Flight Safety Information - October 27, 2026 No. 211 In This Issue : ICAO Withdraws Syrian Airspace Warning After 13 Years : Almost a quarter of European airline pilots fly when too fatigued to work : Incident: Jet2 B738 at Birmingham on Oct 25th 2026, temporary runway excursion : Andros crash triggers aviation safety moves amid ‘break silos’ call : Incident: Lufthansa A388 at Munich on Aug 17th 2026, touched down short of runway : ALPA Helps Lead the Way in Mitigating Flight Safety Risks : Flight encountered severe turbulence, resulting the injur : Safety is Built In, Not Assumed: Keeping Collision Avoidance Ahead of the Traffic : Cessna 208 Caravan suffered a collapse of the left main gear : Calendar of Events ICAO Withdraws Syrian Airspace Warning After 13 Years Passenger traffic at Damascus International Airport, October 19, 2026 (General Authority of Civil Aviation and Air Transport). Enab Baladi • 26/10/2026 5:00 pm Omar Hosari, head of Syria’s General Authority of Civil Aviation and Air Transport, said the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has withdrawn its previous warning concerning Syrian airspace, describing the move as a significant step toward reintegrating Syrian airspace into the international aviation network and ending an advisory that had remained in effect for more than 13 years. Hosari told the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) on Monday, October 26, that ICAO had confirmed its previous advisory would no longer serve as a basis for operational decisions concerning Syrian airspace. Risk assessments would instead rely on updated international frameworks and standards adopted in the aviation sector. He added that the development would allow countries, civil aviation authorities and international airlines to reassess their decisions regarding the use of Syrian airspace, whether for overflights or flights arriving at and departing from Syrian airports. This could help increase overflight traffic and encourage additional airlines to consider resuming services to Syria. Does Not Mean All Operational Restrictions Are Lifted Hosari stressed that withdrawing the warning does not automatically lift all operational restrictions imposed by certain countries or regulatory authorities. However, the move supports technical and diplomatic efforts to address those restrictions based on internationally recognized aviation safety and security assessments. He noted that the authority continues to coordinate with ICAO and international civil aviation authorities to strengthen confidence in the safety of flight operations in Syrian airspace and meet the technical and operational requirements needed to expand air connectivity with regional and international markets. Hosari emphasized that restoring Syrian airspace’s normal role in international air navigation is a strategic priority for the authority, given its potential to strengthen air connectivity, increase passenger and transit traffic, and support economic activity and investment in Syria’s civil aviation sector. The warning issued by ICAO concerning the safety of civilian aircraft operating within the Damascus Flight Information Region dates back to March 22, 2013, according to a document listed among Syria-related materials on the website of the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The advisory remained in effect for more than 13 years. At the time, the advisory warned of potential risks to the safety of civilian flights within the Damascus Flight Information Region amid the war in Syria. It also cited reports of incidents in which civilian aircraft crossing Syrian airspace had been exposed to risks from flying near locations where munitions and missiles were being launched. Reviving the Aviation Sector Syria has recently witnessed a notable shift in air traffic, with a significant increase in overflights and flights operating at its domestic airports. This development reflects a new phase in Syria’s regional aviation position, as its airspace is increasingly viewed as a strategic corridor connecting Europe, Asia and the Gulf states. Economic expert Majdi al-Jamous told Enab Baladi in a previous report that Syria is currently seeking to revitalize its aviation sector amid growing regional, Arab and international engagement, following years of decline during the war. Al-Jamous explained that aviation and overflight traffic are important economic activities, making their revival a national and economic priority. He noted that recent regional developments have contributed to increased use of Syrian airspace as an aviation corridor due to changes in flight routes. He added that these developments, alongside regional circumstances, including the situation involving Iran, have led to a significant increase in flights crossing Syrian airspace. He estimated that overflight traffic had risen by approximately 400% compared with last year, while efforts continue to gradually rebuild Syria’s civil aviation sector. Al-Jamous noted that the relevant authority is working to develop the sector. However, he said its current contribution to the economy cannot yet be considered significant, particularly compared with countries and aviation hubs with extensive infrastructure, such as the United States and Dubai. According to al-Jamous, estimated monthly revenues of approximately $6 million to $7 million remain limited and do not have a substantial impact on the national economy. He explained that overflight traffic remains directly linked to political and regional conditions, noting that potential understandings between the United States and Iran could prompt airlines to return to their previous routes through Iranian airspace, reducing traffic over Syria. According to al-Jamous, developing Syria’s aviation sector depends on regional and security stability, alongside international agreements that could help transform the country into an attractive aviation corridor. He noted that Syria’s geographic location provides a strategic advantage, but the country remains less competitive than Egypt and Türkiye, which play major roles in connecting continents. Al-Jamous concluded by emphasizing that