Flight Safety Information - April 1, 2026 No. 065 In This Issue : Incident: Commute E145 near Jackson on Mar 30th 2026, engine problem : Incident: India Express A320 near Lucknow on Mar 30th 2026, smoke on board : Beechcraft B100 King Air - Electrical Problem (Panama) : Airbus A350-941 - Engine Failure (Pacific Ocean) : Nellis Air Force Base pilot injured in F-35 jet crash north of Las Vegas : Sick passenger dies mid-flight after cabin crew forgets to attach mask to oxygen tank, suit says : Republic Airways pilots mistakenly contact JFK air traffic control tower while landing at LaGuardia Airport : Lithium-ion Battery Fires: Understanding Risks and Containment : SFO faces major delays as FAA reduces arrivals over runway work, safety issues : Business Aircraft Accident Reports: April 2026 : European Aviation Body Eyes Safety Risks as Conflict Squeezes Flight Corridors : USAIG Promotions : Calendar of Events Incident: Commute E145 near Jackson on Mar 30th 2026, engine problem A Commute Air Embraer ERJ-145 on behalf of United, registration N14203 performing flight UA-4302 from Knoxville,TN to Houston Intercontinental,TX (USA), was enroute at FL360 about 250nm northeast of Jackson,LA (USA) when the crew decided to divert to Jackson for a safe landing on Jackson's runway 16L about 35 minutes later. The FAA reported: "CommuteAir Flight 4302 landed safely at Jackson-Medgar Wiley Evers International Airport in Jackson, Mississippi, around 11:50 a.m. local time Monday, March 30, after the crew reported an engine (Ae3007) issue. The Embraer ERJ 145 was traveling from McGhee-Tyson Airport in Knoxville, Tennessee, to George Bush Intercontinental / Houston Airport in Texas. The FAA will investigate. " The aircraft is still on the ground in Jackson about 20 hours after landing. https://avherald.com/h?article=5373b43e&opt=0 Incident: India Express A320 near Lucknow on Mar 30th 2026, smoke on board An Air India Express Airbus A320-200, registration VT-EXA performing flight IX-1523 from Bagdogra to Delhi (India) with 148 people on board, was enroute at FL360 about 90nm east of Lucknow (India) when the crew declared emergency reporting smoke from the avionics panels. The crew released the passenger oxygen masks. The aircraft landed safely on Lucknow's runway 27 about 20 minutes later. Emergency services did not find any evidence of smoke, heat or fire. The aircraft is still on the ground in Lucknow 25 hours after landing. https://avherald.com/h?article=5373b266&opt=0 Beechcraft B100 King Air - Electrical Problem (Panama) Date: Tuesday 31 March 2026 Time: c. 12:46 LT Type: Beechcraft B100 King Air Owner/operator: N980VC Corp Registration: N980VC MSN: BE-19 Year of manufacture: 1977 Fatalities: Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2 Other fatalities: 0 Aircraft damage: Substantial Location: Panamá Pacífico International Airport (BLB/MPPA), Balboa - Panama Phase: Landing Nature: Private Departure airport: Panama City Albrook-Marcos A. Gelabert International Airport (PAC/MPMG) Destination airport: Cartagena-Crespo Airport (CTG/SKCG) Confidence Rating: Information is only available from news, social media or unofficial sources Narrative: A Beechcraft B100 King Air, N980VC, was climbing out of Panama City when the crew realized that there was an electrical problem. Upon attempting to extend the gear thy could not revive a down a locked indication. The crew diverted to Panamá Pacífico International Airport (BLB/MPPA), Balboa, for an emergency landing. The landing resulted in all gear subsequently collapsing and both propellers being damaged. Nobody was injured. https://www.aviation-safety.net/wikibase/568653 Airbus A350-941 - Engine Failure (Pacific Ocean) Date: Tuesday 31 March 2026 Time: c. 07:00 LT Type: Airbus A350-941 Owner/operator: Delta Air Lines Registration: N513DZ MSN: 277 Year of manufacture: 2019 Engine model: Rolls-Royce Trent XWB-84 Fatalities: Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 246 Other fatalities: 0 Aircraft damage: Unknown Location: off Arica, Chilean Sea - Pacific Ocean Phase: En route Nature: Passenger - Scheduled Departure airport: Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport, GA (ATL/KATL) Destination airport: Santiago-Arturo Merino Benitez Airport (SCL/SCEL) Confidence Rating: Information is only available from news, social media or unofficial sources Narrative: Delta Airlines flight DAL147 from Atlanta to Santiago, operated by an Airbus A350-900, N513DZ, was en route off the coast of Chile when it suffered the failure of one of its engines. The aircraft diverted to Antofagasta where a safe landing was made. https://www.aviation-safety.net/wikibase/568657 Nellis Air Force Base pilot injured in F-35 jet crash north of Las Vegas LAS VEGAS (KLAS) — A pilot from Nellis Air Force Base was injured following a crash north of Las Vegas on Tuesday. The crash took place 25 miles northeast of Indian Springs within the controlled airspace and restricted federal property of the Nevada Test and Training Range, according to a Nellis Air Force Base spokesperson. The pilot was flying an F-35 from Nellis Air Force Base when it crashed and was treated for minor injuries. Emergency responders were on-scene, and there was no impact on populated areas, according to Nellis Air Force Base. “The safety of our personnel and the community remains our top priority,” a spokesman for Nellis Air Force Base added. https://www.8newsnow.com/news/local-news/nellis-air-force-base-pilot-injured-in-f-35-jet-crash-north-of-las-vegas/ Sick passenger dies mid-flight after cabin crew forgets to attach mask to oxygen tank, suit says When Porscha Tynisha Brown collapsed aboard a Korean Air flight from Washington, D.C., to Seoul, clutching her chest and struggling to breathe, members of the cabin crew responded with an oxygen mask to place over her nose and mouth. However, Brown continued to gasp for air, and soon “lost consciousness and became nonresponsive,” according to a federal lawsuit reviewed by The Independent. A number of passengers rushed over to assist, as flight attendants “alternated between panicking, observing and taking notes,” the complaint alleges. “At no point in time did the