Flight Safety Information - April 02, 2024 No. 067 In This Issue : Incident: Nepal A332 at Kathmandu on Mar 28th 2024, hydraulic Leak : Incident: Easyjet A320 over Atlantic on Mar 29th 2024, hydraulic failure : Aircraft Cabin Air International Conference - 17 & 18 September - London : A British Airways jet came 'extremely close' to a drone that was flying 24 times above its legal maximum altitude, report says : FAA should not requite pilots to disclose talk therapy, panel says : Pilot Age and Safety: Looking for Links : American Airlines plane hit a parked aircraft while leaving a gate at PHL : FAA Rules Aside, U.S. Shops Prepare For SMS : Korean Air finalises order for 33 A350s : Contractor crushed by T-38 jet suffered broken ribs, spinal fractures : United Airlines is asking pilots to take time off in May because of a shortage of new Boeing planes : (APTSC) Asia and Pacific Turboprop Safety Conference - June 26 - 27, 2024 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia : Call for Nominations For 2024 Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Award : CALENDAR OF EVENTS Incident: Nepal A332 at Kathmandu on Mar 28th 2024, hydraulic Leak A Nepal Airlines Airbus A330-200, registration 9N-ALY performing flight RA-239 from Kathmandu (Nepal) to Doha (Qatar), was climbing out of Kathmandu's runway 20 following the (long) standard instrument departure route when the crew stopped the climb at FL250 due to low pressure at their yellow hydraulic system. The aircraft returned to Kathmandu for a safe landing on runway 02 about 45 minutes after departure. A replacement A330-200 registration 9N-ALZ reached Doha with a delay of about 4 hours. The occurrence aircraft remained on the ground in Kathmandu for about 13 hours before returning to service. According to information The Aviation Herald received there had been a major hydraulic leak. https://avherald.com/h?article=516d5bf7&opt=0 Incident: Easyjet A320 over Atlantic on Mar 29th 2024, hydraulic failure An Easyjet Airbus A320-200, registration G-EZRT performing flight U2-3111 from Glasgow,SC (UK) to Las Palmas,CI (Spain), was enroute at FL360 over the Atlantic Ocean about 360nm southwest of London Gatwick,EN (UK) when the crew decided to divert to Gatwick due to a hydraulic failure. The aircraft landed safely at Gatwick about 75 minutes after leaving FL360 and turning to divert to Gatwick. A replacement A320-200 registration G-EZUI reached Las Palmas with a delay of about 4:15 hours. The occurrence aircraft returned to service after about 14 hours on the ground. https://avherald.com/h?article=516cdba9&opt=0 A British Airways jet came 'extremely close' to a drone that was flying 24 times above its legal maximum altitude, report says • A British Airways pilot said a drone flew "extremely close" to their aircraft at 9,600 feet. • The Airbus A321 was flying at 250 mph when the drone was spotted, the MailOnline reported. • An Airprox report said it was categorized as a high-risk incident. A British Airways jet had a close call with a drone flying more than 9,000 feet above its legal limit, safety investigators have said. One of the pilots on the Airbus A321 said they saw an unmanned aircraft system (UAS) appear level with the plane's nose that then "shot down our right-hand side," describing it as "extremely close," per an Airprox report. The plane was roughly 30 miles away from London Heathrow Airport when the incident occurred, the report said. The pilot added that the UAS had been "on a constant bearing with closing distance." Recreational drone operators are barred from flying any higher than 400 feet in the UK, according to the Civil Aviation Authority, but this one was recorded at an altitude of 9,600 feet — 24 times the limit. The incident occurred on January 3, but it was first reported by the MailOnline on March 28. The Mail's report said the jet had 180 passengers on board and was flying at 250 mph while on its way back to London from Athens when the encounter took place. The aircraft was waiting to join the final flight path to Heathrow when they spotted the rogue drone, per the report. The drone came within about five feet of the wing and around 30 feet of the cockpit, it added. The incident was categorized as high risk in the Airprox report. Researchers at the University of Dayton warned in 2018 that it was "only a matter of time" before a drone strike caused significant damage to a plane. David Dunn, a drone expert at Birmingham University, highlighted the dangers posed by drones to The Telegraph: "Research shows that a drone collision at speed in the air, through the walls of the aircraft, is enough to down an aircraft." "If a drone was to go through the windscreen of an aircraft, it would certainly incapacitate the crew," he added. In 2018, flights were halted at London's Gatwick Airport after drones were spotted close to a runway. It led to more than 1,000 flights being canceled between December 19 and December 21. https://www.businessinsider.com/british-airways-jet-extremely-close-drone-collision-2024-4 FAA should not requite pilots to disclose talk therapy, panel says WASHINGTON, April 1 (Reuters) - An expert panel appointed by the Federal Aviation Administration said Monday the agency should drop a requirement that airline pilots and