Flight Safety Information - April 09, 2024 No. 072 In This Issue : Incident: Fastjet E145 at Victoria Falls on Apr 6th 2024, cabin did not pressurize : Incident: Flydubai B38M at Dubai on Apr 7th 2024, could not fully retract gear : Aircraft Cabin Air International Conference - 17 & 18 September - London : Incident: Singapore A388 at Sydney on Apr 7th 2024, flaps problems : New method for detecting unusual air turbulence holds promise for aviation safety : FAA’s ‘cozy’ relationship with Boeing at issue again after Alaska Air blowout : NTSB Adds Two New Members To Bring The Board to Full Strength : New AI Search Tool Scans Flight Manuals for Pilots : American Airlines Begins Cockpit Display Retrofits On Over 170 Airbus A320 Family Aircraft : Global Aerospace's SM4 Aviation Safety Program Offers Insights on FAR Part 91 Safety and SMS Implementation : United Airlines delays flights on two new routes amid FAA safety probe : Spirit Airlines furloughs 260 pilots to save money : PhD GRADUATE RESEARCH SURVEY : CALENDAR OF EVENTS Incident: Fastjet E145 at Victoria Falls on Apr 6th 2024, cabin did not pressurize A Fastjet Embraer ERJ-145, flight FN-8006 from Victoria Falls to Harare (Zimbabwe), was climbing through FL160 out of Victoria Falls when the crew observed a pressurization failure and descended the aircraft back to 10,000 feet. The aircraft returned to Victoria Falls for a safe landing. The airline reported the aircraft returned due to a pressurization failure while climbing through 16,000 feet. https://avherald.com/h?article=5172a9d4&opt=0 Incident: Flydubai B38M at Dubai on Apr 7th 2024, could not fully retract gear A Flydubai Boeing 737-8 MAX, registration A6-FKH performing flight FZ-17 from Dubai (United Arab Emirates) to Doha (Qatar), was climbing out of Dubai's runway 30L when the crew stopped the climb at 9000 feet and decided to return to Dubai due to being unable to fully retract the landing gear. The aircraft landed safely on Dubai's runway 34L about 25 minutes after departure. A replacement Boeing 737-8 MAX registration A6-FKB reached Doha with a delay of about 3:50 hours. The occurrence aircraft returned to service about 18 hours after landing back. https://avherald.com/h?article=5172a3c5&opt=0 Incident: Singapore A388 at Sydney on Apr 7th 2024, flaps problems A Singapore Airlines Airbus A380-800, registration 9V-SKM performing flight SQ-232 from Sydney,NS (Australia) to Singapore (Singapore) with 474 passengers and 27 crew, was climbing out of Sydney's runway 34L when the crew stopped the climb at 10,000 feet reporting problems with the flaps. The aircraft returned to Sydney for a safe landing on runway 34L about 75 minutes after departure. The aircraft remained on the ground in Sydney for about 4:15 hours, then departed again and reached Singapore with a delay of about 5 hours. The airline reported a technical issue linked to the aircraft's flaps prompted the return to Sydney. https://app.constantcontact.com/pages/dashboard/home New method for detecting unusual air turbulence holds promise for aviation safety With air turbulence presenting a significant safety concern in civil aviation, especially amidst the growing impacts of climate change and the expansion of the aviation industry, the need for effective monitoring and mitigation strategies has become paramount. Traditionally, the eddy dissipation rate (EDR) has served as the standard metric for assessing turbulence in aviation. However, a new study published in Advances in Atmospheric Sciences proposes a novel approach by employing a symbolic classification approach based on genetic programming, aiming to detect turbulence anomalies directly from quick access recorders (QARs) aboard aircraft. QARs are airborne flight data recorders designed to capture environmental, equipment, and operational parameters throughout a flight, providing valuable insights into flight conditions. Hongying Zhang from Civil Aviation University of China, the corresponding author of the study, says, "QAR data are a standard feature in modern aircraft, so our method eliminates the need for direct EDR computation, making it universally applicable and easily implementable across the aviation sector." In essence, the integration of symbolic classifiers into turbulence monitoring systems holds significant promise for enhancing civil aviation safety amid escalating environmental and operational challenges. "By integrating symbolic classifiers into turbulence monitoring systems, we can streamline the detection process and improve the accuracy of identifying turbulence anomalies," says co-author Pak-Wai Chan from Hong Kong Observatory. Air turbulence poses a tangible threat to flight safety, necessitating innovative approaches for its detection and mitigation. The findings of this research provide a reliable and efficient method for identifying turbulence anomalies, by leveraging existing data sources and advanced classification techniques. Airlines and aviation authorities can then enhance their capacity to ensure passenger comfort and prevent potential losses associated with turbulence-related incidents. While the current method focuses on detecting the presence or absence of turbulence anomalies, future research aims to refine the approach by developing multi-classifiers for classifying turbulence levels, according to the