Korean Air flight personnel attempt to take charge of the situation, provide instructions to the volunteering passengers, or render aid to Ms. Brown,” it contends. The pilot eventually diverted to Japan, where Brown, a civilian employee for the U.S. Department of Defense, was pronounced dead. “Only after the flight made its emergency landing did [Brown’s travel companions] learn that the Korean Air flight personnel had never plugged the oxygen mask into the oxygen tank,” according to the complaint. “Consequently, during the frantic attempts by passengers to save Ms. Brown’s life, Ms. Brown never received supplemental oxygen from the oxygen tank provided by Korean Air flight personnel.” Had the cabin crew responded properly, Brown “would not have experienced intense physical and emotional pain before dying at the age of 33,” the complaint states. Attorney Hannah Crowe, who is representing Brown’s estate in the suit, described her as “a really remarkable young woman.” “She was at the beginning of her young adulthood, and was a really accomplished and beloved member of her community,” Crowe told The Independent. She said that all airlines have strict policies and procedures for how to respond when passengers have a medical emergency, and to deviate from those protocols is to invite tragedy. Darren Nicholson, Crowe’s co-counsel, said he found the circumstances of Brown’s death particularly disturbing. “What is unusual about this case is that the apparent violations are so bad, it really shocks the conscience how the airline personnel handled this situation,” Nicholson told The Independent. “There were some very simple things they should have done, that they didn’t do.” Korean Air did not respond to a request for comment. On March 29, 2024, Brown boarded Korean Air flight 94, set to fly from Washington Dulles International Airport to Incheon International Airport in Seoul, South Korea. She was going there on vacation with three friends, according to the complaint in her case, filed March 27 in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Brown, a Maryland native with a master’s degree and plans to pursue a doctorate, worked at Fort Belvoir, a U.S. Army installation in Virginia, as a civilian DoD employee, the complaint states. A workplace safety specialist, Brown received an award of excellence from her garrison commander four days before she left for Korea, the complaint continues. Brown died aboard a flight from DC to Seoul. Her family is now suing Korean Air, alleging the cabin crew failed to provide sufficient medical assistance (US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia) Around 12 hours into the 15.5-hour flight, Brown – who had just told one of her travel companions that she was feeling fine – got up to go to the restroom, the complaint goes on. A few minutes later, the complaint says a flight attendant got on the PA and asked if there was a doctor on board. Putting two-and-two together, Brown’s friends hurried to the back of the plane, where they found Brown on the floor, grasping at her chest while repeating, “I can’t breathe,” according to the complaint. “Korean Air flight personnel handed an oxygen mask to Ms. Brown to place over her face, leading [her friends] to believe that Ms. Brown was receiving oxygen,” the complaint states. “Despite the mask, Ms. Brown’s belabored breathing continued and she continued to indicate… that she could not breathe.” Several passengers tried to assist, but Brown soon blacked out, the complaint says. Flight personnel fetched a medical kit, and the passenger volunteers gave Brown a shot of an epinephrine, which did not reverse her symptoms. At this point, the crewmembers brought over the onboard defibrillator and set it down, according to the complaint. However, though they were all trained on how to use the machine, the Korean Air crew did nothing and provided no instructions, it alleges. Instead, the Good Samaritans were left to figure it out on their own, according to the complaint. “Several times, and in the presence of Korean Air personnel, the… machine gave the audio command, ‘[S]hock advised, shock advised,’” the complaint states. “The passengers, who were not trained on the… machine, did not know that they needed to press the ‘shock’ button to administer a shock. Consequently, no lifesaving shock was administered to Ms. Brown.” With the situation getting worse by the second, the captain made an emergency landing in Osaka, Japan, where she was rushed to Rinku General Medical Center and pronounced dead, according to the complaint. “Ms. Brown’s Japanese death certificate lists her cause of death as ‘acute cardiac failure,’” it says. Traumatized, Brown’s three friends then had to figure out the logistics of getting her remains back to the U.S. from Japan, a country none of them had ever been to before and where they knew no one, Crowe told The Independent. The global incidence of medical emergencies aboard commercial aircraft runs somewhere between 18.2 per million passengers and 39 per million passengers, or one every 212 flights, depending on the study. Survival rates in the event of cardiac arrest are far lower than those that occur on the ground, a team at the Duke University School of Medicine found. “The potential for a very unfortunate outcome is high because flight crews often lack proper training to deal with these types of situations," attorney Abram Bohrer, who specializes in cases involving airlines but is not involved in Brown’s lawsuit, told The Independent. When a person dies mid-flight, International Air Transport Association guidelines say the body should be moved to a seat “with few other passengers nearby,” if possible, and restrained with a seat belt “or other equipment.” “Close the eyes, and cover the body with a blanket up to the neck if a body bag is not available,” the guidelines suggest. Last year, a couple were reportedly forced to sit beside a corpse aboard a Qatar Airways flight from Melbourne, Australia, to Doha, Qatar, after a fellow passenger died 10 hours into the 14-hour flight and was stored next to them for the remainder. “They tried to wheel her up towards business class, but she was quite a large