air traffic controllers disclose talk therapy sessions. "The FAA should develop a non-punitive pathway for reporting previously undisclosed mental health conditions, treatments, or medications," said the panel whose members include aviation associations, pilot and air traffic controller organizations, academia, and medical professionals. The issue has taken on new urgency since an off-duty Alaska Airlines ALK.N pilot in October was charged with trying to disable the engines of a jet in flight and told police afterward he was suffering a nervous breakdown. Pilots should be able to attend a therapy session without disclosing it, the panel said, adding "it is indisputable that the requirement to disclose talk therapy leads to healthcare avoidance and/or non-disclosure." The FAA said Monday it was reviewing the recommendations "to help break down barriers that prevent pilots and air traffic controllers from reporting mental health issues." Pilots face strict rules and can be forced to stop flying for six months if they change antidepressant or anxiety drug dosage levels or medications for mental health issues. The report recommends that be dropped to two months. The panel also recommends the FAA reconsider its current policy that bars pilot or controllers from duty when being treated for ADHD or taking any ADHD medication. The FAA has said it would also work to address uncompleted recommendations from a July inspector general's office report on pilot mental health, which found the FAA’s "ability to mitigate safety risks is limited by pilots’ reluctance to disclose mental health conditions." National Transportation Safety Board chair Jennifer Homendy has said the FAA oversight of pilot mental health is in need of significant reform. "The current system is broken and has been for a really long time," Homendy told Reuters earlier saying pilots are fearful "they could lose their job if you mention you are going to talk therapy." https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/panel-says-faa-should-end-mandate-pilots-disclose-talk-therapy-sessions-2024-04-01/ Pilot Age and Safety: Looking for Links • Revisions of mandatory retirement rules reignite risks debate • Proposed revisions of mandatory pilot retirement rules are reigniting a debate over the risks of aging pilots. Mandatory pilot retirement regulations are in the spotlight as battles over age limits rage anew. Previously, these issues largely bypassed the business aviation world, because retirement age regulations established by many agencies worldwide apply solely to airline operations. The effort to raise the standard from 65 to 67 years through the latest FAA reauthorization package is simply the newest clash over Part 121 retirement rules. But for the first time, mandated retirement has come to the Part 135 air taxi/air charter realm, as NetJets, following a recent law change, this year imposed a retirement age of 70 for its pilots. Many arguments for keeping, raising, or scrapping the mandatory retirement age have been offered over the decades, but the most contentious continue to be safety-based: those favoring age limits for safety’s sake cite scientific acceptance of cognitive declines associated with aging; advocates of relaxing the rules note the lack of data linking accidents and pilot age that would justify retirement mandates. Their ongoing campaigns have embroiled regulators, operators, pilots, safety professionals, and many others for the majority of the more than 100 years since age limits came to aviation. The International Commission for Air Navigation established the first age limit for pilots in 1919, set at 45 years, but the stricture may not have fit well with the quickly evolving industry. When the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the global regulator of international airline operations, assumed the commission’s responsibilities in 1947, the age restriction was removed. In the absence of regulatory limits, in the late 1950s, U.S. airlines sought to impose their own mandatory retirement policies. At the time, jets were replacing piston fleets (the pilots’ union, Air Line Pilots Association, or ALPA, signed its first jet contract—for National Airlines’ DC-8 fleet—in 1958), and with a supply of young, military-trained jet pilots available, management at major carriers began raising questions about older (and more highly paid) pilots’ ability to transition to turbine aircraft. Return of Age Limits In 1958, American Airlines, TWA, and Western Airlines instituted an age-60 mandatory retirement, citing additional costs of training and concerns about declining mental capabilities. Pilots at all three carriers filed labor grievances in response. That same year, Congress created the Federal Aviation Agency (now the Federal Aviation Administration/FAA), with the responsibility for civil aviation safety. Surely, retirement policy and regulation would have been key issues confronting the new agency. Meanwhile, the airlines’ retirement disputes were sent to binding arbitration for resolution, where all three of the companies were ruled in violation of fair labor law. The Western Airlines arbitrator said the evidence didn’t support the carrier’s contention “that it is unsafe to let a pilot perform after the age of 60” or “that the attainment of age 60 is in itself enough to disqualify a pilot.” American Airlines alone refused to comply with the ruling, which helped spark a pilots’ strike that the airline settled in early 1959. Shortly after that, American’s CEO, C.R. Smith, sent a private missive to the head of the FAA, Elwood Quesada—the two were close friends, having served together in the Army Air Force during World War II—advocating a government-mandated retirement age. Whatever the impact of Smith’s entreaty, soon thereafter the agency drafted a medical justification for mandatory retirement, and by year’s end the age 60 rule was published. The following year, the International Air Transport Association (IATA), a global representative of airlines’ interests, recommended that its members incorporate the same benchmark, and in 1963 ICAO adopted an age-60 pilot retirement standard, based on perceived risks of sudden incapacitation, according to ICAO. (Not all countries have followed ICAO’s recommendation: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, New Zealand, Senegal, and Ukraine are among the members that have no Part 121 retirement mandates, though their 65-and-older pilots are barred from nations ascribing to ICAO age standards. Japan, amid a long-term pilot shortage, raised the retirement age from 65 to 68 in 2015.) Over succeeding years, calls to raise or abolish the limit continued, and ICAO periodically reviewed and left in place the age-60 standard, even as advances in healthcare quantifiably extended the vitality of aging populations throughout the developed world. Aging Science With U.S. airline traffic rebounding after 9/11 early in this century and concerns about a possible pilot shortage growing, the Senate directed the FAA to revisit the issue of pilot age and accidents. The agency’s Civil Aeromedical Institute (now the Civil Aerospace Medical Institute) published four reports in response. Two, published in 2003, examined pilot age and accident rates, the first focusing on ATP pilots, the second analyzing both ATP and commercial pilots, and both including accident data from Part 135 pilots aged 60 to 63. The reports’ conclusions were filled with caveats. However, the first found, “The overall tests suggest that mean accident rates did not differ statistically by age group,” while the second determined that “the main effect for age was statistically significant in all analyses.” A third report was simply a bibliography of research and publications on pilot age and performance conducted during the 1990s, and the fourth was a statistical analysis of the data used by the Chicago Tribune in a 1999 article that reported airline accidents were spread evenly among all pilot age groups. One of the FAA’s conclusions in this last report resonates even today amid debates about links between pilot age and safety risks: “…More comprehensive investigations are warranted. There are important technical issues that must be carefully considered in order to conduct a more definitive, and informative, analysis with regard to Age 60.” These four reports were written more than 20 years ago, before airline pilots were permitted to fly until age 65, and remain the only pilot age-related research the FAA has conducted. Support for relaxing retirement rules, meanwhile, gained more traction in the international community. In 2006, following a policy review by its Technical Commission, ICAO determined that although incapacitation risk increases with age—the basis for its age 60 rule—“the risk of incapacitation[-]cause accident is less now than in the 1970s,” because of improved life expectancy and medical technologies. Accordingly, ICAO raised the standard retirement age to 65 for multi-crew operations, when paired with a second crewmember under age 60. The U.S. was among a small minority (16 percent) of the organization’s almost 200 members that favored maintaining the age-60 rule due to possible safety risks. But despite the U.S. defense of the status quo, by the next year, the FAA and ALPA reversed their backing for the age 60 rule, and Congress set 65 as the new limit in 2007’s Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act. The Business Aviation Path Fast forward a decade. In 2018, NetJets declared, “The lack of a pilot age restriction for large private air carriers is a growing concern in aviation safety,” and that same year Congress proposed establishing mandatory retirement rules for Part 135 and Part 91K (fractional ownership) operators. The proposed law would have applied only to those flying 150,000 or more flight operations per year—a benchmark that NetJets alone, operating the world’s largest fleet of business jets, met. Though the proposal was scrapped that year, it resurfaced in the omnibus spending bill adopted by Congress in December 2022, with two key changes. First, the operational threshold was halved; any operator flying at least 75,000 jet operations annually may establish a retirement age of 70 for its pilots. Second, the policy is optional for qualifying operators. Once instituted, however, a mandatory retirement policy can’t be reversed. NetJets implemented the policy in January, reportedly affecting fewer than 100 of the company’s some 3,100 pilots. A request by a group of pilots for a