developing the sector requires advanced infrastructure, expanded agreements with international airlines, and improvements to aircraft fleets and airports. He said achieving domestic and regional stability could eventually allow Syria to compete in the overflight sector alongside regional countries, including Türkiye, Egypt, the Gulf states and Iraq. Almost a quarter of European airline pilots fly when too fatigued to work Pilots report pressure to extend working hours and fears of penalties for declaring themselves unfit to fly Carmen Aguilar García and Sarah Marsh Mon 26 Oct 2026 02.00 EDT Three in four European airline pilots have taken microsleeps in the cockpit, while almost a quarter routinely fly despite being too fatigued to work, according to a report. The findings, based on a survey of almost 7,200 captains and first officers by the European Cockpit Association (ECA), include pilots reporting insufficient rest, pressure to extend working hours and fears of being penalised for declaring themselves unfit to fly. Almost a quarter (24%) of pilots admitted they usually continue flying rather than report themselves unfit due to fatigue, while another 16.8% said they call in sick instead. In aviation, fatigue can result from long duty hours, insufficient rest, irregular schedules and flying across time zones, which disrupt the body’s natural sleep cycle. It is a significant safety concern because it can impair pilots’ judgment, slow their reactions, reduce alertness and impair responses to unexpected situations. Under European aviation safety regulations, airlines are required to have systems in place to identify, monitor and manage crew fatigue. The survey, conducted in August, found that three-quarters of respondents had experienced at least one microsleep – a brief, involuntary episode of sleep – while operating an aircraft in the previous four weeks. Pilots working for airlines based in Ireland and Malta reported the highest levels of microsleeps. More than a third said they were not getting enough rest to prevent fatigue from building up over time. Despite the prevalence of exhaustion, only one in three pilots said they usually reported themselves unfit for duty when fatigued. Half admitted they had operated a flight in the three months before the survey when they should have declared themselves too fatigued to fly. Almost half of the respondents said they feared negative consequences from management if they reported themselves unfit because of fatigue, while just 11.9% trusted their airline’s fatigue reporting system. Ian Holder, the managing director of the aviation safety consultancy Baines Simmons, said the results showed persistent differences in how airlines and national authorities manage fatigue. “This survey captures how European pilots experience fatigue risk management in practice,” he said. He stressed that the findings represented pilots’ first-hand experiences rather than a direct measurement of aviation safety outcomes, but said the consistency of the results over three years highlighted areas requiring attention. Holder pointed to Finland and the Netherlands as evidence that stronger fatigue reporting cultures were achievable. Pilots working for airlines based in Ireland and Malta were among the most likely to fear management reprisals and the least likely to trust the reporting systems. The proportion of pilots who said they would fly when fatigued was higher in Spain, Ireland and France. Two in five of the pilots working for airlines based in Spain and a third of those working for Ireland- and France-based airlines said they usually fly when fatigued. That compares with only one in 10 of the pilots flying for an airline based in the UK. Only 15.6% of pilots at low-cost carriers believed their airline managed fatigue risks well, compared with 18.6% at ACMI or wet-lease operators – companies that supply aircraft, crew, maintenance and insurance to other airlines. Incident: Jet2 B738 at Birmingham on Oct 25th 2026, temporary runway excursion By Simon Hradecky, created Monday, Oct 26th 2026 14:42Z, last updated Monday, Oct 26th 2026 14:42Z A Jet2.com Boeing 737-800, registration G-JZHE performing flight LS-1310 from Venice (Italy) to Birmingham,EN (UK), landed on Birmingham's runway 33 at 14:19L (14:19Z) but veered left off the runway until the left main gear rolled over soft ground before the aircraft returned onto the runway. The aircraft taxied to the apron. The airline reported the aircraft temporarily left the runway due to extraordinary weather conditions. At the time Storm Boelo battered the British Islands. The aircraft is still on the ground in Birmingham about 24 hours after landing. Metars: EGBB 251550Z 27014KT 240V300 9999 SCT045 11/03 Q1005= EGBB 251520Z 27014KT 230V300 9999 SCT044 12/02 Q1005= EGBB 251450Z 27015KT 230V310 9999 SCT046 12/02 Q1004= EGBB 251420Z 28019G32KT 9999 SCT049 12/01 Q1003= EGBB 251350Z 28017G28KT 9999 SCT049 12/01 Q1002= EGBB 251320Z 27018G30KT 240V310 CAVOK 12/02 Q1002= EGBB 251250Z 27019G34KT 9999 BKN048 12/02 Q1001= EGBB 251220Z 28018G31KT 240V320 9999 SCT049 12/02 Q1000= EGBB 251150Z 28019G32KT 240V310 9999 SCT047 12/02 Q1000= EGBB 251120Z 28018G35KT 240V310 9999 SCT049 12/01 Q0999= EGBB 251050Z 27018G29KT 240V320 9999 SCT046 12/02 Q0998= Ground observer video (Video: Airport Action): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HWNHiDcJqnc Andros crash triggers aviation safety moves amid ‘break silos’ call THE SMOULDERING remains of a Cessna 402 belonging to Flamingo Air after the plane went down in a pine forest in North Andros killing all ten people onboard, including the pilot. As of Thursday, October 22, 2026 By NEIL HARTNELL TRIBUNE Business Editor nhartnell@tribunemedia.net THE BAHAMAS must “break the silos” and stop only responding when “crisis” strikes, aviation executives argued yesterday, after investigators urged greater surveillance and “preventative intervention” in response to the fatal Independence Day plane crash. Dr Anthony Hamilton, president of the Bahamas Association of Air Transport Operators, and administrative chief at Southern Air Charter, told Tribune Business that “no one has a bye” and it will