research team. Additionally, efforts will be directed toward building regression models to estimate the severity of turbulence, further enhancing the safety and efficiency of air travel. https://techxplore.com/news/2024-04-method-unusual-air-turbulence-aviation.html FAA’s ‘cozy’ relationship with Boeing at issue again after Alaska Air blowout “At the FAA, they talked about being a partnership,” a former employee said. “I would call it more of an abusive-spouse relationship.” Following the crashes of two 737 MAX jets that left more than 300 people dead and Boeing’s reputation for safety in tatters, Congress held probing hearings that unmasked limp and malleable federal oversight of how American planes are built. While the flying public enjoyed the safest decade on record until the crashes five years ago, Boeing capitalized by persistently convincing the Federal Aviation Administration to narrow its scrutiny of the company’s factory floor, former employees of the company and its chief regulator told The Seattle Times. With each passing year, the FAA ceded a little more of its authority by deputizing manufacturers like Boeing to police the quality of their own work. Congress held hearings in 2020 investigating the twinned tragedies in Ethiopia and Indonesia, crashes caused primarily by engineering mistakes at Boeing. The panel reached the conclusion that Boeing — not the FAA — was comfortably piloting its own regulatory fate, and demanded a course correction. Internal communications between Boeing and the FAA, testimony from experts who’d seen Boeing’s manipulation of the FAA, and surveys of FAA employees uncovered during that 2020 inquiry showed technical design flaws and faulty assumptions about pilot responses, as well as management failures by both Boeing and the FAA, were instrumental in the chain of errors that led to the crashes. Years have passed since his committee issued that report, but former U.S. Rep. Peter DeFazio says the government still hasn’t solved its Boeing problem. “You’ve got to turn this company around because it’s a mess,” the Oregon Democrat said recently. “The worst part of the equation is Boeing, but it will take political pushing because there’s so much inertia there.” DeFazio’s hearings resulted in a new law — the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act — and FAA promises to strictly monitor the quality of Boeing aircraft. But critics of the FAA now say the slow action on those legislated changes and promises have meant alarmingly little. “Since ACSAA became law, Boeing has supported implementation of the legislation, including providing full transparency for the FAA’s expert review panel in its evaluation of our safety culture and other safety measures,” Boeing said in a statement responding to questions from The Times. “Over the past several years, we’ve taken a number of significant actions to strengthen our safety practices and culture. “We put safety and quality above all else, and continue to make significant changes to our culture, production and processes as we strive to improve.” Four years on from the hearings, Boeing and the FAA face a new round of questions on Capitol Hill about the midflight blowout of a fuselage panel from an Alaska Airlines MAX 9 plane in January. As Boeing and the FAA stand at another crisis-induced crossroads for the future of commercial air travel, safety engineers who worked at Boeing and FAA, and some families whose loved ones were killed in the MAX crashes, point to the latest mishap as evidence of scant progress. They accuse Boeing of continuing to stiff-arm accountability measures ever since the hearings, and the government of easing its pressure on the manufacturer. “Congress changed because it was forced to after our crashes by persistent families, persistent media coverage and the biggest investigation in the history” of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Michael Stumo, whose 24-year-old daughter, Samya Rose Stumo, died in the March 2019 Ethiopia Air crash, said in a phone interview from his home in Massachusetts. “It was very surprising how quickly that ebbed. As soon as the news coverage went away, that ebbed.” Some Boeing critics wonder whether the promised reform will ever materialize in a meaningful way. Testimony and documents extracted from the FAA and Boeing for the 2020 hearings showed that employees of the company and its regulator flagged manufacturing irregularities only to be ignored. Congress acknowledged the phenomenon in passing the ACSAA of 2020, which among other provisions created a system for reporting interference with inspectors. The FAA recently concluded an audit of Boeing’s production line that an FAA spokesperson said exceeded the agency’s standard inspection process. It found Boeing out of compliance with its manufacturing process, storage and handling of parts and control over its products. Because it is part of the ongoing FAA investigation of Boeing, the FAA declined to release those findings. Implementation of the 2020 law is ongoing, according to the FAA. Most provisions are in the rule-making phase, when the agency creates regulations to meet the congressional mandate. But according to a spokesperson, the FAA has fulfilled the law’s requirements for reining in delegated authority, including a provision to root out instances