lady and they couldn’t get her through the aisle,” traveler Mitchell Ring told an interviewer at the time. Earlier this month, a woman in her 60s died shortly after takeoff aboard a British Airways flight from Hong Kong to London, and was stashed in a galley until the plane landed at Heathrow some 13 hours later. A “foul smell” reportedly soon began to waft about the cabin, which was blamed on the galley’s heated floor. In 2024, a Turkish Airlines captain died while piloting a passenger plane from Seattle, Washington, to Istanbul, Turkey, forcing the crew to make an emergency landing in New York. The crew attempted a medical intervention but it was “ineffective,” Turkish Airlines spokesperson Yahya Ustun wrote on X. The complaint filed in Brown’s case says the Korean Air crew violated company policy by not rendering effective aid, and accuses them of waiting too long to declare a medical emergency and not diverting sooner. “As a direct and proximate result… Ms. Brown was caused to suffer great pain, distress, agony, and mental anguish,” the complaint states. https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/sick-passenger-dies-mid-flight-134810383.html Republic Airways pilots mistakenly contact JFK air traffic control tower while landing at LaGuardia Airport Republic Airways pilots mistakenly contacted the wrong New York air traffic control tower while landing at LaGuardia Airport earlier this month, according to reports and authorities. Delta connection flight 5752, operated by Republic Airways, was gearing up to land at LaGuardia Airport on March 15 when the pilots contacted the tower at John F. Kennedy Airport — roughly 10 miles away, CBS News reported. A Delta Airlines jet on the runway at LaGuardia Airport, with a "To New York" sign in the background. Republic Airways pilots mistakenly contacted the wrong New York air traffic control tower while landing at LaGuardia Airport earlier this month. Air traffic controllers at JFK Airport sounded baffled by why the LaGuardia-bound flight from Washington, DC, was requesting clearance to land, according to air traffic control audio obtained by the outlet. The pilot could be heard saying, “Brickyard 5752, LaGuardia Tower,” to which the JFK Tower controller responded, “Brickyard 5752. I’m sorry, where are you?” “2-mile final, Brickyard 5752,” the pilot confirmed. “2-mile final where?” the JFK tower controller asked. “Runway 4,” said the pilot. “At LaGuardia?” the controller asked, to which the pilot confirmed, “Yes, ma’am.” “This is Kennedy Tower, please go to LaGuardia Tower,” the controller quickly responded. “Oh my goodness. Alright,” the pilot said. “That’s crazy,” another pilot uttered. A spokesperson for Republic Airways told The Post that the flight initiated a go-around after the slip-up and landed at LaGuardia Airport without incident. Delta Airlines confirmed its flight crew was not aboard the aircraft. “If the airplane would have landed at LaGuardia without receiving landing clearance, it would have been a very bad mistake,” Robert Sumwalt, a former National Transportation Safety Board chairman, told CBS. “I flew for 31 years, I was an airline pilot for 24 years, [and] I’ve not heard of this particular error occurring. We want to learn from it, so we can keep it from happening again,” Sumwalt said. The mix-up happened exactly a week before Air Canada Express Flight 8646 smashed into a Port Authority truck on LaGuardia Airport’s Runway 4 — killing two pilots and injuring 41 others. https://nypost.com/2026/03/31/us-news/republic-airways-pilots-mistakenly-contact-jfk-air-traffic-control-tower-while-landing-at-laguardia-airport/ Lithium-ion Battery Fires: Understanding Risks and Containment On average, two lithium-ion battery thermal runaway events occur every week, mostly while aircraft are in cruise Lithium-ion battery fires are an increasing risk for aviation, with more incidents and greater severity in recent years. The threat of these fires exists on any flight at any time. Uncontained, these fires can lead to a catastrophic loss of an aircraft in minutes. Although passengers may not recognize these dangers, the industry is actively working on improved mitigation and containment strategies. Underwriters Laboratories' Thermal Runaway Incident Program (TRIP)—a voluntary program that tracks and trends lithium battery incidents—indicates that the risk of a lithium-ion battery fire is at its highest point in five years of data collection. On average, there are two lithium-ion battery thermal runaway events per week; over half of those events occur during the cruise phase of flight, often the furthest point from a suitable airport. Thermal runaway is defined as a phenomenon where the lithium-ion battery enters an uncontrollable, self-heating state. In addition to extreme heat, fire, and smoke, experts are now concerned with the vapors that release harmful toxins. TRIP surveys suggest that the average passenger brings four rechargeable devices onboard and often (one in five passengers) packs rechargeable batteries in their checked luggage. Half of all Americans, according to the surveys, know nothing about the dangers of lithium batteries. Once alerted to the risks, passengers show high levels of concern. Industry experts understand the growing risk of lithium-ion batteries traveling onboard aircraft and are concerned that operators are ill-equipped to handle an in-flight event. Lithium Battery Air Safety Advisory Committee chairman Bob Brown said, “After six years of expert analysis, our committee reached a clear finding: lithium battery fires can outpace traditional firefighting methods rapidly, and most aircraft are not equipped with containment tools proven to manage these events under real-world conditions.” The frequency of these events is troubling, Brown added. “Industry data shows more than two lithium battery events occur worldwide every week, and the trend continues upward. More concerning is that most aircraft do not carry containment systems capable of controlling these events once they escalate.” A hidden danger of a lithium-ion battery going into thermal runaway is the toxins released in confined spaces. “The thermal