Flight Safety Information - December 11, 2025 No. 246 In This Issue : South Korea Boosts Aviation Safety With AI Accident Prevention Plan : Air India admits compliance culture needs overhaul after flying without permit : The Main Differences Between Soviet & Western Aircraft : Incident: Cathay Pacific B773 at Hong Kong on Dec 10th 2025, burst tyre on departure : NDAA makes exceptions on DC military flight restrictions : Alaska Joined Southwest, easyJet, Japan Airlines, and Air India in Shocking Pilot Misconduct Scandals, Exposing Critical Flaws in Aviation Safety and Raising Serious Concerns in 2025 : Incident: Albastar B738 near Paris on Jul 21st 2023, radar contact lost for 20 minutes, loss of separation as result : LAPD Air Support builds aviation readiness at multi-agency ‘Chili Fly- : TERRAIN COLLISION - POWERLINES, C-FIT Hughes 369D | N161LA : Calendar of Event South Korea Boosts Aviation Safety With AI Accident Prevention Plan by Jim Wilson December 10, 2025 in @AirGuide Business, Aircraft Business, Airline Business, Airport Business, Financial Services & Private Equity, Government, Regulatory & Legal, Safety, Tech & Artificial Intelligence (AI) South Korea is elevating aviation safety as its top national priority, unveiling a comprehensive five-year roadmap that includes AI-powered accident prevention, strengthened runway inspections, and measures to address airline market concentration. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MOLIT) announced the Fourth Basic Aviation Policy Plan on the 10th, marking the first major aviation strategy update since the Jeju Air crash at Muan Airport on December 29 last year. The new policy blueprint outlines sweeping improvements across airport operations, air traffic management, flight allocation, and safety oversight. At its core is a full-scale overhaul of aviation safety systems. MOLIT will reinforce bird-strike prevention equipment at major airports and establish continuous monitoring of runway risk factors. A key initiative is the introduction of an artificial intelligence system capable of analyzing national aviation safety data in real time to detect early warning signals that could indicate potential accidents. The ministry will also revise pilot and aviation-worker qualification standards to align with international requirements. South Korea’s air traffic operation system will undergo major upgrades to prepare for rising traffic volumes and upcoming airport openings. MOLIT will re-segment national airspace to improve efficiency and deploy additional Korean Augmentation Satellite System (KASS) satellites—numbers 3, 4, and 5—to enhance navigation accuracy. A new integrated platform will also be developed to unify aircraft arrival and departure time management with real-time weather information. The government is also moving to reshape airline market competitiveness. Following the integration of Korean Air and Asiana Airlines, regulators will encourage new or alternative carriers to enter the market and closely monitor competitive conditions to prevent monopolistic behavior. For financially fragile domestic airlines, the ministry will implement measures to ensure safety investments and consumer protections are not compromised. Regional airport policy will shift as well. New airport development will involve greater participation by local companies, and authorities will explore pathways to attract duty-free retail, logistics, and MRO industries. Regional airports will expand charter and domestic flight operations to improve accessibility, while evolving into multi-functional hubs supporting urban air mobility (UAM), maintenance, and training activities. Passenger protection rules will also be strengthened. MOLIT will revise standards for managing flight delays, enhance mobility access for travelers with transportation challenges, and overhaul support systems for aviation accident victims. In alignment with global climate goals, the government will pursue a roadmap to mandate sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) in the coming years. The plan also prioritizes the expansion of future aviation technologies, including drones and UAM. The government will localize key drone technologies and broaden their use across industries such as delivery, infrastructure, and leisure. For UAM, operating standards and safety frameworks will be established ahead of expected commercial launch in 2028. “Aviation safety is the foundation of the entire industry,” Minister Kim Yun-duk said. “If safety falters, the sector contracts. We will place the highest priority on advancing safety management.” Air India admits compliance culture needs overhaul after flying without permit An Airbus A320 flew passengers between New Delhi, Bengaluru, Mumbai and Hyderabad on November 24 to 25 without the mandatory Airworthiness Review Certificate, or ARC, a key permit issued annually by the regulator after a plane passes safety and compliance checks By Reuters Updated - December 10, 2025 at 03:34 PM. | New Delhi An Air India investigation into why one of its Airbus planes conducted eight commercial flights without an airworthiness permit found "systemic failures", a company document showed, putting the lives of hundreds of passengers at risk. An Airbus A320 flew passengers between New Delhi, Bengaluru, Mumbai and Hyderabad on November 24 to 25 without the mandatory Airworthiness Review Certificate, or ARC, a key permit issued annually by the regulator after a plane passes safety and compliance checks. Air India found engineers and pilots had failed to check the aircraft's documents and that changes were needed to bolster compliance protocols. "Critical information was not shared with all relevant stakeholders, and opportunities for timely intervention were missed," said the internal investigation report, which was reviewed by Reuters. "The incident highlights the need for urgent improvements in process discipline, communication, and compliance culture," added the report, which was dated December 6. The findings, with a cover letter signed by Chief Operations Officer Captain Basil Kwauk, have been submitted to Indian aviation authorities, but have not been made public. The report is a stark admission from an airline that suffered its worst disaster when a Boeing Dreamliner crashed moments after take-off in June killing 260 people. Air India has also received warnings for running planes without checking emergency equipment, not changing engine parts on time and forging records to show compliance, as well as other audit lapses. Air India last week called the Airbus November incident "regrettable" and said that some people had been suspended, while India's civil aviation watchdog DGCA ordered the aircraft to be grounded and called for an investigation. Air India, which is owned by India's Tata Group and Singapore Airlines, said in a statement to Reuters it had proactively reported the incident to the DGCA and had "implemented immediate measures to prevent similar instances", adding it would continue to strengthen its compliance systems. The DGCA and Airbus did not respond to Reuters requests for comment. PILOTS WARNED TO BE CAREFUL An ARC violation can attract a penalty of up to 10 million rupees ($111,201). The certificate is issued annually for commercial aircraft after a comprehensive review and verification of their compliance with airworthiness standards, according to the DGCA. It is typically issued after DGCA officials conduct a physical inspection, which includes interior and exterior checks ranging from medical kits on board to tyre condition. Air India's investigation found that aircraft VT-TQN flew eight passenger flights and one test flight with an expired ARC due to the "convergence of multiple latent organizational and process deficiencies." It found both the plane's engines were changed and it was released for the test flight on November 24 without the required special flight permit, because the aircraft maintenance engineer "failed to check the onboard documents". Further checks on passenger flights were also missed, added the report, which was drafted after interviewing employees and reviewing internal evidence. The Air India investigation also blamed the pilots, saying those who flew the eight flights did not comply with standard operating procedures before taking off. On December 1, Air India's Director Flight Operations, Manish Uppal, reminded all pilots via an internal email to check paperwork before every flight, including navigation charts, cargo manifest and the ARC, the report said. "Non-adherence to company policy or SOPs will be viewed