Flight Safety Information - November 03, 2026 No. 216 In This Issue : Pilot Training: A Snapshot of Accidents and Issues : The Gulfstream G700 was being pushed back; jet lunged forward over running the tug : Safety board recovers voice recorder from fatal air ambulance crash : Dallas Love Field Runway 13L Closed After JSX Flight XE281 Rolls Off Runway on Landing : Outback chopper firm Fortescue Helicopters grounded over safety breaches : Eastar Jet Wins Government Awards for Aviation Safety Work : Key aircraft incidents that reshaped aviation safety rules since 9/11 : FAA Safety Briefing Magazine : Cranfield University training to boost Mahama’s aviation hub agenda and strengthen aviation safety – AIB Ghana Commissioner : Calendar of Events Pilot Training: A Snapshot of Accidents and Issues Industry experts discuss problems and solutions Accidents and safety concerns are driving discussion among experts about their causes, potential solutions, and where pilot training plays a role. © AdobeStock By Matt Thurber • Editor-in-Chief November 2, 2026 Since the Colgan Air accident near Buffalo, New York, on Feb. 12, 2009—which had its own part to play in today’s pilot training milieu—the aviation industry has witnessed accident after accident where training, or lack thereof, was a significant factor. That training works is not in doubt. The rise of sophisticated full-motion flight simulators, spurred by an insurance industry tired of paying out for the many accidents that were occurring, is one piece of incontrovertible data about the benefits of training. Another point on the data spectrum is what happened to members of the Citation Jet Pilots (CJP) Association after it implemented a program to improve training and reduce accidents that were common in the light-jet arena. At the recent CJP annual event, the association revealed that members who participate in the Gold Standard program of frequent recurrent training and other training events have had zero accidents and incidents in the nine years since the program launched. Members who participate in CJP’s flight operational quality assurance program, in place for five years, have also not had any accidents or incidents. CJP’s Safe to Land initiative contributed to that success and gave pilots a comprehensive set of tools to help prevent runway excursions. Even with such tools, however, runway excursions seem to be taking place at a significantly high rate recently. Recent Events On Sept. 1, 2026, a Cessna 560XL overran 5,960-foot Runway 12 at Porterville Municipal Airport (KPTV) in California. According to the NTSB preliminary report, “On about a 1 nm final approach, the airplane’s altitude was about 1,000 ft msl and the groundspeed was about 245 knots. The last data point, about 1,800 ft from the runway threshold, showed the airplane at about 600 ft msl, with a groundspeed of about 234 knots.” A typical approach reference speed (Vref) for the 560XL is 100 to 115 knots. “On the visual straight-in approach, the airplane was estimated to cross the runway threshold between 225-250 knots and floated about a third to halfway down the runway,” according to the NTSB. The two pilots and four passengers were not injured in this accident. On September 6, a 21 Air Boeing 767 overran Runway 30 at Miami International Airport (KMIA) after arriving over the runway threshold at 200 feet msl, 180 knots, and a descent rate of 1,536 fpm, according to flight tracking data. A typical Vref for this airplane is 130 to 145 knots. Near the end of the runway, at 120 knots and 15 seconds before the cockpit voice recording ended, one crewmember called for a go-around; then the brakes were released, and power was added. They then retarded power and stepped on the brakes again near the end of the runway. Five seconds after the go-around call, the 767 went off the end of the runway, killing five people in a vehicle. Another business jet runway excursion took place on September 21 in Libya. Three crewmembers survived the accident and resulting fire after the Citation Latitude veered off Misrata International Airport’s Runway 15 around 4,600 feet from the threshold before crossing the runway shoulder and then catching on fire. It is not known how fast the Latitude was flying during the approach and landing because its tracking information is blocked. While runway excursions comprise a high number of fatalities, according to NTSB data analyzed by upset recovery and prevention training provider Aviation Performance Solutions (APS), loss of control in-flight (LOC-I) remains the leading fatal accident cause in business aviation Part 91 operations. During the study period from 2016 through 2025, there were two LOC-I accidents, one of which was fatal, with six killed. Runway excursions tallied six accidents, with one fatality in one of the accidents. “Its lower fatality count does not diminish its operational relevance, but it represents a different consequence pattern from loss of control in-flight,” according to APS. The crew of this 21 Air Boeing 767 tried to go around 5 seconds before the jet left the runway. © NTSB Warnings Ahead of LOC-I LOC-I certainly has taken its toll on airline and business aviation operations. Harbingers of such events have surfaced during training. After an Atlas Air 767 crashed out of control near Houston on Feb. 23, 2019, killing both pilots and a third in the jumpseat, the NTSB final report cited as contributing factors deficiencies in the selection of the first officer (FO) and measurement of his performance, “which failed to address the first officer’s aptitude-related deficiencies and maladaptive stress response.” In the report, the NTSB outlined problems with the FO’s past experience, including checkride failures and the need for remedial training to pass the oral examination for his 767 type rating, as well as remedial fixed-base simulator training before starting full-flight