when inspectors are pressured over their findings or recommendations. “One of the main objectives of [the 2020 legislation] was to force the FAA to exert greater control over the aircraft certification process and strengthen its oversight,” said U.S. Sen. Maria Cantwell, D-Wash. “While there has been some effective tightening of regulations around testing and evaluating pilot reactions in emergency situations, Boeing’s quality system issues demonstrate FAA still has a ways to go.” “This won’t be back to business as usual for Boeing,” FAA Administrator Mike Whitaker said in a written statement responding to questions from The Times. “They must commit to real and profound improvements. Making foundational change will require a sustained effort from Boeing’s leadership, and we are going to hold them accountable every step of the way.” Safety engineers and families affected by the crashes have expressed little faith in Boeing, the FAA or Congress because of the manufacturing giant’s persistent focus on profits and the clout it wields in the halls of power. “The FAA basically takes orders from Boeing. That’s been going on for the past 10, 15 years for sure,” said Joe Jacobsen, who worked for Boeing from 1984 to 1995 and then at the FAA for more than 15 years. “At the FAA, they talked about being a partnership [between the regulator and the company]. I would call it more of an abusive-spouse relationship.” FAA’s “customer” To find the origins of Boeing’s manufacturing troubles requires some history. Multiple former Boeing and FAA employees point to the McDonnell Douglas merger with Boeing in 1997 as the start of the current troubles. Almost immediately, McDonnell Douglas’s profit-driven ethos began to push safety aside, according to Jacobsen. He said that trajectory snowballed in the years following the merger. That’s supported by the congressional report from the 2020 hearings; it showed that pressure exerted on manufacturing workers by Boeing managers led to mistakes and stoked reluctance to acknowledge or fix them. “If you’re only looking at the next quarter’s financial statement, then everything gets pushed off,” Jacobsen said. A change in the way the FAA monitored aircraft manufacturing only fueled the problem. In 2005, the FAA, with the support of Congress, created a system for delegating oversight of the manufacturers to the manufacturers. While some measure of delegation had existed since the 1950s, the new system was designed to vastly expand the practice, and did. The new approach replaced a system of inspection that relied on specific individuals designated by the FAA to be its eyes on the factory floor. Suddenly, it redirected FAA inspectors’ eyes away from a narrow focus on specific work to a far broader approach that assessed compliance of manufacturing systems. “FAA managers used to call it ‘getting out of the critical path,’ ” recalled Mike Dostert, an engineer who worked at Boeing and later the FAA. Even before the aircraft manufacturers approached the government about expanded self-policing of their work, the FAA was moving in that direction, Dostert said. Boeing had decentralized its supply chain by selling off some of its component manufacturing operations, including Wichita, Kan.-based Spirit AeroSystems, where 737 fuselages are built before being shipped to Renton for assembly. The global diaspora of suppliers further obscured regulators’ view into manufacturing. “That business model saved Boeing money up front, but it created a real problem,” Dostert said. “I would go to meetings as an FAA rep and ask the engineers, ‘What about this?’ They’d say, ‘I don’t know, we have to ask the supplier.’ “ Suppliers didn’t always provide worthwhile answers. The supply chain’s impact on certification and regulation captured the spotlight in 2013, when Congress held hearings over a lithium battery fire in a Boeing 787 Dreamliner in Boston. The battery was built in Japan. The system it connected to was from France. And the FAA never visited either manufacturer. Instead, it took the word of Boeing and Boeing’s suppliers that everything would be fine. When it wasn’t, the FAA’s head of national aircraft certification at the time, Dorenda Baker, said, “it would virtually be impossible to keep up with industry” absent extensive delegation of oversight to the manufacturer. In 2011 and again in 2015 the Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of Congress, pointed out myriad flaws in the way the FAA delegated oversight authority to manufacturers. The 2015 GAO report that took aim at delegated authority said the FAA focused on meeting the minimum regulatory requirements, resulting in findings that seldom related to high-risk issues — those that could directly impact the potential loss of critical systems or other safety concerns. Instead, FAA regulators were chasing paperwork errors, like companies using their marketing names instead of their official names on their submissions. Despite the GAO’s criticism, the FAA moved in 2016 to expand its reliance on delegated authority to manufacturers — resulting in a more than 50% reduction in the direct involvement of FAA certification staff in reviews. Correspondence between union leaders and FAA managers showed Congress and the regulated industries wanted it that way. The warnings aside, FAA continued to expand