seriously and may attract action," the email said. The Main Differences Between Soviet & Western Aircraft By Nicholas Cummins Published Jul 28, 2020 Note: See photos in the original article. Journalist - Working in news media for over a decade with outlets including 9News and the Discovery Channel, Nick is an airline marketing specialist with a Masters level education. Working closely with AirAsia, Virgin Australia, Turkish Airlines and others, Nick provides unique insight and analysis on a variety of aviation topics. Based in Sydney, Australia. At the height of the cold war, Boeing, Airbus, and other manufacturers were not only competing with each other but also with the might of the Soviet aviation industry. But how did the two industries compare, and what were their aircraft like? Credit: Soviet-era aircraft look very similar to Western planes. Photo: Dmitry Terekhov via Wikimedia The soviet aviation landscape While many readers are intimately familiar with Boeing and Airbus' early years, the soviet civil aviation landscape maybe a little more obscure to most. Now you will notice this author used the word civil, not commercial, to describe the USSR run-enterprise. This is because it wasn't a commercial aviation space but rather a state effort to compete with the west. When it came to aircraft, Soviet-era planes followed the critical design principle set by Andrey Tupolev - designing aircraft for both civil and military use. Thus most airframes from the era seem less of a passenger aircraft and more a troop transport. At least until 1972, when the Tu-154 arrived on the scene. Stay informed: Sign up for our daily aviation news digest. What are the differences between aircraft? There are only a few differences between soviet aircraft and western airframes. At the beginning of the Jet Age, the Soviet Union brought to the market the successful Tu-104 against the de Havilland Comet. While it did have some crashes (not reported to the west or the public inside the state), 200 would be built, and it would be the main Russian civil carrier until 1972. Surprisingly, the interior of the soviet era aircraft at the start was completely the opposite of what you would expect. Interiors were opulent, with curtains, porcelain toilets, and more - a far cry from the communist manifesto you may expect. Besides, many aircraft didn't have any overhead baggage bins - designers believed that passengers should carry their luggage onboard and store it under their seats. The plane would be outclassed by the Boeing 707 in 1954, that could do three times the range and was more accessible to purchase for western markets. The soviet union would go on to produce more aircraft for the state-run airline Aeroflot, many that would replicate features of well-known western aircraft. Credit: The first USSR passenger jet aircraft, the Tu-104. Photo: Lars Söderström via Wikimedia Tupolev aircraft Below is a simple list of each soviet aircraft and their western counterpart: Tupolev Tu-104 - Competitor to the de Havilland Comet. The workhorse of the soviet fleet although couldn't fly very far (a range of only 2,120 km (1,320 miles, 1,140 nautical miles)) Tupolev Tu-114 - Propeller aircraft that could fly almost as fast as a 707 and carry over 200 passengers. Typically it only carried 170 and had a dining area (like a train carriage) and sleeping berths for passengers. ✕ Remove Ads Tupolev Tu-116 - Built in parallel with the Tu-144, this propeller aircraft had a smaller payload of 24 passengers to the same range of 10,750 km (6,680 miles, 5,800 nautical miles). The USSR only built two. Tupolev Tu-124 - It seems that designers loved the Tu-104 so much that they shrunk it down to 56 passengers and put it to work as a regional jet aircraft. It had a range of 2,100 km (1,300 mi, 1,100 nautical miles) and is best compared to the Boeing 717. Tupolev Tu-134 - A powerhouse aircraft and the first to have international recognition (and thus could fly into western airports). Reliable, Aeroflot would use this aircraft for most of its routes to Europe until increasing noise restrictions phased it out. It could carry 84 passengers to a range of 3,000 km (1,900 mi, 1,600 nautical miles). Tupolev Tu-144 - Competitior to the Concorde. Tupolev Tu-154 - Competitor to the Boeing 707. The first real rival to western design. It could carry up to 180 passengers to a range of 6,600 km (3,600 nautical miles; 4,100 mi). It was mostly a beefier version of the Tu-134. This version would get an overhaul in the late nineties after the soviet era with western avionics and systems. Credit: The TU-154M, an upgraded version of the original with western parts. Photo: 日本防衛省·統合幕僚監部 via Wikimedia Tupolev would go on to build more western aircraft after the end of the USSR. But that is a story for another day. Ilyushin Aircraft You may have noticed that many of these aircraft don't seem to fit the mold of bigger aircraft like the Boeing 747 and Airbus A330. Enter Ilyushin. Ilyushin Il-62 - The first jet aircraft from this manufacture. Designed to rival the long-range potential of the Boeing 707 and Douglas DC-8, it could take 186 passengers to a range of 10,000 km (6,200 mi, 5,400 nautical miles). Ilyushin Il-86 - The first of the larger jet aircraft from this manufacture could carry 320 passengers to a range of 5,000 km (2,700 nautical miles). At the time, the soviet union was interested in buying the 747 and the Lockheed L-1011 TriStar, but the US government vetoed both ideas at the time. This aircraft was to rival the Airbus A330. Credit: An Aeroflot operated Ilyushin 86 in 1987. Photo: Getty Images Ilyushin Il-96 - A replacement for the -86 and designed to rival the Airbus A340. The series could carry from 300 to 420 passengers up to a range of 11,500 km (6,209 nautical miles) Other aircraft While Tupolev and Ilyushin aircraft flew much of the large and prestigious international routes, many regional areas of what is now Russia and Central Asia still used old fashioned piston aircraft. Therefore the USSR needed a new regional aircraft - the Yak-40. The Yak-40 would be the world's second trijet after the Hawker Siddeley Trident and could carry 32 passengers to a range of 1,800 km (1,100 mi, 970 nautical miles). There isn't a direct western comparison apart from a smaller Embraer aircraft. In 1972, the Yakovlev design bureau set out to create a new aircraft to replace the Yak-40. The Yak-42 would carry 120 passengers to a range of 4,000 km (2,500 mi, 2,200 nautical miles). The world of soviet era aircraft is a fascinating one, and we have barely scratched the surface in this article. The key takeaway is that many of the soviet aircraft either copied western designs or, in the case of a trijet, inspired others. Incident: Cathay Pacific B773 at Hong Kong on Dec 10th 2025, burst tyre on departure By Simon Hradecky, created Wednesday, Dec 10th 2025 16:53Z, last updated Wednesday, Dec 10th 2025 16:53Z Note: See additional details in the original article. A Cathay Pacific Boeing 777-300, registration B-KQC performing flight CX-105 from Hong Kong (China) to Melbourne,VI (Australia), departed Hong Kong's runway 07R when the crew stopped the climb at 5000 feet and decided to return to Hong Kong due to a burst tyre. The aircraft landed safely on runway 07L about 25 minutes after departure, vacated the runway and stopped on the parallel taxiway. A passenger reported there was a loud bang just as the aircraft took off. The airline reported the aircraft returned to Hong Kong after a flat tyre was detected after departure. A replacement Boeing 777-300 registration B-KQY reached Melbourne with a delay of about 6:45 hours. The occurrence aircraft is still on the ground in Hong Kong about 23 hours after landing back. Congress: NDAA makes exceptions on DC military flight restrictions Some had hoped to see stricter language after this year’s deadly collision over the Potomac River Proximity transmission language in the NDAA falls short of what some had hoped after a fatal midair collision over the Potomac River earlier this year. Above, Apache helicopters fly past the Washington Monument on June 14. (Tom Williams/CQ Roll Call) By Valerie Yurk Posted December 8, 2025 at 5:14pm The compromise House-Senate fiscal 2026 national defense authorization bill includes requirements and restrictions for military training flights operating in Washington airspace, but stops short of mandating National Transportation Safety Board recommendations included in a bipartisan Senate measure. The legislation is a response to the fatal midair collision between a commercial flight and a Blackhawk Army helicopter in January. The NDAA provisions would specifically restrict military training helicopters from operating in the “special flight rules area” — a 30-mile roughly circular area surrounding the city — unless the aircraft is actively providing warning of its proximity to nearby aircraft. But the NDAA language would allow the Defense and Transportation secretaries to waive the proximity transmission requirement in the case of national security interests or if commercial flights are found not to be at risk. They would have to give notice to Congress for waivers that last more than 30 days. The bill would also require the Defense Department to report to Congress on the number of near misses between military and commercial aircraft over the past year. The provisions leave room for more exceptions than the measure sponsored by Senate Commerce Chairman Ted Cruz, R-Texas, with ranking member Maria Cantwell, D-Wash., among the 16 co-sponsors, eight from each party. Their bill would implement some NTSB recommendations on D.C.