preliminary injunction blocking the policy implementation was denied, as the court deemed the plaintiffs’ case unlikely to succeed. NetJets declined to comment on its new policy, and the NetJets Association of Shared Aircraft Pilots, the pilots’ union, also declined to comment, citing potential pending litigation. Even after cutting the initial proposal’s qualifying flight-operations threshold in half—to 75,000 operations—only three additional operators qualify: Flexjet, Vista Global, and Wheels Up. “Flexjet has opted against implementing the rule,” said Joe Salata, that company’s senior vice president of flight operations. “We do not have any reason to force retirement when the pilots remain healthy and qualified.” Vista America president Dave Stanley sidestepped the retirement policy question but said that the company’s training, in-house programs, and proficiency checks for its pilots ensure “their continued proficiency and competence.” Wheels Up declined to address the topic. The Flight Safety Foundation followed the development of the Part 135 retirement policy, finding it without medical justification. “We’re interested in data-driven provisions, based on stringent medical requirements, and I don’t believe the age of 70 is data-driven,” said Hassan Shahidi, president and CEO. Advances in medical technology, diagnostic capability, and health data analysis should be harnessed to “make sure that pilots are assessed appropriately, and the right decisions are made in terms of their suitability to fly, regardless of age,” Shahidi said. The National Air Transportation Association (NATA), while taking no position on the new retirement rule, also sees no evidence of risk reduction in the retirement mandate. “What data is telling you that safety has been marginalized because of [age]?” NATA’s v-p of regulatory affairs, Alan Stephens, asked rhetorically. “That’s where the logic behind the argument [for age limits] begins to fall apart.” That same absence of evidence appears to apply to the Part 91 world. “We have examined NTSB accident data and cannot find any correlation between age and safety,” said the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), whose members are mostly general aviation pilots, unencumbered by regulatory age limits. But today, insurance underwriters “are not renewing policies or quoting exorbitant premiums” once pilots hit 70, even with impeccable safety and health records, AOPA said, forcing many to stop flying. The new Part 135/91K retirement mandate was not the first effort to put business aviation operations under federal age limits. In 1980, amidst a rapid expansion in air charter activity, the NTSB, citing three unspecific accidents, told the FAA it had found “significant medical problems involving pilots more than 60 years old,” and recommended that Part 121 age limits “should be equally and immediately applied to Part 135 operations.” Noting that previous studies on the link between aging and human performance “have generally been inconclusive,” the NTSB also recommended that the agency undertake its own studies to establish an appropriate age limit for charter pilots. Concurrently, the National Institute of Health (NIH) was conducting a congressionally mandated study examining whether mandatory retirement for pilots aged 60 or older was medically warranted, and the two aviation organizations agreed to review the NIH report’s results before proceeding. The NIH concluded that insufficient precise and reliable data existed for determining the medical appropriateness of mandatory retirement ages, or understanding how the data could be medically evaluated to make such determinations. Citing these results to the safety board, the FAA declined to change its retirement regulations, and after several attempts to get the agency to reverse that decision, in 1984 the NTSB classified its Part 135 mandatory retirement recommendation as “Closed—unacceptable action.” The Negotiations Negotiations over the five-year FAA reauthorization making its way through Congress have been the latest retirement age battleground. Sparked by concerns that a pilot shortage could impact service to smaller communities, the House version of the bill initially proposed raising the Part 121 retirement age from 65 to 67 before it was removed to ensure swift progress on the bill. However, the issue still had become a sticking point in the Senate. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina), a leading supporter, minimized any potential safety impact, noting that when the limit was raised from 60 to 65 in 2007, “The sky did not fall.” Not taking any chances, when the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee brought the reauthorization package up for consideration, FAA Administrator Michael Whitaker wrote committee leaders, stating, “…Other countries have not conducted research before increasing their upper age limit, but in the United States, we have the largest, most complex system in the world.” Before increasing the retirement age, Whitaker said, “It is crucial to provide the agency an opportunity to conduct research and determine mitigations.” ALPA restated its opposition, labeling the alleged pilot shortage a “fake problem,” and charging that the change would disrupt airlines’ operations