its reliance on delegated oversight. But after a Boeing MAX 8 crashed into the Java Sea in October 2018 killing all 189 onboard, and another MAX 8 cost 157 people their lives when it crashed in Ethiopia, congressional hearings drew together a massive amount of evidence that delegation to the manufacturers had dramatically eroded safety. From the moment Congress began investigating the relationship between Boeing and its regulator, the chumminess was evident, according to DeFazio. “When we started the investigation, FAA was referring to Boeing as ‘a customer,’ I said, ‘They’re not your customer. You’re regulating in the interest of public safety,’” DeFazio said. “But they had evolved into this cozy relationship. They kept expanding the [delegation of authority] — less and less FAA regulation.” Surveys of FAA employees and managers in early 2020 unearthed by the hearings found “external pressure from industry is strong and is impacting safety culture.” Technical experts at the FAA said their safety recommendations were commonly ignored. Among the survey respondents, 43% did not believe the FAA appropriately delegated authority to people outside the agency. When Boeing couldn’t fix a problem on the factory floor, the company flexed its muscle on the floor of Congress or the executive offices of the FAA to seek grace instead, the House committee report showed. Employees and managers at the FAA described “pressure to find win-win solutions that benefit industry. Many reported that industry would escalate issues to senior [FAA] leadership and/or Congress if FAA employees were perceived as ‘getting in their way,’ which leads directly to decisions that are friendlier to industry.” “Somehow, the managers of the failed company that merged with Boeing became the top dogs at Boeing,” DeFazio said. “Now the corruption of Boeing by the McDonnell Douglas alums has been almost complete, and it’s going to take a lot to reverse it.” The Boeing lobby Boeing emerged from its beating in Congress saddled with new laws aimed at strengthening safety oversight and a deferred-prosecution agreement with the Justice Department that would stave off criminal penalties for the international crashes if the company showed improvement. Dostert, Stumo and others worry that attention to the oversight reforms has faded as time moved on from the international crashes. They said the FAA’s slow implementation of reforms and recent actions in Congress indicate that momentum for change has backslid. Dostert points to an outdated cockpit display on MAX models as a telling example of Boeing’s influence and the government’s waning interest. Even after the stinging hearings of 2020, Boeing resisted a standing requirement to modernize cockpit displays. “That’s a prime example of the effectiveness of the Boeing lobby, and the way the FAA will not regulate,” Dostert said. After decreasing between 2017 and 2018, the air transport industry that includes Boeing has increased its spending on lobbying each year since the international crashes of Boeing planes. Lobbying by that industry sector peaked at $137 million in 2023, according to the nonpartisan, nonprofit Center for Responsive Politics. From 2019 through the present, Boeing has spent more to influence decisions in Congress and federal agencies than any other player in that industry, committing more than $67 million to lobbying over the past five years. Over the past decade, Boeing’s corporate political action committee has pumped more than $25 million into federal election campaigns, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. Most of it went to Republican campaigns. Dostert and Jacobsen are on the advisory board of The Foundation for Aviation Safety, a nonprofit founded after the MAX crashes. It’s populated with concerned technical experts who hope to provide a counterweight to the aircraft manufacturing industry — Boeing in particular. The group minds and reports publicly disclosed manufacturing problems and flight anomalies, then issues recommendations for improving safety. DeFazio said he saw Boeing’s clout firsthand in Congress. “In part it’s a ‘too-big-to-fail’ mentality, that Boeing is so important to the nation. They were our leading export item in terms of value … I want them to succeed, but to succeed by selling a safe, quality product.” Reform, all over again Within a week of the January blowout, FAA Administrator Whitaker announced sweeping changes to the agency’s oversight of Boeing. “It’s time to reexamine the delegation authority and assess any associated safety risks,” Whitaker said in a distributed statement. On paper, Whitaker looks like other FAA administrators over the past 20 years who pass through the revolving door between the FAA and the C-suites of aerospace firms. But across the board, the Boeing critics interviewed by The Times expressed a measure of confidence in Whitaker. “He has his head on straight,” Stumo said. “He is taking a very strong position to reset the FAA as a regulator, and not a buddy of Boeing,” DeFazio said. “Whitaker seems to be saying the right things. It kind of made it easier to do that when the door blew off,” Jacobsen said. “I’m encouraged that Administrator Whitaker appears to be taking the issues and his responsibilities seriously and will force the necessary improvements,” Sen. Cantwell