require “commitment and sacrifice” from all industry stakeholders to correct safety woes and other deficiencies impacting the industry. He spoke out after the Aircraft Accident Investigation Authority (AAIA), in the latest update on its probe into the tragic crash that claimed the lives of the pilot and nine passengers during the 53rd Independence celebrations, revealed it has issued two safety recommendations for the Civil Aviation Authority of The Bahamas (CAAB) to implement. One calls for greater “preventative regulatory intervention” by the CAAB, which has primary responsibility for regulating commercial and civil aviation, including the creation of risk-based safety “triggers” and escalated supervision for operators and pilots who display a “pattern” of involvement in safety-related events. The other recommends heightened safety oversight and surveillance during peak domestic air travel periods such as public festivals, regattas, homecomings and other festivals as a means to boost regulation amid more frequent and packed flights. “The AAIA recommends that Civil Aviation Authority Bahamas establish and implement a documented, risk-based internal safety event triggering and escalation mechanism for regulated entities based on the number, frequency, severity and pattern of safety-related events within a defined period,” the AAIA said. In reply, it added that the Civil Aviation Authority Bahamas has already supplied it with its “existing risk-base surveillance methodology”, which analyses “occurrence trends, compliance histories, audit findings and corrective action performance to prioritise oversight”. The Civil Aviation Authority Bahamas had also advised it is “formalising” a documented safety event triggering and escalation mechanism that features “defined trigger criteria, escalation levels, responsibilities” and other provisions plus provided three examples of its actual application. The AAIA said this addresses “the intent” of its safety recommendation and “presents a credible framework of preventative regulatory intervention”. However, signalling that it is now looking for execution and implementation by Civil Aviation Authority Bahamas, it added that it will continue to review the procedure, records and “consistent operational application” before deeming the issue closed. As for the second safety-related recommendation, the AAIA said: “AAIA recommends that the Civil Aviation Authority Bahamas develop and implement a formal, risk-based mechanism to identify periods of significantly increased domestic aviation activity - including public holidays, regattas, festivals and homecomings and apply enhanced safety oversight during such periods. “CAA-B advised that, effective September 2026, satellite office surveillance coverage was expanded from a general 9am to 5pm schedule to 7am to 6pm, incorporating weekends and public holidays while retaining risk-based prioritisation. CAA-B also indicated that inspector surveillance records would be examined to verify completion and documentation of assigned activities. “Expanded coverage is a positive and relevant measure, particularly for weekends and public holidays,” the AAIA added. “Continued review of evidence is required to establish that CAA-B has implemented a formal method for anticipating event-driven peaks in domestic aviation activity, and systematically directing enhanced oversight to the associated risks, as distinct from merely extending routine coverage hours.” The AAIA said it considered Civil Aviation Authority Bahamas’ reply as “responsive”, but that not “all corrective actions have been completed”. Dr Hamilton, responding to the two recommendations, told Tribune Business that “all of us have a role to play” in the industry in addressing weaknesses, adding that “it’s only when a crisis comes that we pay attention to it”. “Honestly, Neil, there’s nothing new about this,” the Southern Air and Association chief said. “We’ve known this for a long time about this industry. The industry needs a mindset of looking to ensure we are moving forward together. There are a number of silos in the industry, and they need to be broken. “It’s only in a crisis situation where we’re seeing a coming together in that instance, and it’s blown away. We need to determine deliberately and intentionally as fas as the aviation industry in The Bahamas is concerned. It’s a bunch of lip service until we sit down and do it properly, and hold everyone accountable. “No one has a bye,” Dr Hamilton added. “All of us are in this together, and it will not be corrected if we continue to operate in silos. None of us are exempted. In the Bahamian aviation industry, we must come together and fix it. If we come as a group, we will be able to fix this. “It will take commitment and sacrifice, and many are not prepared to make the commitment and sacrifice to get this corrected. We can talk as much as we like, but until we get together and be focused about it… Everyone from top to bottom has to come to the table to be focused to correct it otherwise it’s a waste of time, a bunch of lip service and we’ll continue to make the mistakes.” Dr Hamilton added that the Bahamian aviation industry needs an “atmosphere and environment” where all elements and voices are able to participate, otherwise there will be push back and resistance to reforms and change. “A lot of things have been lagging,” he said. “There’s a lot of lag in the system. By design the system is supposed to be highly effective. That’s the only way in which the industry is going to make it. We just have to roll up our sleeves and get this thing done. Talking is over with the loss of those lives. “Without exception, all of us have a responsibility. The entire ecosystem of Bahamian aviation has to be brought to account, stand up, take the necessary responsibility and do what we need to do… Follow through must take place so that the kind of investment being made, and that ought to be made in the industry, we can get true investment value for the benefit of all of us. That’s the way forward.” Captain Randy Butler, the former Sky Bahamas chief executive and an ex-Civil Aviation staffer, who is now focused on