runaway vapors are definitely not conventional ‘smoke’ as they contain toxic and flammable components,” Batt-Tek Consulting’s George Brilmyer explained. “In a confined space such as a bedroom or aircraft, the toxins can reach dangerous concentrations that may do permanent damage to your eyes and lungs, per National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and the Acute Exposure Guideline Level -1 (AEGL-1) safety specifications.” The Stage for Thermal Runaways In general, lithium-ion batteries are rechargeable batteries that employ a Nobel-prize-worthy electrochemical process (intercalation) to store energy. Lithium-ion batteries are widely used in many consumer products because they offer higher specific energy, greater energy density and efficiency, and longer cycle and calendar life compared to other rechargeable batteries. In the three decades since its introduction, the volumetric energy density increased threefold, while its cost decreased tenfold. Higher-capacity lithium-ion batteries contain multiple cells. As an example, a battery for a large electric vehicle may contain 4,000 to 6,000 cells. As described, lithium-ion batteries store a lot of energy. Damaged, overheated, overcharged, or otherwise in distress, Brilmyer added, “the battery goes into thermal runaway and delivers all of its energy through a spontaneous and self-sustaining chemical thermal degradation reaction.” Lithium-ion batteries in failure will overheat, smoke, emit toxic fumes, and eventually explode or catch on fire. Brilmyer, in his paper “The Hidden Dangers of Vapor Toxicity in Li-ion Battery Fires,” describes the five stages of the thermal runaway process and extrapolates published vapor concentration data to describe the dangers of these toxic vapors in confined spaces. Understanding each stage of the thermal runaway will provide insight into managing a potential battery fire or an actual battery fire. As described, a thermal runaway is a multistep chemical reaction: 1) Onset; 2) Escalation; 3) Runaway; 4) Propagation; and 5) Aftermath. Onset is the first stage where an “event” initiates cell overheating. Examples of these initiation events may include the cell being damaged by crushing, puncturing, over-charging, or internal damage related to a manufacturing defect. In this stage, the cell begins to overheat (internal temperature rises), and the protective layer on the carbon or graphite anode begins to decompose. Escalation is the second stage where cell self-heating takes control of the reaction. The unprotected anode releases heat and flammable vapors as it attacks the electrolyte. The cell temperature continues to increase; throughout this stage, there is the possibility of internal shorting. Also, during this stage, the internal pressure of the cell begins to climb, and cells begin to bulge. At this point, there is no turning back since the thermal runaway is well underway. Full runaway is the third stage, where the cell demonstrates the features of a runaway reaction (the cathode releases its oxygen). Large quantities of vapors are now released through the safety vent or the rupture of the case. These vapors are toxic and typically flammable; flames and fires are only seen about 50% of the time. Propagation is the fourth stage, where—in devices that use multi-cell batteries (tablets, laptops, power banks, et cetera)—a “domino effect” begins. The thermal runaway of one cell begins to propagate to neighboring cells, starting a cascading effect that travels from one cell to the next. During this stage, the heat and thermal runaway quickly spread through the whole battery module or pack. Aftermath is the fifth and final stage of a thermal runaway. Often thought of as the “reignition” step, larger batteries with multiple cells may take hours or days to conclude the propagation. Generally, this stage will continue until all cells have released their energy. Battery fire on aircraft Lithium-ion battery fire events remain highly dangerous when they occur in a confined space such as an aircraft cabin or cockpit, and it’s important for operators to develop mitigation measures. Toxic Vapors As highlighted, the thermal runaway is a chemical reaction that is almost unstoppable. According to Brilmyer, “Inside the lithium-ion cell, the high-power anode and cathode may spontaneously react with each other, or the electrolyte, to deliver massive amounts of heat and toxins. Unlike most other batteries, the solvent and electrolyte in the lithium-ion battery is flammable, and that is the crux of the lithium-ion thermal runaway problem.” Of importance, there is no set timeline between each stage of a thermal runaway; it is volatile and unpredictable. According to Brilmyer, “…should the cell experience any significant amount of heat—either internal or external—one or more of these stages may spontaneously set the entire process into action.” Thus, for the flight crew, early recognition and action are paramount. Brilmyer further lists the chemical compounds that have been identified in the vapors emitted from a lithium-ion cell during a thermal runaway and the concentration of these compounds pre-ignition and post-ignition. Of the compounds identified, they are either highly toxic, flammable, or explosive. Common compounds include carbon monoxide (CO) and carbon dioxide (CO2). Hydrogen fluoride (HF) and phosphoryl fluoride (POF3)—along with some ultra-fine metal oxides—are very hazardous, have higher concentrations during pre-ignition, and are extremely corrosive to lungs, eyes, and skin, and can be fatal or cause long-term health effects in higher doses. HF is heavier than air and will collect near the floor. According to Brilmyer, “At the top of this list of toxins is HF, which is the biggest immediate risk to human health—flames or no flames. The NIOSH-identified immediate danger to health and life level of HF is only 6 ppm (during a thermal runaway—pre-ignition HF is measured at 20 to 200 ppm).” In a confined space such as an aircraft, this is extremely dangerous. A thermal runaway is hazardous at any stage. Pre-ignition, there are high concentrations of toxins. Post-ignition, there are flames, explosions, and extreme