's stall training *Level bust cited after Air France-El Al airprox over Serbia *Super Puma helicopter safety checks ordered *2009 Air disasters and security threats on USA flights *Fire Hazard in Resetting Circuit Breakers *Delta, Northwest receive single operating certificate ****************************************** NY-To-Paris Flight Diverted to Maine http://www.davesweb.cnchost.com/AA757.jpeg BANGOR, Maine (AP) -- Officials say a New York-to-Paris flight carrying 180 passengers was diverted to Maine's Bangor International Airport when pilots reported engine trouble shortly after taking off. Airport Director Rebecca Hupp says no emergency was declared before pilots of American Airlines Flight 120 made the unscheduled landing early Wednesday. Hupp says a water discharge froze and damaged one of the Boeing 757's two engines. French media quoted passengers as saying they were told after taking off Tuesday evening that a toilet was leaking. Hupp says passengers departed late Wednesday morning on a replacement plane. Mechanics were still repairing the damaged plane Thursday. ****************** At last minute, DHS extends certification for pilots to carry firearms Washington (CNN) -- The Department of Homeland Security on Thursday extended permission for hundreds of pilots to carry firearms -- just hours before their certification to carry the weapons was to expire, according to an organization which represents the pilots. "A few hundred" Federal Flight Deck Officers -- or FFDOs -- were to lose their certification to carry firearms effective midnight on New Year's Eve, said Mike Karn, executive vice president of the Federal Flight Deck Officer Association. The loss would have come at a time of heightened concern about air security because of the attempted bombing of Northwest Flight 253 on Christmas Day. But Karn said the DHS's Federal Air Marshal program notified him Thursday afternoon that the pilots' certification would be extended. A Transportation Security Administration official confirmed that certifications had been extended for six months "in light of recent events." The official said that "due to an internal miscommunication, scheduled notifications to these officers were prematurely issued," but he offered no further explanation. FFDOs are commercial pilots who volunteer to undergo training so they can carry weapons to protect their aircraft. They undergo initial training at federal law enforcement training academies and must re-qualify with firearms every six months, and undergo a two-day recurrent training every three to five years. "I'm grateful [for the extension] because that will keep the most cost-effective last line of defense [of aircraft] in place," Karn said. "But I'm still concerned that such a limited budget has been approved for this program, and volunteers who want to protect the American public will be turned away." Karn said the budget for the program has not increased since 2003, effectively capping the number of armed pilots. The exact number of FFDOs is classified, but government officials have said in the past the number greatly exceeds the number of federal air marshals -- plain-clothed officers who fly in the cabin of the plane to protect aircraft. Several FFDOs contacted by CNN said DHS has made getting recurrent training onerous for pilots, limiting the number and sizes of classes. Pilots also must pay for their own hotels and food during training -- "our own time and our own dime," said one pilot -- placing a further burden on them. Had the loss of certification occurred, it would not have affected the pilots' flight clearance, only their ability to carry weapons. http://www.cnn.com/2009/TRAVEL/12/31/dhs.armed.pilots/ **************** Colgan pilots fault airline's stall training WASHINGTON - Colgan Air pilots said today that the airline's inappropriate training may have influenced Capt. Marvin Renslow's fatal decision to raise the nose of Continental Connection Flight 3407, which then spun out of control and crashed to the ground, killing 50 in Clarence in February. Colgan's stall training emphasized maintaining a plane's altitude during a potential stall, four pilots for the regional airline that operated the flight for Continental told The Buffalo News. They said that contradicted what they had previously learned as pilots. The four pilots, all speaking on condition of anonymity for fear of losing their jobs, said Colgan taught pilots to react to stall warnings by maintaining altitude, even though safety experts increasingly teach that the nose should be lowered and the altitude reduced slightly to build the aircraft's speed. Documents filed with the National Transportation Safety Board confirm the pilots' contention. Most importantly, a Colgan training manual instructs pilots to "maintain altitude." Several safety experts said that was the wrong approach. "Pitch up and maintaining altitude...is contrary to what I was taught as an aviator," said Steven Chealander, a former military and American Airlines pilot who