-area flight restrictions and when safety technology must be on. The panel approved that bill in an en bloc package by voice vote in October. The NTSB found in its preliminary report on the January crash at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport that the Army helicopter had its Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Out system, a technology that transmits location data quickly to nearby aircraft and air traffic control towers, disabled during the flight. The helicopter hadn’t transmitted ADS-B-Out data to an FAA ground station for 730 days prior to the accident, although it was not clear if it was malfunctioning or turned off, the report said. Army Brig. Gen. Matthew Braman told senators in March that Army policy is that ADS-B-Out transmission must be off for certain sensitive operations in matters of national defense, homeland security, intelligence and law enforcement if transmitting would compromise the operation’s security of the mission or pose safety risks to the crew. Although some of the safety provisions in Cruz and Cantwell’s aviation bill fall outside the NDAA’s jurisdiction, the defense policy bill’s language is still looser on exemptions to military flight requirements. The aviation safety bill, for example, would require the definition of waived flights to be “narrowly construed” and would specifically prohibit Army training flights and flights transporting federal officials below the rank of Cabinet member to be exempt from the requirements. The NDAA text narrowly requires position transmissions for only military training flights in the area and doesn’t explicitly define “national security interests.” The Senate aviation safety bill would also establish an Office of Federal Aviation Administration-DOD Coordination to streamline communication between the agency and the Defense Department — language that’s not included in the NDAA text. A Senate Commerce Republican spokesperson declined to comment on the NDAA provision. Alaska Joined Southwest, easyJet, Japan Airlines, and Air India in Shocking Pilot Misconduct Scandals, Exposing Critical Flaws in Aviation Safety and Raising Serious Concerns in 2025 Published on November 18, 2025 In recent years, Alaska Airlines has joined the ranks of major airlines like Southwest, easyJet, Japan Airlines, and Air India in a series of shocking pilot misconduct scandals. These incidents have not only raised alarms but have also revealed critical flaws in aviation safety. From pilots engaging in reckless behaviour to serious lapses in training and oversight, these scandals have put both passengers and the aviation industry at risk. The misconduct cases across these airlines have exposed deep vulnerabilities, highlighting the importance of strict regulations, thorough screening, and mental health support for flight crews. Alaska Airlines, like its counterparts, now faces the challenge of restoring trust and ensuring that such flaws do not compromise the safety of air travel in the future. This growing issue calls for immediate action to tighten safety protocols and better address the personal well-being of those in charge of flying our planes. The Incident: A Pilot’s Desperate Actions Mid-Flight In October 2023, Emerson, who had been a pilot for Alaska Airlines for years, was riding in the cockpit jump-seat of a Horizon Air flight traveling from Washington State to San Francisco. During the flight, he suddenly declared, I’m not okay, and reached up to grab two red fire handles. These handles are used in emergencies to deploy the fire extinguisher system and cut off the engine’s fuel supply. The act of pulling these handles would have shut down the plane’s engines and cut off the hydraulics, putting the lives of everyone on board in immediate danger. Fortunately, one of the pilots noticed Emerson’s actions and quickly intervened, grabbing his wrists and stopping him from completing the act. Emerson was then escorted out of the cockpit, and the second pilot declared an in-flight emergency. The flight was diverted to Portland, where it landed safely. Despite Emerson’s attempt, the red fire handles were never fully pulled, and the engines continued to function, preventing a catastrophic outcome. But the question remains: How could this happen? Emerson’s Explanation: A Drug-Induced Crisis When Emerson was questioned after the flight, he admitted that he had not slept for two days and felt both dehydrated and tired. But more chillingly, he confessed to feeling mentally “in crisis.” He revealed that he had been depressed since the death of his friend six years earlier and that he thought he was dreaming when he tried to pull the fire handles. Emerson also admitted that he had taken psychedelic mushrooms for the first time in a social setting with friends. The effects of the mushrooms, combined with his lack of sleep, led him to become “completely detached from reality” for several days. He did not realise the gravity of his actions and was unaware of the dangerous consequences of his behaviour at the time. This disturbing admission reveals how easily mental health issues and drug use can impair a person’s ability to think clearly. Emerson’s case shows just how fragile the human mind can be under stress, and how quickly something as simple as a bad decision can turn into a life-threatening situation. Legal Consequences and the Cost of Recklessness In the aftermath of the flight, Emerson was charged with interfering with a flight crew, a federal crime. He pleaded guilty to the charges, and in a sentencing memo, he requested credit for the time he had already served and asked for probation. Federal prosecutors acknowledged that Emerson had acted out of self-inflicted drug-induced psychosis, but they also praised the actions of the on-duty pilots who had managed to regain control of the situation. Emerson was sentenced to three years of court supervision, with a recommendation for 12 months in prison, followed by supervised release. He spent 46 days in custody before returning to California. In a bizarre twist, Emerson founded a nonprofit called Clear Skies Ahead to speak to aviation professionals about health care avoidance. In addition to his federal sentence, Emerson faced charges in state court. He pleaded no contest to 84 counts of recklessly endangering another person and one felony count of endangering an aircraft. The state court judge sentenced him to restitution of almost $60,000, 664 hours of community service, and five years of formal probation. As part of his probation, Emerson was also banned from coming within 25 feet of an operable airplane. A Wake-Up Call for Airline Safety Emerson’s actions and the subsequent legal consequences are a chilling reminder of how vital it is for pilots to be in peak mental and physical condition before they operate an aircraft. This incident also highlights the importance of strict drug and alcohol policies for airline staff, as well as the need for proper monitoring of pilot well-being. While the incident did not result in a tragic outcome, it could have easily ended in disaster. The bravery of the flight crew in managing the situation prevented any loss of life, but the potential for tragedy was very real. This incident underscores the fact that mental health issues, substance abuse, and fatigue can significantly impair a pilot’s judgment and ability to perform their duties safely. Airlines must continue to strengthen their processes for ensuring that pilots are fit for duty, both physically and mentally. This includes implementing more robust health