said. “We should all remember that FAA’s job must be compliance, not efficiencies.” Despite some cautious optimism about Whitaker, Stumo and the rest remain skeptical. “The FAA,” Stumo said, “their story remains to be written.” Last month, The Foundation for Aviation Safety provided virtual briefings to top leaders at the U.S. Department of Transportation and the FAA. In a blunt PowerPoint presentation, the foundation spotlighted Boeing’s delayed responses to corrective actions and data connecting 20 years’ worth of engineering failures to delegated oversight. “The FAA has enabled Boeing to cut corners and is continuing to enable this behavior,” the report said. The presenters are still waiting for a response. https://www.heraldnet.com/news/faas-cozy-relationship-with-boeing-at-issue-again-after-alaska-air-blowout/ NTSB Adds Two New Members To Bring The Board to Full Strength The NTSB is now up to a full complement of five members, including, (l-r) Tom Chapman, new member J. Todd Inman, Chair Jennifer Homendy, new member Alvin Brown, and Michael Graham. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has added two new members to bring the board to full strength at five. Alvin Brown and J. Todd Inman were nominated by President Joe Biden to fill two vacancies and were confirmed by the Senate. The slot filled by Brown runs through 2026 while Inman’s extends to 2027. Inman served at APCO Worldwide from July 2022, after serving as secretary of the Florida Department of Management Services. He was also a senior adviser and chief of staff to the former U.S. Transportation Secretary Elaine Chao. He earned a bachelor’s degree from the University of Mississippi. Brown earned bachelor’s and master’s degrees from Jacksonville University, and a second master’s degree in from the Duke Divinity School. He comes to the NTSB from the U.S. Department of Transportation, where he was a senior adviser on infrastructure opportunities. He also served as mayor of Jacksonville, Florida, from 2011 to 2015 and served as executive director of the White House Community Empowerment Board under Commerce Secretary Ron Brown. Alvin Brown and Inman join board members Michael Graham and Tom Chapman, along with NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy bringing the board to its full complement of five members. Homendy said, “I am pleased to have Alvin and Todd join our board and share their depth of experience in pursuing our mission of keeping people safe in every mode of transportation.” https://www.avweb.com/aviation-news/ntsb-adds-two-new-members-to-bring-the-board-to-full-strength/ New AI Search Tool Scans Flight Manuals for Pilots • Amelia AI is the first in a planned series of artificial intelligence features • Web Manuals Amelia AI document search tool uses artificial intelligence to retrieve relevant information from pilots' flight manuals. Web Manuals has launched a search tool using artificial intelligence (AI) for pilots’ flight manuals. According to the Swedish company, flight crewmembers will be able to ask questions via the platform to get descriptive answers from their manuals, helping them to quickly make well-informed operational decisions and potentially avoid flight diversions and delays. The Amelia AI system integrates natural language processing that can accelerate the process for understanding factors such as aircraft faults to support decisions over airworthiness. Once initial information from the manuals has been shared, pilots can continue to interrogate the platform to find out more details and assess the responses. For instance, Amelia AI can help the crew understand whether there are any applicable safety notices or bulletins that are relevant to a particular flight procedure they are working on. The pilots then get a summarized response based on the manuals along with sources referencing relevant content from the documents. As part of its security protections, the system only conducts searches within the documentation available to the user and relevant to their specific needs. It does not access any external public data. All responses provide specific references to parts of the manuals to ensure that users can validate the search results. Malmö-based Web Manuals said it plans to roll out other AI-based features for its services. Amelia AI will be released through the Web Manuals Core 2024.3 update, with additional features to be announced later this year. “Web Manuals’ Amelia AI document search system not only revolutionizes information retrieval processes but also underlines our ongoing commitment to delivering exceptional value and user satisfaction,” said the company’s chief technology officer, Richard Sandström. “This first feature of Amelia makes navigating through large amounts of operational and company manuals much more manageable and time efficient, with data retrieval within seconds.” Last week, the company announced the acquisition of another Swedish company called ManualAI which it said will help it to capitalize on the advantages AI can bring to digital documentation management. https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/business-aviation/2024-04-08/new-ai-search-tool-scans-flight-manuals-pilots American Airlines Begins Cockpit Display Retrofits On Over 170 Airbus A320 Family Aircraft The carrier expects the conversions