heat. As described, any lithium-ion battery that is compromised (damaged, distressed, overheated, et cetera) has the potential to enter the irreversible stages of a thermal runaway—volatile, unpredictable, and unstoppable—and an operator must have a swift plan to mitigate and contain this risk. Containment Plan “Government testing conducted by Transport Canada highlights a reality every professional pilot should understand,” noted the Lithium Battery Air Safety Advisory Committee’s Brown. “Once a lithium-ion battery event progresses beyond approximately 19 minutes, it can become operationally uncontrollable using traditional onboard firefighting tools.” Brown continued: “At that point, heat output can overwhelm handheld extinguishers, toxic smoke and flammable vapors increase rapidly, and crew workload rises sharply as visibility and systems degrade. Diversion timelines compress quickly, often leaving crews with fewer viable options. The operational lesson is straightforward: early and effective containment matters. Delay can allow a manageable event to become a serious, aircraft-threatening emergency.” Engaged with government and industry, Brown has extensively researched battery fires for nearly two decades. “Aircraft fire protection systems were never designed to manage prolonged, chemically driven lithium-ion battery failures,” he said, further explaining that, unlike conventional Class A or B fires, thermal runaways are self-sustaining, prone to re-ignition, and capable of producing large volumes of toxic and flammable gases. In fact, ISO3941:2026 has just been issued and classifies lithium-ion battery fires as “Class L,” a totally new fire class. But ISO has yet to map a “Class L” fire extinguisher. According to Brown, here is the crux: many of the containment bags and systems developed in the past 15 years are not effective at containing lithium-ion battery fires. “Data from airline SMS programs, Underwriters Laboratories’ TRIP surveys, and testing conducted by the FAA and EASA consistently show that many commonly used containment bags leak smoke and fine particulate matter, lose structural integrity over time, and fail to manage sustained heat or repeated re-ignition,” he said. Brown further stressed, “Compounding this risk is a critical regulatory fact pilots should clearly understand. There is no FAA certification or approval pathway for lithium battery fire containment bags. Claims of ‘FAA-approved’ equipment are marketing language, not safety standards. In practice, labels and assumptions do not guarantee performance when it matters most.” In fact, FAA emphasized this point when issuing AC 120-80B, Firefighting of General and High-Energy In-Flight Fires, on March 16, 2023. Guidance in the advisory circular stated, “Manufacturers may have stated in their advertisement and marketing videos that their products are ‘FAA-certified,’ ‘successfully tested by the FAA,’ or ‘meet FAA standards.’ However, the Fire Safety Branch of the FAA William J. Hughes Technical Center and the Aircraft Certification Service emphasize that no FAA test standards exist for these containment products, nor does the FAA have a mechanism to approve these products.” UL 5800 Standard Underwriters Laboratories (UL) developed UL 5800 to become the first comprehensive aviation safety standard created specifically to address lithium-ion battery fires. Unlike short-duration flame tests, UL 5800 requires demonstrated performance under realistic, energized battery conditions. According to this standard, to earn the “UL” stamp of approval, a compliant system must contain heat, flames, smoke, and toxic emissions continuously for six hours, even with batteries capable of propagation and re-ignition. Involved in much of the UL 5800 testing, Brown said, “That six-hour requirement is not arbitrary. It reflects how lithium battery events behave in flight. Operationally, UL 5800-compliant systems are designed to buy time—time to divert safely, time to manage crew workload, and time to prevent smoke and fumes from incapacitating the cockpit or cabin.” Likewise, regulator momentum is accelerating. “Regulators and industry bodies are rapidly aligning around this risk,” he said. “After publishing test data demonstrating how commonly used fire bags fail, the FAA issued SAFO 25002 directing operators to reassess lithium battery fire risks, emergency equipment, and onboard mitigation capability. EASA testing has reached similar conclusions regarding smoke leakage and containment shortcomings.” Brown continued, “UL 5800-compliant containment devices became the committee’s top recommendation for aircraft. Testing by the FAA and EASA validated the importance of having a certified safety standard. The industry consensus is shifting away from improvised or unverified solutions and toward certified performance-based mitigation strategies.” As specified in SAFO 25002, operators should, at a minimum, accomplish the following: Assess onboard safety equipment, such as fire extinguishers, water sources, and fire containment products, to ensure they have the capability to mitigate fires from lithium batteries. Evaluate aircraft components, emergency equipment, and passenger items that may become involved in a thermal runaway event. Review procedures that minimize the potential for smoke inhalation by passengers and crew members. Bottom line The threat of lithium-ion battery fires is real, frequent, and unforgiving of delay. According to Brown, “Testing shows a lithium-ion battery fire can rapidly overwhelm traditional firefighting methods, while no regulatory safety net ensures that onboard containment tools will perform as expected.” While UL 5800 changes that, operators must also employ a comprehensive plan that develops a strategy to mitigate the battery fire threat for crew members and passengers alike. https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/air-transport/2026-03-01/lithium-ion-battery-fires-understanding-risks-and SFO faces major delays as FAA reduces arrivals over runway work, safety issues SFO faces delays as FAA reduces flights over safety, runway work Travelers face delays at SFO after the FAA cuts a third of arrivals