screenings, encouraging open discussions about mental health, and offering support to staff who may be struggling with personal issues or substance abuse. The Human Cost of Mental Health Struggles and Drug Use Joseph David Emerson’s attempt to sabotage a flight while under the influence of psychedelic mushrooms is a sobering reminder of the human factors that can jeopardise aviation safety. It highlights the importance of mental health support for aviation professionals, the dangers of impaired decision-making, and the critical role of pilot fitness for duty. Though Emerson’s actions were driven by a combination of mental health issues and drug use, the consequences were severe. It is fortunate that the flight crew was able to intervene and prevent a tragedy, but the incident serves as a warning to the aviation industry and society as a whole: the stakes are high when it comes to human behaviour, and we must never underestimate the impact that mental health and substance use can have on safety. For the aviation industry, it’s time to take a long, hard look at the systems in place to monitor pilot fitness. Safety in the skies depends not only on the aircraft but on the people who fly them. It is clear that more needs to be done to ensure that pilots are supported, healthy, and fully fit for duty before stepping into the cockpit. The Alarming Rise of Pilot Misconduct: Shocking DUI and Drunken Hotel Incidents in 2025 In 2025, two separate, high-profile incidents involving pilots from Southwest Airlines and easyJet have shocked the world. These events highlight the alarming consequences of crew impairment in the aviation industry. While pilot interference with flight systems remains rare, the cases we discuss today reveal serious questions about pilot fitness for duty. From DUI arrests before flights to disturbing behaviour during layovers, these incidents shed light on the urgent need for strict oversight of airline crews, both on duty and off. Southwest Airlines Pilot Arrested for DUI Before Flight In January 2025, a Southwest Airlines pilot was arrested in Savannah, Georgia, under suspicion of driving under the influence (DUI). The arrest happened just before the pilot was scheduled to operate a commercial flight. He was reportedly found performing pre-flight checks when airport police noticed signs of impairment. His eyes were bloodshot, and he smelled strongly of alcohol. According to reports, the pilot failed parts of a field sobriety test and was immediately detained. This disturbing incident occurred at Savannah/Hilton Head International Airport, where the pilot was preparing for a flight from Georgia to Chicago. Airport security staff had noticed the pilot’s physical signs of intoxication during the pre-flight check. This raised alarm, especially considering the pilot was supposed to be in control of a flight carrying dozens of passengers. This event is a clear violation of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations. According to FAA guidelines, pilots are prohibited from flying if their blood alcohol concentration (BAC) is 0.04 or higher. Additionally, pilots must refrain from flying within eight hours of consuming alcohol. The fact that the pilot was still found to be impaired before the flight not only violated these rules but also put the lives of passengers at significant risk. When questioned, the pilot claimed to have consumed a “few light beers” the previous night and stated that the alcohol smell could be attributed to nicotine patches. However, his poor performance on the sobriety test suggested that his claim was unconvincing. The FAA quickly revoked his pilot certification, and Southwest Airlines grounded him immediately. This is a serious breach of aviation safety protocols and raises questions about the airline’s pre-flight screening procedures. While this particular case did not involve direct interference with the aircraft systems or endangerment in the air, it still highlights the significant risks posed by impaired pilots. Pilots are entrusted with the safety of everyone on board, and this event serves as a reminder of the need for stringent monitoring of crew members, both during their shifts and outside of them. EasyJet Pilot Suspended After Drunken Hotel Incident in Cape Verde Just a few months later, in August 2025, a captain working for easyJet found himself suspended after a troubling incident during a layover at a resort hotel in Cape Verde. The easyJet pilot was reportedly spotted wandering around a luxury hotel naked after a long night of drinking. This bizarre behaviour occurred just hours before he was scheduled to fly passengers back to London Gatwick. The pilot was staying at the Meliá Dunas Beach Resort & Spa, a five-star resort on the island of Sal, Cape Verde. After an all-night drinking session, he stripped naked and began wandering the hotel’s reception, gym, and spa areas, leaving other guests stunned. The hotel staff and other visitors were alarmed by his behaviour, prompting them to alert the airline. Fortunately, easyJet was quick to react. Upon being informed of the pilot’s behaviour, the airline grounded him immediately, ensuring that he would not operate the next day’s flight. The incident highlights how a pilot’s off-duty behaviour can still have serious implications for aviation safety. While the pilot did not engage in any dangerous behaviour while flying, his unprofessional conduct raises serious concerns about his fitness for duty. The fact that this incident occurred during a layover is concerning. Pilots are not only responsible for their actions when they are in the cockpit; their behaviour during rest periods and layovers also affects their ability to perform their duties. The incident in Cape Verde shows how easy it can be for a pilot to lose focus or become unfit for duty, even when they are not actively flying. easyJet’s swift response to suspend the pilot demonstrates the airline’s commitment to safety, but the event still serves as a reminder that more needs to be done to monitor pilots’ behaviour and ensure they remain in good health and spirits before their flights. The Growing Concern of Pilot Impairment and Misconduct Both of these incidents—one involving a DUI arrest and the other involving a drunken and naked hotel incident—underscore a growing concern within the aviation industry: pilot misconduct and impairment are serious threats to flight safety. While these events did not involve direct interference with aircraft systems, they still highlight the need for rigorous oversight of pilots, not only during their flights but also in their off-duty hours. The aviation industry has long relied on stringent regulations to ensure the safety of air travel. Pilots are required to undergo regular medical examinations, and there are strict rules governing their fitness for duty. However, these incidents show that even with these regulations in place, there are still significant risks that need to be addressed. The question remains: how can airlines better monitor and manage their pilots to prevent such behaviour from occurring? One potential solution could be to implement more frequent and comprehensive checks of pilots’ fitness for duty, even during layovers. Airlines could also introduce more training to help pilots manage stress, fatigue, and other factors that may affect their performance. Additionally, more emphasis should be placed on promoting mental health and well-being for pilots, so that they are better equipped to handle the challenges of their demanding job. Furthermore, there needs to be a cultural shift in the aviation industry. Pilots and other aviation professionals should be encouraged to speak out when they feel unfit to fly, whether due to physical impairment, mental health issues, or substance abuse. In both the Southwest Airlines and easyJet cases, the pilots were allegedly not in a state of mind conducive to performing their duties safely. Had these issues been addressed earlier, the situations may have been prevented altogether. The Role of Airline Oversight and Regulation Regulation and oversight by governing bodies such as the FAA and the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) in the UK are crucial in maintaining high standards of safety in aviation. These organisations set the rules and guidelines that all airlines must follow, ensuring that pilots are medically fit and mentally prepared to handle the responsibilities of flying. However, incidents like these highlight that regulatory bodies alone cannot guarantee safety. Airlines themselves must take responsibility for monitoring their