and training, and raise ticket prices. The Senate Commerce Committee, like the House, left the retirement age unmentioned in its FAA funding proposal, making any change an uphill battle. But not leaving anything to chance, ALPA waged a major lobbying campaign in March, taking out ads in publications read by lawmakers to object to any policy change. ICAO and its age 65 standard will be the next theater for the campaign’s opposing forces, coming later this year. IATA, representing almost 300 carriers, in 2022 submitted a paper to the organization, “Upper Age Limit for Pilots,” that suggests scrapping Part 121 pilot age limits entirely. “The demand for commercial pilots is expected to exceed supply,” IATA’s paper said, and the time had come to “revisit legacy age limitation requirements to ensure that they remain fit for purpose, do not represent an unjustified barrier to employment for these critical workers, and do not constitute de facto age discrimination.” The proposal is scheduled to come before the organization’s 193 member states for consideration at this September’s General Assembly in Montreal. https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/air-transport/2024-04-01/pilot-age-and-safety-looking-links American Airlines plane hit a parked aircraft while leaving a gate at PHL The American Airlines plane, which was headed to Charlotte, had crew and customers deplane and both the aircrafts were taken out of service to be inspected by maintenance Two airplanes are now out of service at the Philadelphia International Airport after one of them clipped the other. An American Airlines spokesperson said a flight from Philly to Charlotte was pushing back from a gate on Monday when it hit a parked plane. Everyone on the plane had to exit and no one was hurt. Now, both planes are being inspected. An American Airlines plane made contact with another aircraft while departing from the Philadelphia International Airport on Monday morning. A spokesperson with the airline said that during pushback when the aircraft was leaving the gate, the wing tip made contact with a parked aircraft. The American Airlines plane, which was headed to Charlotte, had crew and customers deplane and both the aircrafts were taken out of service to be inspected by maintenance. There were no injuries reported to customers or crew, officials said. The airline said it was working to get the people who were flying on that plane to their destination. The original flight 847 was set for 10:31 a.m. The flight was rescheduled to 2:35 p.m., according to the American Airlines site. At this time there is no word from officials on what caused the plane to hit the parked aircraft. https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/american-airlines-plane-hit-a-parked-aircraft-while-leaving-a-gate-at-philadelphia-international-airport/3818581/ FAA Rules Aside, U.S. Shops Prepare For SMS The FAA remains undecided about whether to require organizationwide safety management systems for its 5,000 certified repair stations, but the global footprint of many U.S.-based shops leaves them with no choice. Transport Canada (TC) and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) both require safety management systems (SMS) for MRO shops. TC’s mandate does not cover all shops now, but that will soon change. EASA’s requirement kicks in this December, when MRO providers are expected to have their SMS implemented. Neither regulator is stopping at a domestic mandate. The next update to maintenance annex guidance (MAG) that supplements the U.S.-European Union aviation safety bilateral is expected to include SMS requirements for more than 1,000 U.S.-based shops with EASA approval. MAG 10, as it is called, is slated for publication this year, with a likely implementation date in 2025. The good news for affected U.S. shops: EASA is expected to agree that an SMS meeting the FAA’s current voluntary standards will suffice. About 20 U.S.-based shops have an approved SMS, and 50 more are setting them up or awaiting the FAA’s sign-off. TC, an early SMS adopter among regulators, has required them for most large certificate holders for more than a decade. In the maintenance world, the mandate started with shops that serve airlines. The regulator is both revamping and expanding its SMS mandate. Among the certificate holders expected to be affected by expansion are smaller maintenance organizations, including component shops, TC Chief of Operational Airworthiness Jeffrey Phipps said at the recent Aeronautical Repair Station Association (ARSA) conference. He also confirmed that TC plans to work SMS requirements into bilateral agreements. “All of our international agreements are being updated to include SMS as part of any revision or any new agreement,” he said. TC has no timeline on the SMS expansion, but a revamp of its requirements is underway. Canada’s early foray into SMS for aviation meant its certificate holders would generate many of the initial lessons learned. A 2018 evaluation of SMS performance in Canada helped codify these lessons and guide TC in improving its regulations. Among the key takeaways: Integrating SMS into different parts of the regulations, such as listing airline SMS requirements in Canadian Aviation Regulations (CAR) Part 700’s