due to safety concerns and runway construction. SAN FRANCISCO -- Travelers should expect delays when they fly through San Francisco International Airport after the Federal Aviation Administration this week cut a third of its arrivals because of safety concerns and runway construction. A temporary runway project and permanent FAA rule change announced Tuesday means San Francisco's airport will go from 54 plane arrivals an hour to 36 arrivals. It is not yet clear if any flights will be canceled. A deadly runway crash between Air Canada jet and a fire truck at New York's LaGuardia Airport in March is the latest air-traffic safety calamity. But the aviation administration said the rule change is not triggered by broader safety concerns and only affects the San Francisco airport. Here's what to know: Concerns involve parallel runways FAA spokesman Ian Gregor said officials decided that SFO's longstanding practice of landing two planes at the same time on closely spaced parallel runways that are just 750 feet (228.60 meters) apart - along with congested airspace - was too dangerous. He could not say why the practice had been allowed. The San Francisco safety concerns are unique to that airport because of how close the parallel runways are and how complicated the airspace is with several surrounding airports. The San Francisco Bay Area is served by three major airports, including San José Mineta International Airport and Oakland San Francisco Bay Airport, and smaller ones. MORE: Travelers encounter long waits at some airports as DHS shutdown affects security checkpoints The airport operates on two sets of parallel runways. The north-south runways are out of commission for six months for a repaving project that is responsible for nine of the 18 flight-per-hour reductions. The rule change will affect the remaining nine flights. Long-term effect of delays is unclear Doug Yakel, an airport spokesman, said about 25% of arriving flights are expected to be delayed by 30 minutes or more. He said the airport is working with the FAA to improve arrival times but didn't provide more specifics on whether flights might be canceled. United Airlines said it is reviewing the rule change to see if any changes need to be made to its flight schedule, a spokesperson said by email. United is the largest airline at SFO. Alaska Airlines, the second-largest carrier, said in an email that the situation was changing by the day, with 15 flights delayed out of SFO on Monday and none experiencing delays on Tuesday. LIVE UPDATES: Delays, cancellations hit SFO, OAK after FAA's 10% flight reduction The runway under construction is set to reopen on Oct. 2, which should alleviate some of the delays, Yakel said. https://abc7news.com/post/san-francisco-international-airport-faces-major-delays-faa-reduces-arrivals-runway-work-safety-issues/18819113/ Business Aircraft Accident Reports: April 2026 Preliminary and final accident reports, April 2026 Preliminary Reports Four Killed in Slackline Collision MD Helicopters 369FF, Jan. 2, 2026, Superior, Arizona All four occupants died after the helicopter struck an uncharted slackline about 600 feet above a valley floor. The main line and the backup line that secured the walkers’ safety harnesses were suspended between anchor points three-quarters of a mile apart; above them was a visualization line marked by five windsocks and “about ten” LED lights. The line had initially been erected one week earlier but taken down on December 30 in anticipation of high winds and rain. The slackliners were raising it again on the morning of the accident when one of them saw the helicopter fly past “at about eye level” toward the lines. Striking them, it “appeared to slow or even reverse direction,” pitched up, and yawed right. The tailboom separated, and the fuselage rolled inverted and crashed. “Material consistent in appearance to the highline/slackline webbing” was found embedded in the vertical stabilizer, and “striations similar to the webbing weave pattern” were on the horizontal stabilizer and two of the main rotor blades. The helicopter’s two wire cutters showed no evidence of contact. First responders reported that about an hour after the accident, a second helicopter flew about 10 feet under the visualization line. A notam for the presence of a “tight rope” 3 nm south of the Superior Municipal Airport had been filed on December 21 and was active from December 26 to January 6. Hydraulic Alert Preceded Gear Collapse Honda Aircraft HA-420, Jan. 16, 2026, Amarillo, Texas The airline transport pilot and all four passengers evacuated without injury after the HondaJet lost both braking and steering capability during a precautionary landing. In cruise flight about 1.5 hours after departure, the pilot saw a yellow crew alerting system message for an air data computer, followed 15 minutes later by one for low hydraulic pressure. He diverted to Amarillo International Airport (KAMA) and landed safely, but lost brake pressure during taxi. The brakes locked when the pilot applied the parking brake; after releasing it, he lost both braking and steering control, and the jet’s left wing struck a parked deicing truck. Turboprop Destroyed in Low Approach Epic E1000, Feb. 13, 2026, Steamboat Springs, Colorado The 1,150-hour commercial pilot and all three passengers were killed when the single-engine turboprop struck a mountainside three miles south of the Steamboat Springs Airport (KSBS) during a night GPS approach. The initial ground scar was found at an elevation of 8,175 feet, about 75 feet below the mountain’s peak. Minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the GPS approach to Runway 32 is 9,100 feet; the last altitude recorded by the airplane’s Garmin G1000 avionics suite was 8,221 feet with the autopilot engaged. Air traffic control vectored the flight to the TILLI waypoint, the initial approach fix for both the RNAV Z approach to Runway 32 and the RNAV-E approach, and cleared it for the “RNAV approach” to SBS. The pilot read back “RNAV 32 to Steamboat Springs” and was cleared to change to the airport’s common traffic advisory frequency. No further communications were received after his readback of the