will be performed over “the next few years.” SUMMARY • American Airlines is retrofitting the cockpits on some Airbus planes with modern liquid crystal displays. • The updates show the airline's commitment to safety and innovation. • The airline has over 160 Airbus aircraft that are over 20 years old. • American Airlines recently started retrofitting the cockpits on some of its Airbus aircraft. The Fort Worth, Texas-based airline said the upgrades enhance the safety of its pilots and reduce the planes' weight. It comes after the carrier announced last month that it would update the interior of its A319 and A320s. The development is yet another indicator that the airline does not have plans to retire some examples of the aging plane types, which have a combined average age of more than 40 years. “A crisper view” In an internal memo obtained by Simple Flying in late March, American shared that the first of 171 aircraft received “a major upgrade.” The cockpit overhaul, conducted on an A319 originally ordered by America West Airlines, introduced new liquid crystal displays (LCDs) seen on modern commercial aircraft. The aircraft, registered as N836AW, is 18 years old, according to ch-aviation. American said the new displays will provide pilots in the flight deck “with a crisper view of their flight instruments, which enhances safety.” The US legacy carrier also explained how the retrofits will result in saving fuel. “The new display system weighs nearly 100 lbs. less than the legacy cathode ray tube (CRT) displays they replace, bringing American aggregate fuel savings.” While many newer aircraft are built with modern displays, American is reportedly the first airline to convert the CRT displays to LCDs on Airbus aircraft, which it says underscores its “commitment to safety and innovation.” Analyzing AA’s Airbuses According to ch-aviation, the airline has a total of 133 A319s with an average age of 20.1 years and 48 A320s sharing an average age of 23 years. Its A321 fleet of 218 aircraft is much younger, with an average age of 11.7 years. With the exception of a subfleet of 32 aircraft, the carrier’s A319 fleet is mainly comprised of aircraft that formerly operated for airlines prior to subsequent mergers that formed the airline into what it is known as today. The plane’s respective tail numbers indicate their past lives as registrations ending with “AW” began service with America West, while the numbers ending with “US” or “UW” are aircraft that were ordered by US Airways. Many of these aircraft were delivered to the two carriers in the late 1990s. In fact, more than 80 examples are over 20 years old. The America West jets officially joined the US Airways aircraft in 2007 when the airlines merged. US Airways combined with American in 2013. More recently, American acquired additional A319s that were once operated by Frontier Airlines. Cleverly, the airline reregistered the aircraft with tail numbers ending with “XF.” Six ex-Frontier planes are also 20 years or older. The airline’s A320 fleet is a bit more simplified. 22 aircraft are legacy US Airways planes with “UW” registrations, and 26 are legacy America West jets bearing “AW” tail numbers. Remarkably, 40 planes are aged two decades or above. The oldest aircraft is 26 years old, while the youngest is only 14 years old. Over 160 aircraft are 20 years or older With a target of 171 aircraft, American is undoubtedly aiming to retrofit its oldest Airbus planes. Fleet data shows that 168 A320 family aircraft in the airline’s fleet are in their twenties: 98 A319s, 40 A320s, and 28 A321s. “These conversions of more aircraft will run for the next few years,” the airline explained. “Thanks to our team members across Tech Ops, Flight and Safety who worked tirelessly to bring this project to fruition.” Simultaneously, American will also work on upgrading the interior of its A319s and A320s. Last month, the carrier announced that it would install more first class seats on the planes. https://simpleflying.com/american-airlines-airbus-a320-cockpit-retrofits/ Global Aerospace's SM4 Aviation Safety Program Offers Insights on FAR Part 91 Safety and SMS Implementation FAR Part 91 Safety – Is It Time for a Wake-Up Call? Morris Plains, April 08, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- The FAR Part 91 sector of aviation has long enjoyed an admirable safety record. Business aviation has always been perceived as a very safe and efficient way to fly. aircraft waiting at hangar But much has happened in the world over the last few years that has impacted business aviation. Significant among the changes is a decrease in engagement caused by the downturn in flying during COVID and the outflow of talent to the airlines. So, what has been the impact of recent world events on business aviation, especially as it relates to safety? And what is the current state of safety in the business aviation industry sector? To get the latest perspective, we asked a randomly selected group of 19 current directors of aviation in the business aviation sector what they thought. Their answers to key questions are below. What is the level of engagement with the SMS within your flight department? This question sought visibility into how well the Safety Management System (SMS) is embedded within the flight department by functional group. The highest