Commercial Air Services chapter, is too cumbersome. Instead, TC will consolidate them within CAR Part 107’s SMS chapter. “The thought moving forward is that CAR 107 will be developed [and] simplified, and it will be the stand-alone SMS requirement for Transport Canada,” Phipps said. “So depending on the certificate you have in the future, those certificate holders will be required to comply with CAR 107 instead of putting SMS into each certificate regulatory framework.” TC also will move away from tailoring SMS to be scalable. While many saw scalability as vital during the development of SMS, the current view is that a single set of clear standards with sufficient guidance is most important. Organizations of different sizes may use various methods to meet the rules, but the standards themselves should be consistent. What will the standards look like? One good bet is that they will emphasize embedding SMS throughout an organization, including in business-only functions that seemingly lack any direct ramifications on a company’s aviation safety-related functions. Another is that they will stress front-line training. Simply put, an SMS is effective only if the entire organization, especially top management, supports it unequivocally and front-line workers understand it clearly. The ramifications of getting this wrong are detailed in a March 2024 report by 24 industry subject matter experts brought together to review Boeing’s safety culture, including its voluntary SMS. The panel found that Boeing’s SMS aligns well with accepted standards, notably International Civil Aviation Organization Annex 19, which lays out the basics of what one should contain. But most of Boeing’s documentation does a poor job of explaining SMS concepts to employees or helping them understand their role. The panel’s final report contains 53 recommendations, 17 of which address SMS-related shortcomings or improvement opportunities. The FAA, which has fixed its safety-related spotlight on Boeing after a string of quality-related problems pointing to organizationwide issues, gave the manufacturer until the end of May to craft a plan addressing the panel’s recommendations. As for the U.S. agency, it is busily wrapping up its latest SMS rule, which will apply to manufacturers, among others. An SMS has long been required for airlines, and the voluntary programs for others, including MRO shops, are important for international harmonization. While the expert panel’s report largely targeted Boeing, it contains FAA-centric recommendations the agency plans to heed. “We are going to take that from an agency perspective and take it on as an agency initiative,” Dan Elgas, acting deputy director of the FAA’s Policy and Innovation Division, told an ARSA audience. “We are going to use what’s in that report to influence how we implement SMS and how we address the recommendations.” https://aviationweek.com/mro/safety-ops-regulation/faa-rules-aside-us-shops-prepare-sms Korean Air finalises order for 33 A350s Toulouse, 2 April 2024 - Korean Air has become a new customer for the A350 Family following the signature of a firm order with Airbus for 33 aircraft. The order covers 27 A350-1000s and six A350-900s. Offering the longest range of any aircraft, the A350 will be able to operate any of the airline’s current intercontinental routes with a 25% reduction in fuel consumption and carbon emissions compared to previous generation aircraft. The additional range of the A350 will also enable the carrier to evaluate new long haul destinations. “The A350’s exceptional range, fuel efficiency and passenger comfort make it a great fit for our global network,” said Jason Yoo, Chief Safety and Operating Officer and EVP at Korean Air. “We are confident that the introduction of the A350 to our fleet will drive operational efficiencies and elevate the overall travel experience for our passengers.” Benoit de Saint Exupéry, EVP Sales, Commercial Aircraft, Airbus said: “This order from Korean Air is another major endorsement for the A350 as the world’s long range leader. The airline will benefit from new levels of efficiency across its operations, with significantly reduced fuel consumption and carbon emissions. The A350 will also be the perfect platform for the carrier to take its in-flight product and world class service to new heights. We thank Korean Air for its ongoing confidence in Airbus and its products, and look forward to seeing the A350 flying in the carrier’s iconic livery.” The A350 Family is the world’s most modern widebody product line and is firmly established as the world’s long range leader, with passenger versions able to fly up to 9,700 nm / 18,000 km non-stop. Powered by latest generation Rolls-Royce engines, the airframe uses 70% advanced materials such as composites, titanium, and modern aluminium alloys to create a lighter and more cost-efficient aircraft. All of which results in an average reduction in fuel consumption and carbon emissions of around 25% compared with similar sized previous generation aircraft. At the end of February, the A350 Family had won 1,240 orders from 59 customers worldwide. https://www.airbus.