industry safety, confirmed to Tribune Business that the Air Accident Investigation Authority’s release confirms it is looking for the Civil Aviation Authority Bahamas to demonstrate it is implementing and executing the two safety recommendations. He suggested the issues raised by the Air Accident Investigation Authority are “not entirely new” as a similar call for greater oversight during Bahamian holidays and peak travel periods had been made in the wake of the 2022 Long Island regatta crash, which claimed one life. “I think it points to the fact that surveillance and safety oversight must be continuous,” Captain Butler said. “They left it open so they did not close the question. The whole goal is prevention. It’s active prevention and continued Civil Aviation oversight. “We have this identical recommendation again, so we did not follow through the first time this came about. We will probably be here again if Civil Aviation does not implement. The promise to do is just not enough.” Captain Butler added that, during his time with Civil Aviation, any operator with a history of accidents or safety incidents “would have been elevated to heightened surveillance” and due diligence through inspections of their planes, operations and flying on their flights. “The latest recommendations issued by the Aircraft Accident Investigation Authority (AAIA) following the tragic San Andros aircraft accident highlight the importance of continuous, effective aviation safety oversight throughout The Bahamas,” he added. “The recommendations address two essential responsibilities: Identifying repeated or serious safety concerns before they develop into greater dangers, and strengthening surveillance during periods of increased domestic aviation activity, including regattas, homecomings and public holidays.” Captain Butler, though, said: “These concerns are not entirely new. Following the June 2022 accident involving a US-registered Piper Navajo at Deadman’s Cay, Long Island, which claimed one life, the AAIA raised a safety concern with the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in February 2023. “That concern called attention to the need for enhanced surveillance of US-registered aircraft operating in The Bahamas. The FAA responded that enhanced efforts would be undertaken in collaboration with CAA-B. “It is therefore reasonable to ask what surveillance arrangements were subsequently implemented, what results were achieved and how those earlier lessons are informing the Authority’s present actions.” “I also welcome the reported extension of surveillance office hours during weekends and public holidays,” Captain Butler continued. “However, extending office hours is not necessarily the same as conducting effective inspections where aviation activity and risks are greatest. “In an archipelago such as The Bahamas, inspectors must have the personnel, transportation and resources necessary to reach the Family Islands regularly. I welcome the Prime Minister’s expressed confidence in our aviation safety system. My objective is to support that confidence through transparency, continuous improvement and demonstrated results. “I am not suggesting that these recommendations establish the cause of the San Andros accident or prove regulatory failure. That investigation remains ongoing. “We cannot simply promise to address safety concerns. We must implement corrective actions, verify that they work and ensure that the same concerns do not continue to arise after another tragedy. Aviation safety must be about prevention, not merely responding to accidents.” Incident: Lufthansa A388 at Munich on Aug 17th 2026, touched down short of runway By Simon Hradecky, created Tuesday, Aug 18th 2026 12:00Z, last updated Thursday, Oct 22nd 2026 19:37Z A Lufthansa Airbus A380-800, registration D-AIML performing flight LH-459 from San Francisco,CA (USA) to Munich (Germany) with 352 passengers and 24 crew, landed on Munich's runway 26L but touched down short of the runway threshold. The aircraft rolled out without further incident and taxied to the apron. The airline reported the aircraft contacted at least one of the runway threshold lights causing damage to the treads of a number of tyres. The occurrence is being investigated by the BFU. The aircraft is still on the ground in Munich about 20 hours after landing. On Aug 28th 2026 the BFU reported the occurrence was rated a serious incident stating the aircraft had "contact with runway lights". An investigation has been opened. On Oct 22nd 2026 the BFU released their preliminary report summarizing the sequence of events: At the time, the First Officer was Pilot Flying (PF) and the Pilot in Command (PIC) the Pilot Monitoring (PM) and trainings captain. For the First Officer, this flight served as training flight for re-qualification after an interruption of about eight months. In the cockpit was a senior first officer as third pilot, who did not perform any flight-related duties during this phase of the flight. According to their statements, the flight crew had discussed the corresponding ILS approach for a possible landing on runway 26R and the Required Navigation Performance (RNP) approach for a landing on runway 26L during their approach briefing. According to NOTAM, an ILS approach to runway 26L was not possible. The RNP approach to runway 26L should occur with the FLS (FMS Landing System) “Guidance”. At 15:03:12 UTC at about FL 180, the PIC requested from Munich Radar a heading of 110° or 115°, respectively, to fly around a bad-weather area in the vicinity of Munich Airport to the north, according to the air navigation service provider’s radio communications recording. One minute later, Munich Radar assigned a heading of 115°. According to the flight crew statement, the estimated cloud tops of the bad weather area were at about 13,000 ft AMSL. At 15:07:26 UTC, the airplane turned into the downwind leg after the instruction from Munich Radar and at 15:08:53 UTC, the flight crew received the clearance to descend 5,000 ft AMSL (QNH 1,015 hPa). At 15:10:17 UTC, the PIC contacted Munich Arrival and received the allocation for the RNP approach to runway 26L. For this approach, the