crews and ensuring they are fit to fly. The swift response of Southwest Airlines and easyJet in grounding their pilots shows that they are committed to maintaining safety, but the fact that such incidents occurred in the first place reveals that there are still gaps in the system. To address these gaps, airlines need to implement stricter screening procedures before flights and increase the frequency of medical and fitness checks for pilots. Additionally, more needs to be done to tackle the stigma around mental health and substance abuse in the aviation industry. Pilots must feel supported in seeking help when they need it, without the fear of judgment or career consequences. Japan Airlines Scandal: Two Pilots Grounded for Alcohol Misconduct In another shocking case, two former pilots from Japan Airlines (JAL) were grounded in 2025 after they were found to have lied about their drinking activities. The two captains had consumed alcohol in excess of the legal limit for flying before their scheduled flight from Melbourne to Tokyo. What made the situation even worse was that the pilots lied about their drinking habits, attempting to cover up their actions and evade scrutiny. This scandal was uncovered after a whistleblower alerted the airline, and the pilots were subsequently grounded by Japan’s transport ministry. The incident, which occurred in December 2024 but was only publicly revealed in February 2025, involved a delay on the flight as the pilots’ blood alcohol levels were found to be above the legal limit. It’s deeply concerning that two senior pilots would put passengers at risk by failing to adhere to aviation safety protocols. Both pilots were suspended, and JAL’s senior management faced disciplinary action, including pay cuts. This incident highlights the ongoing issue of alcohol misuse among airline crews, a problem that continues to plague the aviation industry despite strict regulations. It also underlines the importance of ensuring that all pilots are truthful about their fitness for duty and follow the rules regarding alcohol consumption. While this case did not involve direct interference with aircraft systems or in-flight safety, it remains a serious breach of trust and a threat to passenger safety. Pilots who drink before flying are not only breaking the law but also jeopardizing the lives of those aboard the flight. This case further emphasizes the need for stricter monitoring of pilot health and well-being, as well as better systems for detecting and preventing alcohol-related misconduct. Air India Training Failure: A Whistleblower Uncovers Simulator Misconduct Another troubling incident came to light in March 2025 involving Air India, which had to terminate a trainer pilot for unethical behaviour in their simulator training program. The trainer pilot was found to have misrepresented the number of hours pilots had spent in the simulator, a significant breach of both safety protocols and ethical standards. The issue came to light after a whistleblower reported the misconduct, which led to an internal investigation by the airline. It was revealed that the trainer pilot had falsified records about the number of simulator training hours completed by the pilots under their instruction. As a result, Air India took immediate action, firing the trainer pilot and grounding ten other pilots who had been trained by him. These pilots were temporarily removed from flying duties pending further investigation. The impact of this breach could have been far-reaching. Simulator training is a vital part of pilot preparation, as it ensures that pilots are ready to handle emergency situations and complex flight scenarios. Misrepresenting training hours could mean that pilots were not fully prepared to handle such situations in real life. The grounding of the ten pilots was a necessary step to ensure that safety standards were upheld, but it raises concerns about the oversight of pilot training programs and the integrity of the airline’s safety culture. In addition to the immediate disciplinary actions taken against the trainer pilot and the affected pilots, Air India also made it clear that this incident was part of a wider pattern of ethical breaches within the airline. In 2024 alone, more than 30 employees were terminated for various ethical violations. This suggests that there may be systemic issues within the airline’s operations that need to be addressed to prevent future misconduct and ensure passenger safety. Why These Incidents Matter for Airline Safety All three of these incidents — the off-duty pilot attempting to sabotage a flight, the alcohol-related misconduct by JAL pilots, and the Air India simulator training breach — raise serious concerns about the integrity of airline operations and the fitness of airline crews. While each incident involved different forms of misconduct, they share common themes: the need for rigorous safety protocols, the importance of pilot fitness for duty, and the crucial role of ethical conduct in ensuring that passengers remain safe. The aviation industry relies on the competence, professionalism, and integrity of its pilots and crew members. When these standards are compromised, the consequences can be catastrophic. Whether it’s an off-duty pilot trying to disable an aircraft, pilots lying about their drinking habits, or a trainer falsifying flight hours, each incident puts passengers and crew members at risk. These incidents also highlight the need for better oversight and monitoring of airline crews. It’s not enough to rely solely on pilot qualifications and medical exams — airlines must implement stricter systems for monitoring crew behaviour, both on and off duty. Airlines also need to foster a culture of transparency and accountability, where whistleblowers are encouraged to report misconduct without fear of retaliation. A Wake-Up Call for the Aviation Industry The events of 2025 serve as a wake-up call for the aviation industry. They highlight the ongoing challenges that airlines face in maintaining high safety standards and ensuring that pilots and crew members are fit for duty. While the actions of a few individuals should not tarnish the entire industry, it’s clear that there are systemic issues that need to be addressed. As we look ahead, the aviation industry must prioritise the mental health and well-being of its pilots, strengthen its oversight mechanisms, and ensure that safety standards are upheld at all times. Passengers rely on airlines to keep them safe, and it’s essential that the industry continues to build trust by taking proactive steps to prevent these types of incidents from occurring. The aviation industry must learn from these mistakes and implement stronger safeguards to ensure that the safety of passengers and crew is never compromised. The incidents of 2025 are a stark reminder that even the smallest lapse in judgment can have serious consequences, and that the safety of those on board should always be the top priority. In the end, the goal should be simple: to ensure that every flight is safe, every pilot is fit for duty, and every airline operates with the highest standards of professionalism and integrity. Only then can passengers feel confident that their safety is in good hands. Alaska Joined Southwest, easyJet, Japan Airlines, and Air India in Shocking Pilot Misconduct Scandals, Exposing Critical Flaws in Aviation Safety and Raising Serious Concerns in 2025 Incident: Albastar B738 near Paris on Jul 21st 2023, radar contact lost for 20 minutes, loss of separation as result By Simon Hradecky, created Thursday, Jul 27th 2023 17:29Z, last updated Wednesday, Dec 10th 2025 16:38Z An Albastar Boeing 737-800, registration EC-NGC performing flight AP-4651 from London Stansted,EN (UK) to Lourdes (France), was enroute at FL350 about 90nm southwest of Paris (France) when (secondary) radar contact with the aircraft was lost. About 20 minutes later (secondary) radar contact was re-established at FL350 about 200nm southsouthwest of Paris. The aircraft continued to Lourdes for a landing without further incident. An Air France Embraer ERJ-190, registration F-HBLD performing flight AF-1476 from Paris Charles de Gaulle (France) to Bilbao,SP (Spain), was enroute at FL350 in close proximity while the B738 was invisible on the radar due to their transponder not transmitting. The aircraft remained on the ground in Lourdes for 2.5 hours, then departed for the return flight. The French BEA reported they rated the occurrence a serious incident and opened an investigation. While the aircraft was in contact with the air traffic control center