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2024-04-korean-air-finalises-order-for-33-a350s Contractor crushed by T-38 jet suffered broken ribs, spinal fractures A civilian maintainer was hospitalized for nearly a week with multiple broken bones and other injuries after the nose of a T-38A Talon training jet collapsed on him at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico, in February 2023, according to an Air Force investigation. The unnamed contractor was lubricating the Talon’s landing gear as part of routine maintenance on the jet, assigned to the 509th Bomb Wing at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, when he removed a safety pin that caused the nose gear to retract as he worked on the plane, the service concluded in an investigation report published March 28. The Talon’s nose crushed the man for several minutes, breaking several ribs and leaving him with spinal fractures. It took seven people to lift the aircraft off of him; he was airlifted to a hospital in Texas. Aircraft damages cost more than $116,000 to repair, the report said. The Talon’s forward nose landing gear door, an antenna, forward fuselage and pitot boom, which calculates speed, were damaged in the accident, which was classified as a “Class B” mishap. Class B incidents cause between $600,000 and $2.5 million in damages, permanent partial disability or inpatient hospitalization of three or more personnel, or a combination of those factors. The maintainer worked for Texas-based M1 Support Services, a contractor that maintains T-38s for the 49th Maintenance Group at Holloman. He was qualified to work on fighter jets, and had several years of experience working on helicopters with the Alaska Air National Guard. However, the accident report noted that the contractor’s tendency to deviate from required maintenance guidance and procedures “substantially contributed” to the mishap. His errors included removing the safety pin, which locks the landing gear in place, while the aircraft was not suspended by jacks; applying grease to the aircraft by putting it on his hand, instead of using a lube gun; and pulling on components with “noticeable force” when the Talon began to fall, according to the report. He also failed to review aircraft maintenance forms and perform a safety check before beginning his work that day, investigators said. In addition, the Air Force found that the maintainer had signed off on paperwork for a pre-flight check on a different aircraft earlier in the day, writing that the work was done at 6 p.m. He had already been taken to a hospital by 4 p.m. that day. Investigators also noted that M1 Support Services had slipped in regularly turning around flight-ready aircraft, based on the company’s own records, but said the contractor’s operational tempo wasn’t a factor in last year’s mishap. No personnel appeared to be lacking in training or maintenance qualifications. Investigators also found that though the mishap aircraft’s nose wheel and tire assembly were replaced earlier in the month because of a wobble, that didn’t contribute to the accident. M1 Support Services declined to comment. The Air Force operates a fleet of more than 500 supersonic T-38s, which are used to train American and foreign fighter and bomber pilots. The service is planning to eventually replace the six-decade old Talons with the T-7 Red Hawk. The jet weighs more than 6,600 pounds, according to the Smithsonian Institution’s National Air and Space Museum. Its maximum takeoff weight can reach about 12,000 pounds when loaded with fuel and additional equipment. https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2024/04/01/contractor-crushed-by-t-38-jet-suffered-broken-ribs-spinal-fractures/ United Airlines is asking pilots to take time off in May because of a shortage of new Boeing planes United Airlines is asking its pilots to take time off in May because of delays in receiving new planes that the airline ordered from Boeing, which is struggling with production due to manufacturing problems. A United spokesperson said Monday that the offer is voluntary. “Due to the recent delays in Boeing deliveries, our forecasted (flight hours) have been reduced and we are offering our pilots voluntary programs for the month of May to reduce excess staffing,” spokesperson Leslie Scott said. In a note to pilots obtained by The Associated Press, United said it expects to make similar requests during the summer and possibly into the fall. The Air Line Pilots Association said United is offering short-term leaves and unpaid time off, but they are not mandatory. Boeing declined to comment. United doesn't expect to get all the Boeing jetliners it ordered and was due to receive this year or next year. A month ago, United said it was contractually due 191 planes this year and 127 next year but expects to receive only 88 this year and 64 in 2025. Almost all of the shortfall consists of Boeing 737 Max planes, including a new, larger model. United had planned to begin flying 80 Max 10 jets this year. The Federal Aviation Administration has not yet certified the Max 10, however, and FAA approval is likely to be further delayed by increased scrutiny of Boeing since a panel blew out of an Alaska Airlines Max 9 in January. United is considering options to replace orders for the Max 10. Since the Alaska Airlines accident, federal regulators have been investigating production quality