minimum was 1,810 ft AMSL (340 AGL) and the required visibility 800 m. According to the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR), the last ATIS the flight crew considered was the one of 15:12 UTC. It included a visibility between 2,700 m and 7,000 m, the prevailing weather situation with thunderstorms and heavy rain and mist, cloudy skies of 3 to 4 octas with a lower limit of 1,600 ft AGL and 5 to 7 octas with a lower limit of 3,700 ft AGL, among other things. The runway condition was reported as “wet” and the touch-down zone as “slippery”. The flight crew decided to use maximum reverse thrust for the landing. Until the landing, additional ATIS were published at 15:16 UTC and at 15:20 UTC. The one of 15:20 UTC included a minimum visibility of 1,200 m, among other things. At 15:14 UTC, the airplane turned into the base leg for runway 26L and at 15:15:15 UTC, to a south-west heading, after the instruction from Munich Arrival. At the same time, the flight crew received the clearance for the RNP approach to runway 26L. According to the flight crew’s statement, in the downwind and the base legs runway 26R was visible, runway 26L, however, was hidden by clouds. According to the CVR recording, at 15:16:36 UTC the PIC mentioned to the First Officer the “Weather Ahead Message” of the weather radar which was indicated on the navigation display and warns of potential weather or turbulence hazards. At 15:18:20 UTC, at about 5,000 ft AMSL, the airplane began to descent on the virtual FLS Beam of the RNP approach of runway 26L. According to the flight crew’s statement, the on-board weather radar showed only areas of light or moderate precipitation (green and yellow areas) in the final approach area of runway 26L. After the airplane was fully configured for landing at about 2,300 ft AGL (3,800 ft AMSL) with flaps position 3 and extended landing gear, the First Officer disconnected Autothrust. At the time, autopilot AP2 and the Flight Directors (FD) were engaged and were in F-G/S (FLS Glideslope) and F-LOC (FLS Localizer) mode. Autobrake was armed in position Brake To Vacate (BTV) to vacate the runway via taxiway B4. According to the flight crew, at about 1,200 ft AGL heavy rain began, visibility deteriorated and the use of the wind shield wipers did not significantly improve it. At 15:21:54 UTC, at about 800 ft AGL, the flight crew received the landing clearance from Munich Tower together with the information of the prevailing wind from 310° with 24 kt, minimum 9 kt and maximum 36 kt. According to the flight crew, at about 100 ft above the minimum they could see the approach lighting of runway 26L. The First Officer continued the approach and shortly afterwards he disengaged the autopilot and then flew manually. At the time, the flight crew estimated visibility to be 500 m or less. According to the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) recording, the FD Pitch Order was between 300 ft AGL and 160 ft AGL at about 1°. The centre of the „Fixed Aircraft Symbol“ was correspondingly below the FD Pitch Bar. At this time, the F-G/S deviation increased to 0,7 Dot below (– 0,7 Dot). From 160 ft AGL on up until close to the ground FD Pitch Order was +/−0.5°. The F-G/S deviation increased further and at about 80 ft AGL it was 2 Dots below (-2 Dots) and then reached a “full scale deflection”. At about 100 ft AGL, the flight crew could see the runway, according to their statements. At 30 ft AGL, the PIC realised that they were too low and informed the First Officer accordingly, according to the CVR recording. Two seconds later (at 15:23:06 UTC) the airplane touched down with a vertical acceleration of 2.1 g, according to the FDR recording. The touch-down point of the main landing gear by the Body Landing Gears was 18.8 m before the threshold of runway 26L on a paved surface. The Precision Approach Path Indicators (PAPI) were never visible during the entire approach, according to the flight crew’s statement. After touch-down, the First Officer set maximum reverse thrust. During roll out on the runway below 70 kt, he handed controls over to the PIC and informed Munich Tower about the low visibility below the minimum. The airplane left runway 26L via taxiway B6. Ground control informed the flight crew that ground handling services had been suspended due to thunderstorms and instructed them to stop the airplane on taxiway B6 ahead of taxiway T. From that point on, it took 51 minutes to reach the final parking position 317 on Apron 3. Immediately after the landing, a new ATIS (15:23 UTC) with a new QNH of 1,014 hPa was published. The flight crew noted the change in QNH. According to their statements, the flight crew listened in addition to the ground frequency and later to the apron frequency, also on another radio to the Tower frequency. As they listened, they learned that lights in the area of the runway threshold 26L had been damaged. Runway 26L was temporarily closed for inspection and cleaning work. After the airplane had been parked at the parking position, the senior first officer saw the damage on some of the main landing gear tires and reported it to the other pilots. Then the flight crew realised that the landing had occurred ahead of the runway threshold. Metars: EDDM 171820Z AUTO 26007KT CAVOK 19/15 Q1015 NOSIG= EDDM 171750Z AUTO 28006KT 250V310 9999 VCSH FEW///CB 20/15 Q1014 NOSIG= EDDM 171720Z AUTO 26010KT 9999 VCSH FEW///CB 20/16 Q1014 NOSIG= EDDM 171650Z AUTO 26009KT 9999 VCSH FEW035 FEW///TCU 20/17 Q1014 NOSIG= EDDM 171620Z AUTO 27009KT 240V310 9999 VCSH FEW031 FEW///TCU 20/17 Q1014 RESHRA BECMG NSW= EDDM 171550Z AUTO 27010KT 240V330 9999 +SHRA VCTS FEW016 SCT033 FEW///CB 18/16 Q1014 RETS BECMG NSW= EDDM 171520Z AUTO 25012KT 3800 1200 R26R/P2000N R26L/P2000N +TSRA BR SCT016 BKN036 BKN///CB 18/17 Q1015 BECMG 9999 NSW= EDDM 171450Z AUTO 25007KT 220V280 9999 VCSH BKN015 BKN041 FEW///TCU 19/16 Q1015 RESHRA NOSIG= EDDM 171420Z AUTO 28007KT 230V330 9999 -SHRA BKN013 BKN042 FEW///TCU 18/17 Q1015 RESHRA BECMG NSW= EDDM 171350Z AUTO 28009KT 260V320 9999 SHRA BKN010 BKN043 FEW///CB 18/17 Q1015 BECMG NSW= EDDM 171320Z AUTO 26015KT 230V300 6000 +SHRA VCTS BKN011 BKN024 BKN049 