level of engagement was from flight operations, likely due to the pilot-centric focus of the registration standards. Lower levels of engagement were experienced from the Maintenance and Scheduling functional groups. Is your SMS proactive and effective? Here we probed how effective each aviation director thought their SMS is at finding and adequately addressing safety concerns. Many of them who answered “yes” to this question at the same time expressed some degree of reservation about the effectiveness of their SMS. These reservations included complacency and low utilization, therefore causing the overall effectiveness of the SMS to be below the level to which the department aspires. Another factor behind the high degree of affirmative responses could be the reluctance to acknowledge that their SMS is not as effective as it should be, especially given the level of effort that went into its establishment. What are the barriers to SMS implementation? According to respondents, the primary barriers reported to be in the way of effective SMS implementation are as follows: • Complacency toward use of SMS • Lack of trust in the ‘Just Culture’ • Non-uniform SMS deployment • Workload • Excessive time horizon to spot trends in Part 91 operations • Safety as a collateral duty vs. full-time position • Administrative burden in escalation of “the smaller stuff” What are the most significant safety concerns in Part 91 Today? This is the most alarming part of the survey feedback. The responses to this question came back largely in freeform style, but when nominally grouped, here’s what the aviation directors told us are their primary concerns about safety in the Part 91 world today. Aviation Director Group's Top Part 91 Safety Concerns table Talent Shortage The most significant safety concern in Part 91 operations noted was the talent shortage, particularly the airlines hiring experience away. It is becoming increasingly difficult to replace the pilots who are leaving with an equivalent level of expertise. Higher rates of attrition are seen to risk cohesiveness within the flight department, introducing elevated levels of risk even with high standards, strong processes, and well-defined procedures in place. The departure of highly experienced labor in an ever-tightening labor pool has resulted in less experience across the entire aviation system (ATC, flight operations, technical operations, ground handling, etc.). The belief is that the talent shortage is a factor in higher incident rates and increased stress on what was an already overstressed system. SMS Level of Effort This was the second most critical safety concern expressed, belief that the benefits of an SMS do not outweigh the efforts required for its establishment. Complacency Complacency and a lack of focus on the fundamentals was noted both in the flight department and in the oversight of external vendors and service providers. SOP Non-Compliance Alarmingly, many respondents cited a lack of strict adherence to stated standards and enforcement of them. Lack of Professionalism Many noted a lack of the pursuit of excellence or continuous improvement. Training Center Performance Virtually everyone indicated that the quality of training within the industry has declined. Impact of Automation The increasing complexity of operations in aircraft technology and the mission and range of international operations was noted as a significant safety concern. Is It Time for a Wake-Up Call? Three of the top seven safety concerns—Complacency, SOP Non-Compliance, and Lack of Professionalism—have plagued business aviation for decades. Any of them could cause a serious incident or accident. They are all attitudinal in nature and they are all preventable. We need to stop the “race to minimum criteria,” and instill the pursuit of excellence into business aviation. We need to knock these three concerns off the list once and for all. Where Do We Go From Here? There is nothing more important in aviation—business aviation or otherwise—than to continuously improve the level of safety. Nothing less than a full-court press is required to get these attitudinal threats to safety off the list. Do we have the courage to do so? About Global Aerospace SM4 Aviation Safety Program The Global Aerospace SM4 Safety Program has revolutionized the way insurance specialists help their clients achieve higher levels of operational safety. SM4 was built on the concept of integrating four critical safety components: planning, prevention, response and recovery. Its mission is to help organizations manage risk, enrich training efforts, strengthen safety culture and improve safety management systems. https://sm4.global-aero.com/ Global Aerospace SM4 Aviation Safety Program Media Contact Suzanne Keneally Vice President, Group Head of Communications +1 973-490-8588 https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2024/04/08/2859457/0/en/Global-Aerospace-s-SM4-Aviation-Safety-Program-Offers-Insights-on-FAR-Part-91-Safety-and-SMS-Implementation.html United Airlines delays flights on two new routes amid FAA safety probe WASHINGTON (Reuters) -United Airlines said on Monday it has delayed the start of two new international routes, citing a pause on some certifications by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)for the carrier following a series of