was the NTSB member dispatched to Buffalo at the time of the crash. Chealander, who is no longer on the safety board, said he was speaking generally and did not want to discuss the Colgan crash, because the probable cause of the accident will not be revealed until the agency completes its work and releases its report in February. But another source with knowledge of the NTSB investigation said he expects that Colgan's "negative training" - essentially training pilots to do the wrong thing - will be one of the factors cited in the agency's final report on the crash. Joe Williams, a spokesman for Colgan, said he could not respond to questions about the airline's training until Monday. And a spokesman for the Federal Aviation Administration also said The Buffalo News, which contacted the agency about this story at 2:11 p.m. on Thursday, did not give the agency adequate time to respond. The Colgan pilots said the training policy - which the FAA had approved - has since been reversed and that the airline's pilot training has vastly improved in recent months. But they also said the airline's poor stall recovery training in years past may have been one of the factors that led to the crash in Clarence. "Our training for this situation was a joke," one Colgan pilot said. "They stressed that the way to recover from this sort of thing was to try not to lose altitude. That's all they trained...What they told you to do is counter to what you're supposed to do." The Colgan pilots stressed that several factors could have influenced Renslow's fatal decision to pull back on the plane's yoke in order to raise its nose. The safety board investigation found he spent the evening before the flight in a crew lounge at Newark Airport, meaning he could have been fatigued. And he also had been shown a training video on tail plane icing that may led him to believe that the plane was in a tail stall. Pulling back on the yoke would have been the correct response in that situation. Then again, the airline's emphasis on maintaining altitude to prevent a stall would have no doubt been fresh in his mind, said the pilot who called Colgan's training "a joke." "You're trained to pull back" on the yoke, that pilot said. "So what are you going to do in that situation? You'll do what Marvin did." The pilots interviewed stressed that their point of view was not just based on their experiences, but also on documents filed with the safety board as it completes its investigation of the Clarence crash. The Air Line Pilots Association, in a recent submission to the safety board, said pilots were told during training that they would need to "hold or increase pitch" - that is, steady or raise the plane's nose - in order to pass their flight tests. And a report filed by the NTSB's Operations Group investigating the Clarence crash also noted that sources it interviewed confirmed that Colgan's stall training focused on maintaining altitude. "It was stated in several interviews that during the stall recovery exercises for initial simulator training, the candidates were instructed to maintain an assigned altitude and complete the recovery procedures while not deviating more than 100 feet above or below the assigned altitude," that report said. That goal stemmed in part from an FAA edict which emphasized keeping the altitude steady when recovering from a stall, the operations group said. The FAA abandoned that standard in November 2008 and now emphasizes building speed as central to stall recovery, said Capt. John Cox of Safety Operating Systems, a Washington, D.C., consultancy. The old standard "has been a problem in the industry for decades," Cox said. "There has been a lot of discussion and an effort under way to get away from the zero altitude loss philosophy." The modern-day philosophy is that "you have to accept some altitude loss to get the plane flying," Cox said. That's because of the very nature of an aerodynamic stall, where the plane is flying so slowly that its wings will not keep the plane aloft. To build the speed needed to regain control, pilots not only must move the engines to full power, but also must point the nose downward temporarily to allow gravity to give the plane a boost in speed, aviation experts said. "I can understand that the pilot does not want to lose altitude too fast, but at the same time, you have to make sure the airplane has flying airspeed," said Scott T. Glaser of Defiant Co., a California aviation consultancy that specializes in "upset recovery training," or flying when things go wrong. Meanwhile, a former investigator for the safety board stressed that other airlines followed the FAA guidance and put too much emphasis on maintaining altitude. "It does go against the way you are taught to recover from a stall in a small plane," he said of pilots' early training. In a true stall, he said, adding power alone will not be enough to recover control. "You have to reduce the angle of attack," he said. Asked if the training requirement could have contributed to the