frequency change. The prevailing weather included calm winds with 10 miles of visibility, broken clouds at 1,600 feet agl, and a 2,400-foot overcast. Recorded engine parameters indicated normal function, and about 100 gallons of fuel remained in the wreckage. Notes on the Runway 32 approach plate, stored in the GPS, indicated that neither circling nor straight-in approaches were authorized at night for that runway. Another note warned “Visual Segment-Obstacles,” meaning that there are constraints below the MDA. Runway Overrun after Citation Excel Failed To Rotate Cessna Citation 560XL, Feb. 6, 2026, Danville, Kentucky A Citation 560XL was substantially damaged after the airplane failed to rotate when the pilot applied back pressure at 103 knots during the takeoff roll at Stuart Powell Field Airport (KDVK) in Danville, Kentucky, resulting in a runway overrun, a snow berm strike, and the collapse of all three landing gear, according to the NTSB preliminary report. The two crew members and two passengers were not injured. The crew planned to depart KDVK for Bowling Green-Warren County Regional Airport (KBWG) in Kentucky to pick up a passenger, then continue to Fort Wayne International Airport (KFWA) in Indiana. The airplane was being operated as a Part 91 personal flight. The pilots completed a preflight walk-around using the checklist, reviewed preflight paperwork, and checked the weather for both airports. They added 5,000 pounds of fuel, bringing the projected takeoff weight to 18,000 pounds. During taxi to the 5,000-foot runway, the crew completed the before-takeoff checklist, including verifying flight control position and movement. No anomalies were noted. At 103 knots, the pilot pulled back on the yoke, but the airplane did not rotate and all three landing gear remained on the runway. Confirming the airspeed was above 103 knots with no rotation, the pilot elected to abort. “The pilot applied maximum braking and deployed the thrust reversers,” the report noted. “The airplane began to slow down, but he knew insufficient runway remained to stop. The airplane contacted a snow berm at the end of the runway, and all three landing gear collapsed.” The airplane came to rest in a field after traveling roughly another 450 feet farther. The main landing gear were forced up through the wings, causing substantial damage. There was no post-accident fire. A weather observation at KDVK 10 minutes before the accident recorded visual conditions, scattered clouds at 12,000 feet agl, 10 miles visibility, and winds from 210 degrees at 10 knots. The temperature was -1 degrees C. The crew had filed an IFR flight plan. The NTSB did not travel to the accident scene. The airplane was retained for further examination. No probable cause has been determined; the investigation is ongoing. Final Reports Ditching Traced to Electronic Failure Sikorsky S-92A, Feb. 28, 2024, offshore of Sotra, Vestland County, Norway A failed circuit card in the autopilot’s pitch actuator caused the helicopter to pitch up some 30 degrees and eventually crash backwards into the ocean at a groundspeed of 40 knots during a night search-and-rescue (SAR) training flight. The helicopter’s emergency flotation system did not deploy. Despite the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre’s prompt response to signals from both the helicopter’s emergency locator transmitter (ELT) and three crew members’ personal locator beacons (PLBs), the accident site’s distance from all available airborne resources meant that rescue aircraft did not arrive for 45 minutes. They found that the SAR nurse had been killed, while the five survivors were in “poor condition” from hypothermia and injuries of varying severity. The upset occurred while using the helicopter’s autopilot in Mark on Top (MOT) mode to approach a training beacon dropped earlier in the flight. The approach profile called for the helicopter to turn into the wind and hover at 50 feet, 50 meters (160 feet) aft and left of the point at which MOT mode is engaged. The cockpit voice recording showed that the captain recognized the pitch excursion and attempted to go around five seconds before impact; the crash smashed several left-side windows, and the helicopter quickly filled with water. Extensive disassembly and post-accident testing determined that a Schmitt Trigger filtering component used in the spring deflection and current feedback circuits of the pitch actuator motor driver card had failed. Following its investigation, the Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority issued recommendations for improved personal survival gear for SAR crews and mandated cockpit video recordings in operations where voice and flight data recorders are already required. Passenger Killed in Practice Autorotation Bell 206L-4, July 6, 2025, Hespero/Safron Residence Heliport, Alberta, Canada The pilot suffered a serious head injury, and the only passenger was fatally injured in a hard landing that collapsed the skids; one main rotor blade severed the tail boom, while the other was separated outboard of the blade doublers by contact with the upper wire cutter. There was no post--impact fire. The accident occurred at the end of a 34-minute private VFR flight from the Lodge at Panther River to Hespero/Safron River Heliport, both in Alberta. Flight track data downloaded from the helicopter’s Garmin GTN 750 showed that the pilot overflew the landing area northbound about 700 feet agl and made a 360-degree turn before “commencing a turning approach consistent with an autorotation” terminating in a power recovery, according to the Transportation Safety Board (TSB). After landing, the pilot took off again, making a 270-degree turn and levelling off at 300 feet. A descending left turn “in another descent consistent with an autorotation” reached 43 degrees bank, and the descent rate peaked at 2,362 fpm at 100 feet agl. In the next five seconds, the helicopter pitched up 14 degrees, and the descent rate slowed to 125 fpm, only to increase again over the flight’s final six seconds. Impact occurred 21 seconds after the descent began. The commercial helicopter pilot also held private pilot privileges for airplanes