safety incidents. The impacted routes are between Tokyo and Cebu, the Philippines, and Newark, New Jersey and Faro, Portugal, the carrier said. The FAA said last month it was increasing its oversight of United following a series of recent safety incidents. On March 23, the FAA said it would initiate a formal evaluation to ensure the Chicago-based airline was complying with safety regulations and said the FAA may delay future United certification projects "based on findings from oversight." Reuters reported last month the FAA could potentially not approve allowing customers on United's new planes or new routes. The FAA did not immediately comment on United's announcement on Monday. The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), the union representing United pilots, said earlier that the formal FAA evaluation is a type of audit that U.S. carriers undergo every few years and United most recently had one in 2018. United has experienced several safety incidents in the past few months. On March 15, an external panel was found missing from a United aircraft when it landed in Oregon, prompting an FAA investigation. United said last month that over the next several weeks employees will see more of a presence by the FAA "in our operation as they begin to review some of our work processes, manuals and facilities." https://finance.yahoo.com/news/united-airlines-delays-flights-two-185228199.html Spirit Airlines furloughs 260 pilots to save money Spirit Airlines said on Monday it has reached a deal with Airbus to delay all aircraft deliveries scheduled from the second quarter of 2025 through 2026 and intends to furlough about 260 pilots, as the company looks to save cash. The low-cost airline said it would defer the scheduled deliveries to 2030-2031. As a result of the deferrals, along with quality issues with engines made by supplier Pratt & Whitney, Spirit is furloughing pilots effective Sept. 1. A snag with Pratt & Whitney Geared Turbofan engines has forced Spirit to ground some of its A320neo aircraft, pinching the company at a time when it is already grappling with a cash crunch. The agreement with Airbus would improve Spirit’s liquidity by about $340 million over the next two years, the carrier said, adding that there were no changes to its orders scheduled to be delivered during 2027-2029. “[The] aircraft deferrals and pilot furloughs look positive, in terms of helping the carrier to reduce [or] defer some costs. However, among other factors, the carrier now potentially also reduces its revenue generation opportunities,” Citi Research analyst Stephen Trent wrote in a note. Spirit, which has been losing money for several quarters despite strong travel demand, operates an all-Airbus fleet. As of December 2023, the company had a total of 205 Airbus jets. Spirit now expects to end 2025 with a total of 219 jets in its fleet, with no additions of the A320neo aircraft. It had previously expected to add six A320neo jets in 2025 and increase its fleet to 234 jets. The furloughs “are deeply troubling for our entire pilot group,” said Ryan Muller, chair of Spirit’s Master Executive Council at the Air Line Pilots Association. The council and a negotiating committee were exploring voluntary measures that could mitigate the necessity for, or the number of, required furloughs and downgrades, Muller added. https://www.cnn.com/2024/04/08/business/spirit-airlines-furloughs/index.html PhD GRADUATE RESEARCH SURVEY My name is Michail Karyotakis. I am a Research student at Cranfield University in the UK. Currently, I am working on my Research project, which is focused on Developing a Dynamic Safety Management Framework for Advanced Air Mobility Operations. The following Questionnaires serve the main purpose of data collection since data on the Research field is limited. The surveys are not affiliated with any airline, training organisation, or any other. Participation in the surveys is voluntary and anonymous (if desired by the participant). Each survey will take about 10 minutes to be completed. Thank you in advance for your time and patience. Your participation is highly appreciated. Please click the link below to enter the survey: https://cranfielduniversity.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_1M8LnQdhnjnu0Jg (1) https://cranfielduniversity.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_dmoQJRGyrp9PUEK (2) Student email: michail.k.karyotakis@cranfield.ac.uk CALENDAR OF EVENTS • Blazetech - Aircraft Fire Hazards, Protection, and Investigation Course June 4 - 7, 2024 • (APTSC) Asia and Pacific Turboprop Safety Conference - June 26 - 27, 2024 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia • Airborne Public Safety Association, Inc. (APSCON 2024) - July 29 - August 3; Houston TX • Asia Pacific Airline Training Symposium - APATS 2024, 0-11 September, 2024, Singapore • Aircraft Cabin Air International Conference - 17 & 18 September - London • 2024 Ground Handling Safety Symposium (GHSS) - September 17-18, 2024 - Fort Worth, TX • 2024 ISASI - Lisbon, Portugal - September 30 to October 4, 2024 • International Congress of Aerospace Medicine ICAM 2024 in Lisbon, Portugal, 3 - 5 October 2024 • Aviation Health Conference back on Monday 7th and Tuesday 8th October 2024 • 2024 NBAA Business Aviation Convention & Exhibition - Oct. 22-24 (Vegas) Curt Lewis