Colgan crash, the former NTSB investigator said: "You might say yes because they were not trained to positively lower the nose, but no one ever was trained to pull up the nose the way (Renslow) did." After the crash, Colgan's training program was revamped to emphasize the importance of airspeed in stall recovery, the airline's pilots said. In addition, they said Colgan pilots are now receiving hands-on training in every element of the stall recovery system, including the "stick pusher," an automated stall recovery devise that Renslow overrode as he tried to control the plane on his own. Renslow never had such hands-on training in that device. While lauding the changes Colgan made, another pilot for the airline blamed the outdated training before the crash not only on the airline, but on the FAA, which must approve training manuals and other elements of every airline's pilot training program. "I have old training procedures which clearly state that the pilot must maintain altitude while in a stall," that pilot said. "We objected to it several times, but it was not changed until after the crash. The FAA was fully aware of this as they sat in our training events." Another Colgan pilot said the airline's approach to training at the time did not focus on ensuring that pilots knew how to react in case of trouble. "It was all just about checking the box so it was done and accomplished," that pilot said. A fourth pilot agreed, saying: "It doesn't do a good job in training you to deal with real-world situations." Told of all this, Mike Loftus, a former Continental Airlines pilot who lost his daughter, Maddie, in the Clarence crash, said it's been clear for some time that the crew of Flight 3407 did not receive adequate training. "I never really faulted Renslow or Shaw for this," Loftus said. "They were never trained or given the tools to do it the right way - and maybe they were even led to do it the wrong way." http://www.buffalonews.com/home/story/909286.html *************** Level bust cited after Air France-El Al airprox over Serbia Serbia's civil aviation administration is attributing to a 'level bust' an airprox incident involving an El Al Boeing 777 and an Air France Airbus A318. The incident occurred in Serbian airspace on 28 December after Belgrade en route controllers requested that the A318 - operating flight AF286J to Sofia - descend to flight level 350. Serbia's Civil Aviation Directorate says that, for "unknown reasons", the crew "failed to observe the instructions" and continued to FL347, some 300ft below the assigned altitude, before controllers intervened to halt the descent. The directorate states that the 777, operating flight LY007 to New York, had been flying at FL340 at the time and was 3.5nm distant. It adds that the Air France crew had "correctly repeated" the descent instruction before the incident. Neither Air France nor El Al could be reached for comment. Source: Air Transport Intelligence news ************* Super Puma helicopter safety checks ordered The Super Puma before it crashed [Pic: Gareth Falls] Operators including Bond are checking their fleets Helicopter operators are carrying out fresh safety checks on two types of Super Puma used to carry offshore workers. The European Aviation Safety Agency ordered the inspections after reports of a mechanical issue that could affect aircraft control. The directive was issued after cracks were found in the sections of the aircraft which protects the gearbox. It came in the wake of the the North Sea Super Puma crash, which killed 16. Sea crash The safety agency's instructions related to a problem first highlighted in 2005, prompting fears it could ultimately leave pilots unable to steer properly. Since then, several directives have ordered regular inspections. Eurocopter had offered a modification to the part in question - the fairing gutter - but the discovery of new cracks prompted the demand for fresh checks on AS332 and EC225 Super Pumas. Operators Bond, Bristow and CHC said they were now carrying out inspections on their North Sea fleets. In April, a Bond flight crashed into the sea off Peterhead, killing 16 men. It was the result of a "catastrophic" gearbox failure, which separated the main rotor from the aircraft, the Air Accidents Investigation Branch found. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/north_east/8436119.stm **************** 2009 Air disasters and security threats on USA flights San Jose, CA- The holiday season is quickly winding down and we are once again at the close of another year. Air travel for 2009 continued to see changes in security measures. The TSA continually adjusted travel requirements in response to security needs on both domestic and international flights. For the most part, 2009 was a quiet year for domestic air travel, seeing very few incidents and only one confirmed threat that took place on December 25 aboard Northwest flight 253. This incident has once again raised questions about how to prevent this type of security threat in the future. The "TSA is constantly adapting to address evolving threats" according to the TSA. They have a "layered approach to security that allows [them] to surge resources as needed on a daily basis. They use the following measures to ensure the safety of passengers: . Quickly implement additional screening measures . Explosive detection . Canine teams . Law enforcement officers . Gate screening and "behavior detection" . Other measures both seen and unseen Here is a look back of the TSA incidents and United States Air disaster recap for 2009: January 2- Air Tran Flight 175 January 1, 2009 held nine passengers "for a security related issue onboard the aircraft involving verbal comments made by a passenger and overheard by other passengers". All nine passengers were later cleared of any wrongdoing according to an Air Tran press release. January 15- US Airways flight 1549-"taking off from La Guardia Airport on Thursday afternoon. The pilot ditched in the icy Hudson River and all on board were rescued by a flotilla of converging ferries and emergency boats, the authorities said" according to a report by the New York times. All 155 onboard were safe. February 12- A "commuter plane crashed while attempting to land in rain and sleet, 6 miles northeast of Buffalo Niagara International Airport, were it was scheduled to land" according to planecrashinfo.com. All 49 onboard were killed. March- Man caught with Cocaine at John Wayne Airport and arrested. April 12- Pittsburgh International Airport a man was apprehended when it was discovered he had stolen airport property. April 16- Pittsburgh International Airport multiple IDs in the man's wallet, along with numerous credit cards, some having different names April 17- Tampa International Airport Hundreds of pills were found in a passenger's carry-on bag May 8- Newark Liberty (N.J.) International Airport a man checked in 9 bags and two of the bags contained replica improvised explosive devices, accompanied by inert blasting caps. August 10- ExpressJet Incident- a flight was delayed on the tarmac due to bad weather for "9 1/2 hours - 7 hours on the ground"-- 47 passengers spent the night trapped inside a small plane due to poor airline customer service and lack of appropriate response measures. December 25- Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit a Nigerian man set off a device and was subdued by passengers and crew. December 27- Northwest Flight 253 Incident. A Nigerian man spent an unusual amount of time in the bathroom and was subsequently removed from the plane. It was later determined, according to the TSA, he appeared to have a legitimate illness. http://www.examiner.com/x-29058-San-Jose-Family-Travel-Examiner~y2009m12d31- 2009-Air-disasters-and-security-threats-on-USA-flights ***************** Fire Hazard in Resetting Circuit Breakers Notice Number: NOTC2079 SPECIAL AIRWORTHINESS INFORMATION BULLETIN A Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) advising pilots, owners, operators, and maintenance personnel of potential hazards of resetting an opened circuit breaker on General Aviation aircraft was published on December 23, 2009, and can be found at https://www.faasafety.gov/files/notices/2009/Dec/SAIB_CE-10-11.pdf or at http://rgl.faa.gov. This SAIB also gives in-flight recommendations and best practices regarding tripped circuit breakers, inspection and maintenance of systems, and aging wires. For Further Information Contact: Leslie B. Taylor, Aerospace Engineer, Federal Aviation Administration, Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust Street, Room 301, Kansas City, MO 64106; phone: (816) 329-4134; fax: (816) 329-4090; e-mail: leslie.b.taylor@faa.gov. You have received this notice from FAASafety.gov because you have selected "General Information" in your preferences on your FAASafety.gov account. Click here to log in and edit your preferences on FAASafety.gov. Start FAASTeam CFI Workshops any time! Find Workshop #6 in SPANS. ***************** Delta, Northwest receive single operating certificate Integration between Delta Air Lines and Northwest Airlines continues to advance as today the FAA granted the carriers a single operating certificate following their merger in October 2008. Achieving a single operating certificate required the integrating of roughly 385 manuals and 100 operating specifications, programs and processes at both airlines, Delta executive vice president and COO Stephen Gorman says in a memo to employees. During the first quarter of 2010, all tickets will be consolidated into the Delta reservation system, and the Northwest website will be discontinued, he says. The Delta website will be the official website of the merged parties as the two SkyTeam alliance carriers merged their operations under the Delta name. Nearly 200 pre-merger Northwest aircraft have been painted in Delta's livery to date, more than 80% of the pre-merger Northwest mainline fleet. Source: Air Transport Intelligence news *************** Curt Lewis, P.E., CSP CURT LEWIS & ASSOCIATES, LLC