and had logged about 3,500 hours of rotary-wing flight, including 1,800 in the accident helicopter, 33 in the preceding 60 days, and had completed a pilot proficiency check in the same helicopter the month before. He was reported to conduct recurrent training that included turning autorotations from below 300 feet at six-month intervals. The TSB noted that the prohibition on conducting emergency training during commercial operations does not apply to private flights. https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/business-aviation/2026-04-01/business-aircraft-accident-reports-april-2026 European Aviation Body Eyes Safety Risks as Conflict Squeezes Flight Corridors Wars, including a widening conflict in the Middle East, are heightening risks for aviation as flight corridors are squeezed and drones become more widespread, Europe’s top aviation safety regulator told Reuters. The month-old Iran war is reshaping airspace across the Middle East and increasing disruption to flights, including clogging routes between Asia and Europe that previously transited or flew over the region. On top of the prolonged Russia-Ukraine conflict and fighting between Pakistan and Afghanistan, that has forced airlines into ever tighter corridors, notably over Azerbaijan and central Asia. “It’s clear that concentrating traffic on certain routes, the availability of the airspace for air traffic control, the fact that traffic can use routes which are not so usual, can generate safety risks,” said Florian Guillermet, executive director of the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). The comments are the first from Europe’s aviation regulator since the Middle East war erupted at the end of February. Aviation is among the most disrupted industries, with pilots facing growing risks from missiles and drones. Guillermet, a sector veteran who previously ran France’s air traffic control system, said crew and controllers were trained to anticipate and mitigate risks. Even so, shutting airspace or restricting flights were sometimes unavoidable. “We in aviation have the means to mitigate risk. One of those means is to clear the skies,” he said, adding that while this disrupted passengers, it remained the most effective way to keep traffic density “under control at all times.” EASA, which brings together 31 European countries, is preparing a regular overhaul of its aviation strategy at a time when one of the safest transport modes faces rising hazards – from GPS interference and drones to operational threats such as unstable approaches and runway incidents. On Friday, EASA renewed its advisory to avoid airspace over Iran, Israel and parts of the Gulf until April 10. Clearer Rules for Counter-Drone Usage EASA is also drafting clearer guidance on what powers can be used to counter the surge in rogue drone activity targeting civil airports, Guillermet said. EU airports are grappling with drone incidents that security experts link to so-called “hybrid warfare” – a mix of military force, cyberattacks and other interference. Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, drones have become a key weapon on both sides. Airports from Stockholm to Munich have faced drone-related disruptions, suspected though not confirmed to be linked to the conflict. Guillermet said clearer rules were needed, especially given the rise of “state-related” drone activity. “We are facing a very different landscape today. So that’s what the agency is revisiting right now,” he said in an interview at the agency’s Cologne headquarters. “The situation we face right now is more kind of hybrid warfare.” EASA is examining technical requirements for devices used near airports. “We are considering as a possibility to put some kind of requirements that have to be applicable to the devices that will be used under those circumstances, so that we clearly say, ok, this is a range of powers that you have to use,” he said. https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2026/03/31/864027.htm We are pleased to announce the following promotions which are effective April 1, 2026: Promotions Brett Bernard, Regional Manager, General Aviation Underwriting in our New York Office, has been promoted to Senior Vice President. Mitzi Rasmussen has been promoted to Senior Vice President and is Regional Manager, General Aviation Underwriting in our Chicago Office. Kathleen McCoy, Senior Vice President in Chicago, has been promoted to Underwriting Operations Manager. Jacqueline Gonzalez, Assistant Vice President in our New York Office Accounting Department, has been promoted to Senior Accountant. Phurba Sherpa has been promoted to Senior Accountant and is Assistant Vice President in our New York Office Accounting Department. Robert Barrett of our Atlanta Office has been promoted to Assistant Vice President, Senior Claims Representative. Serafina Vitale has been promoted to Assistant Vice President, Senior Claims Representative in our NewYork Office Special Risks Claims Division. Jessica Tilson, Underwriting Support Coordinator in our Wichita Office has been promoted to Underwriter. Andrea Vanderpool, Underwriting Assistant in the Toledo Office, has been promoted to Quality Assurance Coordinator working with the Underwriting Operations group. Please join me in congratulating all on their well-deserved promotions! John T. Brogan President & CEO CALENDAR OF EVENTS . 2026 ACSF Safety Symposium; April 7-9, 2026; ERAU Daytona Beach, FL . 2026 NBAA Maintenance Conference; May 5-7, 2026; New Orleans, LA . World Aviation Training Summit - 5-7 May 2026 - Orlando . BASS 2026 - 71st Business Aviation Safety Summit - May 5-6, 2026 | Provo, Utah . The African Aviation Safety & Operations Summit - May 19-20 | Johannesburg, South Africa . Safeskies Australia - Australia’s renowned Aviation Safety Conference - Canberra Australia 20 and 21 May 2026 : APSCON/APSCON Unmanned 2026 – Ft. Lauderdale, FL - July 13-17, 2026 : Aircraft Cabin Air International Conference - 22-23 September 2026 . IATA World Maintenance & Engineering Symposium (23-25 June, Madrid, Spain) . 2026 NBAA Business Aviation Convention & Exhibition (NBAA-BACE) Oct. 20-22, 2026 | Las Vegas, NV Curt Lewis