SCT///CB 18/17 Q1015 RETS BECMG NSW= EDDM 171250Z AUTO 25014KT 1900 1200 R26R/1900N R26L/P2000N +SHRA BR FEW006 SCT021 BKN032 SCT///CB 17/16 Q1015 RETS BECMG NSW= EDDM 171220Z AUTO 26012KT 9000 SHRA FEW032 SCT///TCU 19/17 Q1015 TEMPO TSRA= ALPA Helps Lead the Way in Mitigating Flight Safety Risks By John Perkinson, Senior Staff Writer October 5, 2026 Editor’s note: In celebration of ALPA’s 95th anniversary this year, this nine-part Air Line Pilot series revisits some of the union’s “wins”—successful campaigns, projects, and products that make public air transportation safer and more secure and that improve the working lives of the union’s members. ALPA Wins, Part 8: Voluntary Reporting Programs For many decades, airline pilots were reluctant to report issues they witnessed on the flight deck or during airline operations for fear that these might be viewed as performance deficiencies. At a time when the vast majority of aircraft accidents were still attributed to pilot error, rather than to a causal chain of events, pilots remained silent about many of the operational issues they encountered because they feared that, in reporting these events, they would lose their jobs. To address this concern, ALPA actively advocated that pilots should be able to speak freely and share their experiences, without fear of reprisals, as they’re in a unique position to observe and collect an inordinate amount of aviation safety and security data—information that would be beneficial to airlines, the aviation industry, and, ultimately, the traveling public. With basic pilot protections now in place, an enormous amount of safety data is being shared. Today, through the Association’s continued engagement with government and the aviation community, information sharing is playing a vital role in efforts to improve the industry’s impressive safety record. Identifying Risks, ASAP On January 8, 1997, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued Advisory Circular (AC) 120-66, creating the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP). The program enables airline pilots to report safety errors, operational mistakes, and regulatory deviations without fear of FAA enforcement or company discipline to “increase the flow of safety information to both the air carrier and FAA.” Because ASAP is a voluntary safety program, individual airlines, the FAA, and pilot groups need to enter into a formal agreement, such as a memorandum of understanding, for the program and the protections to apply. All three parties play a critical role in administering a successful safety program. Prior to the inception of ASAP, in 1976 NASA and the FAA established the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Similar to ASAP, ASRS collects safety data while providing protections for FAA enforcement action if a pilot has inadvertently violated a regulation. One significant difference between the two programs is that ASRS reports are handled by NASA, whereas ASAP reports are managed “in house” by an Event Review Committee composed of representatives from the airline, the FAA, and the pilot union who jointly review each incident and collectively determine corrective actions. Acknowledging the groundbreaking creation of ASAP, Capt. Randy Babbitt, then ALPA’s president, observed, “[Z]ero accidents is the goal of a shared responsibility of government, industry, and labor organizations. Everyone in the aviation community must work together for more knowledge, better training, more effective procedures, greater emphasis on data collection, and information reporting. Certainly, this is a grand vision, but it must become a reality if we are to continue reducing our airline accident rate.” Prior to the ASAP announcement, the FAA had experimented with similar initiatives at Alaska, American, and USAir. The AC noted, “These programs included incentives to encourage employees of air carriers participating in the programs to disclose information and identify possible violations of the federal aviation regulations without fear of punitive legal enforcement sanctions.” Three subsequent ACs updated the ASAP directive, including the most recent, AC 120-66C, issued on March 31, 2020, which provided broader discretion regarding report filing timeframes. It also outlined specific exceptions for immunity, including “intentional falsification, reckless or criminal behavior, substance abuse, alcohol, or actions outside the scope of employment.” Although the Canadian aviation industry doesn’t employ ASAP, Canadian airlines operate under equivalent voluntary confidential safety reporting programs. While the exact cumulative number of ASAP reports filed by airline pilots isn’t publicly available, the vast majority have been “sole source;” therefore, most safety events identified through ASAP would never have been acknowledged if not for this landmark program. Case in Point Imagine a hypothetical event in which a flight crew inadvertently accepts an air traffic control clearance intended for a similarly identified aircraft, prompting potential confusion about a runway assignment. The problem is quickly recognized and addressed by an experienced senior pilot, who later submits an ASAP report explaining what happened and why it’s a concern. The airline’s Event Review Committee evaluates the details of the report and, instead of reprimanding the pilot, uses the systemic problem to recommend changes to pilot training to improve future communication with ATC. The airline then shares the deidentified incident through the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) system—the national safety-data program that integrates multiple aviation databases to identify risks, monitor trends, and support safety improvements across U.S. aviation—to help ensure that other carriers don’t encounter the same problem, thus providing a system fix. Quality Assurance Following a cluster of airline accidents, on February 9, 1995, U.S. Department of Transportation Secretary Federico Peña, FAA Administrator David Hinson, and Babbitt conducted a joint press conference. The event was a follow-up to a safety summit held the month before, and the trio announced a 63-page