issues at Boeing, and the FAA has barred Boeing from increasing production of 737 Max jets. United previously said that it expects to lose money in the first quarter because its Max 9s were grounded for inspections for three weeks after the blowout on the Alaska plane. The Chicago-based airline is scheduled to release financial results April 16. United CEO Scott Kirby is one of several airline executives who have called out problems at Boeing and sought a meeting with Boeing directors. Boeing announced last week that CEO David Calhoun will step down at the end of the year as part of a leadership shakeup at the company. The head of Boeing's commercial-airplanes unit has already been replaced, and the chairman of the board will not stand for reelection in May. https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/united-airlines-asking-pilots-time-154314452.html Call for Nominations For 2024 Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Award ALEXANDRIA, Va. -- The Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Foundation is now accepting nominations for the 2024 Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Award, honoring a leader in global aviation safety. The Award will be presented during the 77th Annual International Air Safety Summit, taking place November 5 – 7 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Presented annually since 1956, the Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Award recognizes notable achievement in the field of civil or military aviation safety in method, design, invention, study, or other improvement. The Award's recipient is selected for a "significant individual or group effort contributing to improving aviation safety, with emphasis on original contributions," and a "significant individual or group effort performed above and beyond normal responsibilities." Mechanics, engineers, and others outside of top administrative or research positions should be especially considered. The contribution need not be recent, especially if the nominee has not received adequate recognition. Nominations that were not selected as past winners may be resubmitted for consideration in subsequent years. Please note that self-nominations will not be considered. The Award Committee, composed of leaders in the field of aviation, meets each year to conduct a final review of nominees and selection of the current year's recipient. Please help us identify and honor this year's most deserving recipient. Nominations, including a 1-to-2-page narrative, can be submitted via the Laura Taber Barbour Foundation website at http://ltbaward.org/the-award/nomination-form/. Nominations will be accepted through June 2, 2024. For more information, including a complete history of Award recipients, see www.ltbaward.org. About the Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Foundation and Award The Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Award's story dates back almost 80 years. On April 14, 1945, after visiting family in Pittsburgh, Laura Taber Barbour was aboard a Pennsylvania Central Airlines DC-3 when it crashed into the rugged terrain of Cheat Mountain near Morgantown, West Virginia. All passengers and crew were killed. In 1956 her husband, Dr. Clifford E. Barbour and son, Clifford E. Barbour, Jr., in close association with The Flight Safety Foundation, established the Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Award in her honor. For the past 68 years, this distinguished award recognizing outstanding achievements in aviation safety worldwide has been presented at Flight Safety Foundation’s International Aviation Safety Summit. In 2013, The Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Foundation was formed as an independent non-profit charitable organization composed of members of the Award Board, the aviation community, and the Barbour family. In addition to the annual presentation of the award, in 2019 the Foundation initiated a scholarship program that supports worthy students pursuing professional aviation studies. As the Foundation broadens its scope, the Laura Taber Barbour Air Safety Award will continue to recognize those who significantly contributed to aviation safety. For more information on the Foundation, the award, and past winners, visit http://LTBAward.org CALENDAR OF EVENTS • 2024 ACSF Safety Symposium – Air Charter Safety Foundation - April 1-3, 2024 • Blazetech - Aircraft Fire Hazards, Protection, and Investigation Course June 4 - 7, 2024 • (APTSC) Asia and Pacific Turboprop Safety Conference - June 26 - 27, 2024 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia • Airborne Public Safety Association, Inc. (APSCON 2024) - July 29 - August 3; Houston TX • Asia Pacific Airline Training Symposium - APATS 2024, 0-11 September, 2024, Singapore • Aircraft Cabin Air International Conference - 17 & 18 September - London • 2024 Ground Handling Safety Symposium (GHSS) - September 17-18, 2024 - Fort Worth, TX • 2024 ISASI - Lisbon, Portugal - September 30 to October 4, 2024 • International Congress of Aerospace Medicine ICAM 2024 in Lisbon, Portugal, 3 - 5 October 2024 • Aviation Health Conference back on Monday 7th and Tuesday 8th October 2024 • 2024 NBAA Business Aviation Convention & Exhibition - Oct. 22-24 (Vegas) Curt Lewis