Brest radar contact was lost, an Air France Flight (AF-1476) reported they had passed the "lost" flight at the same flight level at less than 3nm distance. On Dec 10th 2025 the BEA released their final report concluding the probable causes of the serious incident were: While cruising at FL 350, the transponder on the Boeing 737-809 operated by Albastar, flight LAV4651, experienced a failure, which meant that both nearby aircraft were not able to detect it and that its correlated radar track was no longer being tracked and no longer being displayed. The air traffic controllers in ACC/west in charge of the sector in which the aeroplane was flying did not perceive the loss of radar contact, which was indicated by various warning systems. These included a track marker, which they deleted without first analysing the information available to them. This action resulted in a loss of awareness of the flight in the control sector for which they were responsible. The crew, for their part, did not detect the transponder failure and continued on their flight plan route without reporting their position by radio at the compulsory reporting point. The crew entered the ACC/south-west airspace without radio or radar contact. A few minutes later, the aeroplane crossed paths with an Embraer 190, at a distance of 2.6 NM and at the same flight level. The crew of this aeroplane saw the Boeing 737 pass in front of them, with no TCAS information displayed. The crew of the Boeing 737, for their part, saw a white diamond on their screens advising of the presence of the Embraer 190 and indicating that there was no risk of collision. Radio and radar contact with flight LAV4651 was re-established by means of the Embraer 190 crew, visual detection without a targeted search by military controllers in Cinq-Marc-La Pile CDC, and numerous telephone exchanges between ACC/south-west, ACC/west and the CDC. Beyond these findings, the loss of separation between the two aeroplanes during cruise flight can be explained by a set of measures intended to reduce the risk of errors, which did not function as expected and did not ensure flight safety. The following factors may have contributed to the two aeroplanes following conflicting flight paths in RVSM airspace without radar contact: - insufficient margins taken into account when designing the transponder model, with respect to the heat dissipation requirements of a transponder component; - a system to alert the crew and inform them of a transponder malfunction or failure, which relies solely on an amber indicator light located outside the primary field of view of both pilots, requiring a deliberate movement of the head in order to see that it has illuminated; - insufficient certification specifications relating to indications of non-functioning or failure of transponders and in force at the time of the certification of the Boeing 737-800; - the display of identical alerts (“track markers”) for different levels of criticality to attract the attention of air traffic controllers; - the routine which had set in based on the frequency of “track markers” related to noncritical situations, which may lead air traffic controllers to delete them without a comprehensive analysis of the information available on their screens; - the handling of safety events by the DSNA, which did not identify all the threats and risk situations with a view to establishing technical and operational mitigation measures; - the limitations of the compulsory position reporting points provided for in the regulatory texts. The BEA analysed: In airspace where the use of a transponder is mandatory, an aircraft flying without radar contact, due to a total or partial failure of the active transponder, will affect both the safety level (increased risk of loss of separation between aircraft and as a consequence, mid-air collisions) and the security level. In the event of an operating fault, the transponder can detect the anomaly itself and activate the alert system to warn the crew of the malfunction. Surveillance by the ground radar stations also generates alerts for air traffic controllers in the event of a transponder malfunction. According to the crew of the Boeing 737 operated by Albastar, the ATC FAIL light situated between the two crew seats did not illuminate to indicate the transponder failure. The two air traffic controllers responsible for the sector in which the Boeing 737-809 was flying did not perceive the successive alerts which were displayed over a period of approximately ten seconds and characteristic of a radar track ageing mechanism. They then deleted the track marker around three minutes after it appeared which, based on other information available on their interfaces, could have enabled them to determine that there was a loss of radar contact and therefore probably, a transponder failure on the Boeing 737-809. The crew thus continued their route specified in the flight plan without being aware of the transponder failure. The air traffic controllers of the ACC/west sector forgot that they had this flight to manage in their sector and never identified that a flight had disappeared from their sector after deleting the track marker. It should be noted that the TCAS of the Boeing 737 operated by Albastar would have been able to transmit traffic and resolution advisories according to the loss of separation with nearby aircraft equipped with a transponder in operation, in particular with the Embraer 190 operated by HOP! The minimum distance between the two aeroplanes, then at the same flight level, was 2.6 NM for a regulatory minimum separation of 5 NM. The partial failure of the transponder of the Boeing 737 meant that the Embraer 190 TCAS could not detect and track this aircraft, and the transmission of a resolution advisory by the Boeing 737 TCAS would therefore not have been coordinated with the Embraer 190 TCAS. The detection by military controllers in Mars-La-Pile CDC and the information message from the crew of the Embraer 190 operated by HOP! who saw the Boeing 737 operated by Albastar pass in front of them, meant that, after numerous coordination actions between the various control centres, radio and radar contact was recovered with the crew of the Boeing 737. They were able to continue their flight. Cause of the transponder failure and measures taken The failure of the transponder selected by the crew during the serious incident flight stemmed from a malfunction of a component (transistor) used in the +50 V DC power supply system, which provides the energy required to transmit transponder messages (squitters and replies). This fault was caused by insufficient consideration given to the thermal dissipation margins of the component chosen when designing the transponder (see paragraphs 1.6.1.3.5 and 1.6.1.3.6). As a result of this fault, the transponder did not transmit any Mode S squitters or replies to interrogations. However, the transponder continued to operate partially during the flight, receiving messages from ground stations and nearby aircraft transponders. The transmission by the Boeing 737 TCAS of periodic long uplink messages (see paragraph 1.9.2), as well as the statements made by the aircraft's crew who saw traffic information on the navigation displays, show that the Boeing 737 TCAS automatic monitoring software considered that its level of operation and performance was not affected by the malfunctioning transponder which continued to send it the mode S messages it received from nearby aircraft. In other words, despite its partial failure, the transponder had the possibility of transmitting TA and RA if necessary, but without coordination with the TCAS of other aircraft to determine complementary evasive manoeuvres. Simulations carried out by Eurocontrol based on the Boeing 737 and the Embraer 190 flight paths confirmed the TCAS displays seen by the Albastar crew, and the absence of any need to activate a TA or a RA. On the other hand, the TCAS of the aircraft in the vicinity of the Boeing 737 were unable to detect its presence due to its transponder not transmitting Mode S messages (squitters and replies), which for these aircraft, was equivalent to the transponder not operating. This was why the HOP! crew were surprised to see the Boeing 737 pass so close in front of them without it being displayed on the TCAS. Several operators had reported similar transponder failures to Honeywell which led to the issue of a service bulletin to replace an internal electronic component. The service bulletin was issued in August 2023, one month after the serious incident, independently of the latter (see paragraph 1.6.1.3.6). At the date of publication of this report, no other similar in service report had been made to Honeywell. The design fault identified by Honeywell confirms that demonstrations to meet specifications for equipment certification and approval are based on a certain number of accepted assumptions such as failure mode predictions (effects and probabilities of occurrence) or the reliability of equipment components (as was the case for the transistor). The limits of these assumptions mean that all the associated risks before the equipment is put into service cannot be determined, and are often identified by experience. In the case of the transponders, notifications to the equipment manufacturer by operators, via flight crews, and by air traffic controllers, as well as Eurocontrol's monitoring of the 1,030 and 1,090 MHz frequencies in Europe as network manager (see paragraph 1.9.2), facilitate the rapid and effective implementation of corrective measures to guarantee a level of safety in line with applicable certification requirements. Systems to attract crew attention in event of a transponder failure The examinations carried out on the transponders of the Boeing 737 during the investigation found that the partial transponder failure was detected by the transponder's internal monitoring function, which generates the signal to illuminate the ATC FAIL light on the ATC Control Panel located between the two crew seats. However, it cannot be affirmed that the light was indeed illuminated during the serious incident flight given that the transponders were removed from the aircraft several flights after the serious incident, and that the crew reported that they had not seen the ATC FAIL light illuminated. Whether or not the light was illuminated, the crew (like others before them, see paragraphs 1.17.8.4.3 and 1.18.5) were unaware of the partial transponder failure. If the transponder failure had been total, the aeroplane’s TCAS would also have detected it through its internal monitoring function. The ATC FAIL light would have illuminated, the TCAS FAIL message would have been displayed on the navigation display, and the display of the traffic in the vicinity of the aeroplane would have been lost. The combination of these warning systems would have increased the probability of the crew detecting and managing the abnormal situation. In the case of the serious incident to EC-NGC, the partial transponder failure may only have been shown by the illumination of the ATC FAIL light. Furthermore, before being transferred to another sector after recovering radar contact, the crew of flight LAV4651 were informed that radar contact had been lost for some time. They did not understand the exchanges in French between the PCR of the ACC/south-west sector and the crew of flight AFR21YB concerning the loss of separation and the loss of radar contact with the 737. The crew then continued to their destination. The crew did not report the transponder failure in the TLB at the end of the flight. This may be explained by the fact that the crew had not seen if the ATC FAIL light was illuminated in flight, and that the ground checks of the TCAS and associated transponder before the following flight (transponder 1, not the one used on the serious incident flight) did not reveal anything. The PCR provided limited information to the crew of flight LAV4651 about the magnitude of the past situation which may also have limited their awareness of the risk and consequences associated with the transponder failure during the flight. Current certification specifications for flight crew alerting systems (CS 25.1322, see 1.17.1.3) require perception by at least two different senses, based on a combination of aural, visual or tactile alerts. Visual elements to attract the attention should be in the pilots’ primary field of view. Based on these specifications, and if it is considered that the ATC FAIL light illuminated during the flight, the lack of detection of the partial transponder failure can be explained by: - the position of this light, between the two crew seats, and therefore outside the primary field of view of the two pilots, which requires a head movement and a voluntary action to envisage detection of the ATC FAIL light; - the ATC FAIL light not being associated with another signal. The installation of the TRA 100B transponder on the Boeing 737 was not considered a major modification requiring an evolution of the certification basis for these aeroplanes, taking into account new requirements such as those relating to crew alerting systems. The FAA circular (Boeing's aircraft certification authority), which aims to guide type certificate holders in the certification process for TCAS II and Mode S transponder installations on board aircraft (see paragraph 1.17.1.2), recommends in particular, that alerts in the event of a transponder failure should be in the pilot's primary field of view (see 1.17.1.3) and associated with the aircraft's primary caution and warning system. These provisions correspond to AMC and concern only “new installations”, for aircraft not already equipped with Mode S transponders or TCAS II or of new design. At the date of publication of the report, the installation of a new type of transponder did not constitute a modification subject to compliance with the certification specifications applicable at the date of the request for this modification, or coming into force subsequently if the design organization so wishes (see paragraph 1.17.1.2), in particular those relating to flight crew alerting systems (CS 25.1322, see paragraph 1.17.1.3). The FAA circular also indicated that compliance with new requirements when installing new types of transponders, particularly those relating to flight crew alerting systems, can be complex due to the limitations of the alert systems already installed on aircraft, possible functions to be added, and economic considerations. The European certification specifications for the installation and certification of transponders (CS-ACNS, see paragraph 1.17.1.2) are applicable to new aircraft and to those undergoing modifications which require the application of these specifications. They do not apply to the installation of new types of transponder. They require that the non-operation or failure of a transponder be indicated, without delay and without the need for crew intervention. There are no other details on how to alert a crew in the event of a transponder not operating or failing. The serious incident on 21 July 2023, like others (see paragraphs 1.17.8.4.3 and 1.18.5), illustrates the risk of a mid-air collision or a collision with the ground due to a transponder malfunction transmitting erroneous information. This risk is currently being assessed by EASA in the scope of the safety issues relating to air navigation of the European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS) (see paragraph 1.9.5). Requirements relating to systems for alerting crews in the event of a transponder failure are the subject of a safety recommendation (see paragraph 5.1). Management of loss of radar contact by air traffic controllers Context when radar contact was lost Several messages and symbols relating to updates of radar track information for flight LAV4651 (see paragraph 1.17.3.7) and intended to attract the attention of air traffic controllers, were displayed on the label for this flight due to the absence of replies from the aeroplane's transponder to interrogations issued by ground radar stations. These alerts were not perceived by the pair of controllers in charge of the sector in which the aeroplane was flying. Similarly, the track marker and the “Flights without track” window, characteristic of a loss of radar contact (see paragraphs 1.17.3.6 and 1.17.3.7) were not perceived at first. All of these alerts appeared on the controllers' screens for a period of four to five minutes during which no messages were transmitted on the radio frequency and no mouse movements were recorded in the positions of the two controllers. This absence of messages and mouse movements is characteristic of a low workload, confirmed by the two air traffic controllers of the sector and by the low traffic in the sector. This period of a low workload came after several busy sequences for the PCR since he started his shift at 04:30. The period of a low workload probably had the effect of reducing the pair's level of vigilance and degrading their monitoring task, including the scan of their sector. Both controllers confirmed this and stated that they had been talking during this period