Aviation Safety Action Plan with 173 FAA/industry initiatives. Among the proposals identified was the creation of voluntary Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) programs at U.S. airlines to collect and evaluate line operations safety data. The goal was to identify hidden operational risks, unsafe events, and unstable approach precursors to prevent potential accidents or incidents. Participating airlines would allow operational parameters to be downloaded from their aircrafts’ digital flight data recorders, including speed and throttle settings, altitudes, and headings. The April 1995 issue of Air Line Pilot noted, “ALPA and the Air Transport Association [a forerunner to Airlines for America] jointly urged the FAA to encourage airlines to establish FOQA programs and to grant airlines and their employees immunity from FAA enforcement action for use of FOQA data.” “[ALPA] has supported the use of flight data recorders as a safety research and monitoring tool since 1986. As early as the 1960s, several pilot groups had negotiated contract provisions that would permit quality assurance programs,” Babbitt remarked. The FAA issued AC 120-82 on April 12, 2004, establishing the framework and guidelines for developing, implementing, and operating FOQA programs. Subsequent studies reported a significant decline in flight deviations the longer a carrier participates in the program. More than 150 airlines worldwide, including Canadian carriers, now have FOQA programs, also referred to as flight data monitoring. Sharing Data Unlike ASAP and FOQA, the FAA implemented ASIAS in October 2007 as a joint government-industry collaborative initiative, connecting multiple previously isolated safety databases into a single, comprehensive data-fusion utility to monitor known risks, evaluate the effectiveness of deployed mitigations, and detect emerging hazards to reduce the potential for accidents. Since its creation, ASIAS has been a conduit for exchanging voluntary safety data between the FAA and the U.S. aviation community, providing valuable information that all participating airlines can benefit from. For example, the system has helped identify factors leading to unintended deviations from assigned arrival or departure procedures. These deviations, if left unaddressed, could have increased the risk of a midair collision. ALPA strongly advocated for and actively supports ASIAS data-sharing networks. The Association has partnered with ASIAS since its inception, ensuring that frontline pilot perspectives, safety-data protections, and operational experiences influence policy and procedural decisions. The Association was the co-recipient of the prestigious 2008 Robert J. Collier Trophy as a charter and core member of the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST), which employed safety data systems including the foundations of ASIAS to dramatically decrease airline fatality risks. CAST brought together the FAA, airlines, manufacturers, and labor groups like ALPA to analyze flight data and implement tangible safety enhancements, and together they reduced the U.S. commercial aviation fatality risk by 83 percent between 1998 and 2008. Working Proactively and Collaboratively ASAP, FOQA, and ASIAS have paved the way for the next generation of organization-wide risk management, including programs like Safety Management Systems. Together, they’re all part of a larger strategy to better engage and build trust with industry partners as well as share information. The reason for this approach is simple. “Voluntary safety reporting programs are the core of aviation safety risk management that provide critical data and unique information,” said Jason Ambrosi, ALPA’s president, in a written statement to the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee on February 7, 2023. “These programs allow us to identify risk in the system before an accident occurs so that the changes necessary to mitigate the risks can be implemented.” Flight encountered severe turbulence, resulting the injuries Date:Wednesday 21 October 2026Time:c. 20:27 LTType: Boeing 777-222 Owner/operator:United Airlines Registration:N769UA MSN:26921/12 Year of manufacture:1995 Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 200 Other fatalities:0 Aircraft damage:None Category:AccidentLocation:off Santa Cruz Island, CA - Pacific Ocean Phase:En route Nature:Passenger - Scheduled Departure airport:Honolulu-Daniel K. Inouye International Airport, HI (HNL/PHNL) Destination airport:Los Angeles International Airport, CA (LAX/KLAX) Investigating agency: NTSB Confidence Rating: Information is only available from news, social media or unofficial sources Narrative: United Airlines flight UA1157 encountered severe turbulence, resulting the injuries of 4 flight attendants, including one that required hospitalization. ICAO Occurrence Category: TURB: Turbulence Encounter Sources: NTSB DCA27LA019 https://www.kptv.com/2026/10/22/severe-turbulence-injures-several-flight-attendants-flight-heading-los-angeles/ https://ktla.com/news/local-news/united-flight-attendants-injured-severe-turbulence-lax/amp/ https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2026-10-22/honolulu-to-los-angeles-flight-hits-severe-turbulence-4-flight-attendants-injured https://globe.adsbexchange.com/?icao=aa64ba&lat=33.291&lon=-119.247&zoom=7.6&showTrace=2026-10-22&leg=1&trackLabels×tamp=1792639771 https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/12108394 (Photo) Safety is Built In, Not Assumed: Keeping Collision Avoidance Ahead of the Traffic Combining TCAS and ADS-B In can give pilots more time to prevent midair collisions. Cam Morast Friday, October 23, 2026 at 04:04 PM ET Verified Edited By: Matt Ryan [Credit: Keena ithar | Shutterstock] Key Takeaways: This summer, two commercial passenger aircraft came within seconds of colliding over Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport before their safety systems intervened. The final line of defense was their traffic collision avoidance systems (TCAS). TCAS is an onboard safety system that alerts pilots to other aircraft in their vicinity. If the system detects a potential flight