of a low workload. However, as there was no recording of the aural environment at the air traffic controllers' workstations, it was not possible to accurately assess the pair's activity during this period of a low workload. This lack of recording also meant that it was not possible to identify any indicators of behaviour that could affect human activity, such as fatigue: the PCR had gotten up early after approximately 4.5 to 5 hours of sleep, after a period of six days of rest (a situation that can contribute to falling asleep late and making an early wake-up difficult). He had also started his shift with periods of heavy traffic. The DGAC has updated an order (see paragraph 1.9.6) which stipulates that the DSNA must equip its units with systems for recording background communication and the aural environment from February 2026, in accordance with ATS.OR.460 of Regulation (EU) 2017/373. LAPD Air Support builds aviation readiness at multi-agency ‘Chili Fly-in’ By Woody McClendon December 8, 2025 Note: See photos in the original article. One powerful element separates airborne law enforcement from other segments of commercial rotorcraft aviation: training. Thorough new-hire instruction and frequent refresher courses are ingrained in police operations across the U.S., and that culture extends into police aviation units. The results speak for themselves — airborne law enforcement accidents and injuries remain a fraction of those seen in commercial rotorcraft operations, despite the challenges police aircrews face daily. The Los Angeles Police Department’s (LAPD) Air Support Unit leads the way in integrated, proactive aircrew training for both pilots and tactical flight officers (TFOs). Its annual multi-agency aviation training, known as the “Chili Fly-in,” is a high-profile example. Offered free of charge to airborne law enforcement agencies throughout North America, the event draws attendees from across the continent and abroad. Greg Doyle Photo As Assistant Commanding Officer Lt. Tarek Ismail noted, LAPD’s culture is to share everything they know about police operations with both neighboring agencies and those worldwide. “We’ve always found collaboration to be a powerful method of growing our own knowledge, as well as sharing with other agencies,” Ismail said. “With law enforcement agencies facing complex societal issues, recruitment shortages, and budget challenges, sharing and collaboration make us more capable of handling issues and continuing to do our jobs.” Held at LAPD’s Hooper Heliport in November, the five-day event drew representatives from 19 law enforcement agencies across the U.S. and Canada. More than 50 officers filled Air Support’s largest classroom, and although the sessions are primarily geared toward TFOs, some pilots — and even a few maintenance personnel — took part as well. This marked the 20th year Air Support has presented the seminar. Previously, the California Highway Patrol (CHP) had offered a similar program until budget cuts ended it. LAPD stepped in to continue the tradition. Greg Doyle Photo Where CHP’s format emphasized general aviation skills, LAPD focused on TFO training. Pilot training across airborne law enforcement is shaped by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations, but no such community-wide standardization exists for TFOs. Because of the size and scope of its mission, Air Support has developed its own comprehensive TFO training program. The 14-week new-hire course is taught to recruits who pass a rigorous selection process and concludes with patrol flights conducted alongside pilots who also serve as TFO instructors — mirroring the field training new officers receive after the academy. This layered training environment became the catalyst for Air Support to create a large-scale event to share its knowledge with other departments, with each participant carrying additional capability back to their own unit. Air support units throughout the U.S. have long found TFO-training resources scarce. One FLIR camera vendor offered an in-depth program, but it focused solely on that company’s product line, leaving units using other systems without comparable training. Greg Doyle Photo As FLIR and camera technology rapidly proliferated, the range of equipment and tactics grew faster than documentation. To address that gap, LAPD aimed to bring together all FLIR vendors to share operational knowledge of their products — and vendors enthusiastically responded with material and speakers. The Air Support TFO Training Team designed the sessions to be highly collaborative, inviting input from vendors, partner air support units, and subject matter experts. Daily schedules were packed with presentations and practical instruction. Training also included several lecture sessions led by Chief TFO Manny Dickerson. He opened the week with a three-hour ground school covering fundamental topics and establishing a baseline of knowledge for the group. Jack Schonely, a retired Air Support pilot and TFO, taught a day-long session on suspect tactics, drawing heavily from his widely circulated book Apprehending Fleeing Suspects. He encouraged participation, and attendees responded with their own experiences, prompting lively discussions that deepened the group’s understanding of foundational air support tactics. Greg Doyle Photo Vendor experts also expanded the group’s knowledge of FLIR camera systems, their supporting components, and their most effective applications in crime suppression. Additional team members from LAPD Air Support and other agencies contributed insights on specialties such as K9 coordination and perimeter management. LAPD Air Support pilots and TFOs presented short lectures on managing emergencies during tactical operations, including how to quickly triage events to decide whether to hold the perimeter or return to routine patrol. Chief TFO Dickerson added another session on managing pursuits, emphasizing officer safety throughout. During the week, attendees were treated to a lunch visit at the LAPD Academy, a historic campus that has trained officers since 1932. Participants later received Certificates of Completion to support their training-credit requirements, and instructors moved through the group afterward, answering final questions and congratulating guests on their accomplishments. The week served as an impressive demonstration of LAPD Air Support’s depth of knowledge on one of the most important subjects in police aviation — and as a testament to the unit’s dedication to sharing and collaborating with other agencies. The enthusiasm that filled Air Support’s hangar and classroom affirmed that these principles deliver powerful rewards for everyone involved. The commitment to continue — and even expand — that tradition appears to be in very good hands. Hughes 369D | N161LA December 5th, 2025 | Locust Grove, Oklahoma Accident Location • City: Locust Grove • State: Oklahoma • Latitude: 36.22111 • Longitude: -95.2525 • Airport ID: H71 Aircraft Info • N Number: N161LA • Make: Hughes • Model: 369D • Aircraft Category: Helicopter • Amateur Built: No FAA Registry Inquiry For: N161LAPilot Info • PIC Name: Tsikoudakis, Emanuele • Gender: Male • Pilot Age: 56 • Pilot Hours: • Flight School: No • Instructional Flight: No • Pilot Certification: Commercial Pilot • IFR Rating: Yes • Pilot Error: Unknown • Pilot Medical: 2nd Class Medical • Pilot Incapacitation: No Analysis • Date: December 5th, 2025 • Time: 9:10 AM Local Time • Day / Night: Day • VMC / IMC: VMC • Phase Of Flight: Maneuvering • Total People Onboard: 1 • PIC Fatality: 1 • PAX Fatalities: 0 • Ground Fatalities: 0 • Total Fatalities: 1 • NTSB No: • NTSB Travel: Unknown • AQP Classification: 7a) TERRAIN COLLISION - POWERLINES, C-FIT Probable Cause DTSB: Pending. The helicopter is reported to have struck an object during hover. NTSB: NONE Recommendation DTSB: Pending. NTSB: NONE TERRAIN COLLISION - POWERLINES, C-FIT Hughes 369D | N161LA CALENDAR OF EVENTS . Singapore Airshow 2026 - FEBRUARY 3-6, 2026. . 60th Annual SMU Air Law Symposium - March 31 - April 1, 2026 (Irving, TX) . 2026 ACSF Safety Symposium; April 7-9, 2026; ERAU Daytona Beach, FL . 2026 NBAA Maintenance Conference; May 5-7, 2026; New Orleans, LA . BASS 2026 - 71st Business Aviation Safety Summit - May 5-6, 2026 | Provo, Utah . The African Aviation Safety & Operations Summit - May 19-20 | Johannesburg, South Africa . Safeskies Australia - Australia’s renowned Aviation Safety Conference - Canberra Australia 20 and 21 May 2026 . 2026 NBAA Business Aviation Convention & Exhibition (NBAA-BACE) Oct. 20-22, 2026 | Las Vegas, NV Curt Lewis