path conflict, it will issue alerts to the flight crew. These alerts are intended to bring awareness to the other aircraft and, if needed, instruct the crew to avoid the conflict. Essentially, TCAS is a final line of defense, alerting pilots after loss of separation has occurred; this could be the result of technical errors, controller oversight failures, or limitations in pilots’ situational awareness. The pilot then follows the system’s commands, helping everyone reach their destination safely, as was the case in Atlanta. Reliant on predictable human behavior These outcomes rest on the assumption that both the technology and the crew will always perform as expected. With Resolution Advisories (RA), the highest level of alert, there is a potential startle factor, combined with a very brief decision-making window. The crew will want to understand what is going on and may confirm the loss of separation by looking to other sources of information (i.e. looking out the window or at available flight deck displays). Pilots are used to having air traffic control direct them, and they might be awaiting instruction from the tower. These are all factors that may delay responses in situations where there’s very little room for error. Under the International Civil Aviation Organization standards, a pilot’s response to an RA is expected within five seconds of the alert (and half of that time in the case of a reversal). This puts significant pressure on pilots to perform maneuvers with both speed and accuracy. A study has found that the RA response decision window may be too small for even the best trained crew to always execute commands accurately, with nearly half of pilots responding weakly or incorrectly, not for lack of expertise, but due to understandable human factors. Near misses happen in the US daily, so the importance of having the best available collision avoidance technology in the flight deck is paramount. Reliable today, better tomorrow US lawmakers have recognized these pressures and are proposing regulation that would mandate ADS-B In technology in the flight deck. This mandated display of ADS-B traffic information would provide pilots with better situational awareness of surrounding traffic, allowing for a more proactive role in separation management. ADS-B In is the receiving half of the ADS-B system already fitted to commercial aircraft. It gives pilots a GPS-precise view of surrounding traffic up to 180 nautical miles, updated every second. Pairing a reactive system like TCAS II with one that offers proactive traffic awareness can earn the crew additional time to react, so conflicts are managed before the last-resort collision avoidance layer is called upon. The winning combination The benefits of ADS-B In would go beyond the flight deck. En route, for instance, ADS-B In can help by optimizing spacing through Interval Management. In our trials, ATC spent noticeably less time talking to ADS-B In-equipped aircraft, freeing the controllers to focus on their primary job, maintaining a safe airspace. Quite simply, the technology works with the procedures and the people, not instead of them. Collision avoidance systems will remain at the heart of aircraft safety. It’s a proven last line of defense. As airspace gets more congested and with the rise of EVTOL craft, pilots, passengers and ATC deserve the benefits of combining both reactive and awareness based technologies to ensure we truly have safer skies. Air Cessna 208 Caravan suffered a collapse of the left main gear on touchdown Date:Saturday 24 October 2026Time:08:40Type: Cessna 208B Grand Caravan Owner/operator:Asian One Air Registration:PK-LTF MSN:208B0922 Year of manufacture:2001 Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 10 Other fatalities:0 Aircraft damage:Substantial Category:Accident Location:Bilorai, Intan Jaya - Indonesia Phase:Landing Nature:Passenger Departure airport:Timika-Moses Kilangin (Tembagapura) Airport (TIM/WAYY) Destination airport:Bilogai/Sugapa Airport (ZGP/WAYB) Confidence Rating: Information is only available from news, social media or unofficial sources Narrative: An Asian One Air Cessna 208 Caravan, PK-LTF, suffered a collapse of the left main gear on touchdown at Bilorai, Intan Jaya. The aircraft slid down the runway and veered off the left side, impacting an embankment. Two occupants sustained moderate injuries. ICAO Occurrence Category: SCF-NP: System/Component Failure or Malfunction (Non-Powerplant) Sources: https://regional.kompas.com/read/2026/10/24/101209078/pesawat-asian-one-air-tergelincir-dan-tabrak-bukit-di-intan-jaya?source=bacajuga_artikel https://news.detik.com/berita/d-8722182/pesawat-tergelincir-usai-ban-lepas-saat-mendarat-di-intan-jaya https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/pk-ltf#42437d93 History of this aircraft Other occurrences involving this aircraft 20 June 2002N786DMIsla Nena Air Services0Vieques Airport (VQS/TJCG)sub 30 August 2003N786DMIsla Nena Air Services0near Culebra Airport (CPX/TJCP)sub 14 April 2023PK-LTFAsian One Air0Beoga Airport, Puncak Regency, PapuaminHit by ground fire 9 October 2023PK-LTFAsian One Air0Kenyam Airport, Nduga Regency, Highland PapuaminRunway excursion (veer-off) 16 February 2024PK-LTFAsian One Air0Beoga AirportminHit by ground fire CALENDAR OF EVENTS . European Aviation Training Summit 3 – 5 November 2026 • Estoril Congress Centre, Cascais, Portugal . 79TH ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY SUMMIT MONTREAL | NOVEMBER 10-12, 2026. . Airlines 2026 conference - November 11, 2026 (London) . 2026 NBAA Business Aviation Convention & Exhibition (NBAA-BACE) Oct. 20-22, 2026 | Las Vegas, NV . Gulf Flight Safety Association (GFSA)conference Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on the 28th and 29th of October 2026 . Bombardier Safety Standdown (November 10–12, 2026 in Wichita, KS) . CHC Safety & Quality Summit - 11th – 13th November 2025 - Vancouver, BC Canada . Aircraft Fire Hazards, Protection, and Investigation17 to 19 November 2026, Woburn MA : Save The Date - February 11-12, 2027 - ProDIGIQ User Conference . 2027 ACSF Safety Symposium - April 6-8, 2027 - ERAU Daytona Beach, FL Curt Lewis