simulator training. The FO failed his type rating checkride, according to the NTSB, “due to unsatisfactory performance in CRM [crew resource management], threat and error management, non-precision approaches, steep turns, and judgment. During a post-accident interview, the Atlas check airman who was the FO’s examiner said the FO was very nervous, had ‘very low’ situational awareness, overcontrolled the airplane, did not work well with the other pilot, omitted an emergency checklist during an abnormal event, and exceeded a flap speed. The examiner said the FO was not thinking ahead, and, when he realized that he needed to do something, he often did something inappropriate, like push the wrong button. The examiner said the FO’s performance was so poor that he worried that the FO would be unable to ‘mentally recover’ enough to complete the course.” There was information about the FO’s previous airline jobs, but Atlas never received it, even though those details related to “lack of progress in training,” an incomplete FO training event, failed oral and practical tests during his airline transport pilot (ATP) checkride, an unsatisfactory grade during a line check, and an unsuccessful captain upgrade. Instructors interviewed by the NTSB reported that “when presented with something unexpected in the simulator, the FO would get extremely flustered and could not respond appropriately to the situation. She [one of the instructors] said that when the FO did not know what to do, he became extremely anxious and would start pushing a lot of buttons without thinking about what he was pushing, just to be doing something. She noted that the FO lacked an understanding of how unsafe his actions were, and he could not see why he should not be upgraded to a captain.” The Safety Board pointed to similar notes logged by others, including at the FO’s former employers Mesa Airlines and Air Wisconsin Airlines. “Another check airman at Mesa said the FO’s stick and rudder skills were weak, and he also struggled with basic flight management system tasks. This check airman described the FO’s piloting performance as among the worst he had ever seen and noted that the FO tended to have an excuse for each of his poor performances, such as blaming his simulator partner, his instructor, or the hotel. “A third check airman at Mesa said that the FO had weak situational awareness, did not realize what was going on with the airplane at times, and had difficulty staying ahead of the airplane. She said the FO was completely unaware that he lacked skills, unwilling to accept feedback, and unhappy with her about his failure to upgrade to captain. “An instructor who taught cockpit procedures on the flight training devices at Air Wisconsin Airlines recalled that during one emergency procedures training scenario, the FO made abrupt control inputs that triggered the stick shaker and overspeed alerts. The instructor said that instead of staying engaged in the scenario and addressing the problem with his training partner, the FO just stopped what he was doing and turned around and looked at the instructor. The instructor found this reaction highly unusual.” The crash of a Colgan Air-operated Q400 led to the FAA’s controversial 1,500-hour rule. © NTSB Origins of the 1,500-hour Rule The NTSB’s Colgan Air accident final report identified significant issues with the training background of the flight’s captain. However, the backlash to that accident had more to do with pilot hours. The victims’ families promoted a legislative effort that resulted in forcing the FAA to change the minimum flight time requirement for Part 121 airline first officers to 1,500 hours, up from 250 hours, despite the fact that both pilots in that accident had logged more than 1,500 hours. The so-called 1,500-hour rule includes provisions allowing less flight time for college graduates and military pilots. Detractors of the rule say it has created an environment where prospective airline pilots are focused on quantity of hours over quality of training and have pushed for relief for those who receive simulator training. However, that continues to meet stiff opposition on Capitol Hill. As for the Colgan accident, the NTSB stated, “The probable cause of this accident was the captain’s inappropriate response to the activation of the stick shaker, which led to an aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not recover.” The NTSB didn’t address training deficiencies specifically as a contributing cause. When the Bombardier Q400’s stick shaker activated after an autopilot level-off with no subsequent addition of power, “the captain’s subsequent control inputs were also not appropriate because he pulled back on the column rather than pushed forward to reduce AOA.” In the final report, the NTSB identified remedial training and stall training as safety issues. “The NTSB concludes that the captain had not established a good foundation of attitude instrument flying skills early in his career and that his continued weaknesses in basic aircraft control and instrument flying were not identified and adequately addressed.” This was evident throughout the pilot’s career. He failed his first instrument checkride. He failed his first commercial single-engine land checkride, and he failed his first commercial multi-engine land checkride. While the FAA, in a response to an NTSB safety recommendation, pointed out “that multiple checkride failures showed no correlation with pilots’ accident and incident records…the captain’s established pattern of first-attempt failures might have indicated that he was slow to absorb information, develop skills, and gain mastery or that the training he received was not adequate.” In 2004 and 2005, the captain logged second-in-command multi-engine turbine time with Gulfstream Training Academy, which was known for its “pay for right-seat time” program at Gulfstream International Airlines (GIA). During his initial training at GIA, training records “revealed his continuing difficulties with aircraft control. During two simulator periods, he was graded unsatisfactory in ‘approach to stall-landing configuration.’ During a later simulator period, he demonstrated unacceptable altitude and airspeed control. During the final planned simulator session, the instructor noted basic attitude flying problems and repeated deviations.” The captain attended Gulfstream Training Academy from August 2004 to April 2005 and completed initial training at GIA (which was directly associated with the academy) in December 2004. When he was hired at Colgan Air, he met the airline’s minimums of 600 hours total time and 100 hours multi-engine time, having logged 290 hours with GIA and a total of 618 hours. (Editor’s note: perhaps this is part of the reason the Colgan families derived the 1,500-hour requirement.) In his application for employment, he was asked whether he had ever failed any proficiency check, FAA checkride, IOE [initial operating experience], or line check. He left out any mention of his multiple failures except for the instrument rating checkride failure. “At the public hearing for this accident,” according to the NTSB, “the company’s vice president of administration stated that, if the captain’s incomplete answer had previously been known, it would have resulted in his dismissal from the company.” Although he didn’t fail the initial proficiency check for a first officer position on the airline’s Saab 340, he was required to obtain additional training on normal and abnormal procedures. During his first recurrent proficiency check in the Saab 340, “the captain received an unsatisfactory grade” for rejected takeoffs, general judgment, landings from a circling approach, oral exam, and nonprecision approach. He had to stop the recurrent training and conduct requalification proficiency training. “However,” the NTSB report said, “no evidence showed that Colgan considered the captain’s performance (as a Saab 340 first officer) to be a concern, even with the problems he demonstrated during the initial and recurrent proficiency checks.” When it came time for upgrade training in the Saab 340, the pilot failed his checkride, which was for the ATP certificate and Saab 340 type rating. The failure was because “the captain’s airspeed was too slow on a second missed approach while attempting to complete a single-engine ILS approach.” He did pass the recheck three days later. “Even though the captain had demonstrated problems with the three checkrides he had performed, Colgan was not proactively addressing his training and proficiency issues,” the NTSB noted. Having completed recurrent training and a line check, the captain was approved to upgrade to the Q400 and “satisfactorily completed his line-oriented flight training, IOE, line check, and type rating.” Yet, according to the NTSB, “Interviews with Colgan instructors revealed that, even though the captain had progressed significantly in terms of his confidence, crew management, and execution of procedures, some of his problems with aircraft control remained. For example, the Q400 simulator instructor stated that, during unusual attitude training, the captain was ‘very rough’ on the controls and had somewhat overcontrolled the roll axis.” When the accident happened, the captain had been flying the Q400 for a bit over two months “and thus was still new to the airplane,” the NTSB report noted. More recently, another accident occurred when the pilot pulled the yoke full aft, but this time in a Hawker 900XP. On Feb. 7, 2024, the pilots were conducting a post-maintenance stall flight test because of work done on the wings. Flight data captured by the jet revealed that after the jet stalled, it rolled quickly to the right, and the crew then input full left wing-down aileron, full power, and then pulled the yoke full aft, which was exactly the opposite of the way the elevator control needed to move. The result was an out-of-control spin and impact with the ground. Flight instructors should be encouraged to develop master-level teaching skills and be paid well. © AdobeStock Training Issues The above accidents are cited because they all either had training issues documented in accident reports or appear to be related to training. While final reports are not complete on some of these accidents, the fact that some involved hugely excessive speeds on final approach or mistaken fundamental moves—like pulling instead of pushing the elevator controls during a stall—raises questions about not only how individual pilots were trained to fly but also how they were trained to operate as a crew, with proper adherence to standard operating procedures and CRM protocols. Another factor to consider in the high-speed overruns is why these crews did not initiate a go-around from such wildly unstable approaches and whether their training included go-around criteria and practice. Lack of Experience The problems that the industry is seeing with poor-quality flying come down to the lack of experience among the flight instructors who are teaching low-time pilots to be instructors, according to Pat Cannon, a longtime designated pilot examiner (DPE) and MU-2 expert. New pilots are transitioning too quickly through the system, he said. As a DPE, he sees two trends: flight instructor candidates who still don’t know how to use the rudder and poor understanding of short- and soft-field landings. One multi-engine instructor candidate was clearly struggling to hold rudder pressure during a single-engine ILS approach, although he was able to pass the checkride. Afterward, Cannon asked the candidate why he didn’t use rudder trim, and the response was that his instructor had told him never to use it. “If we don’t learn it, we don’t teach it,” Cannon said. He is seeing pilots try to gentle the airplane down to the ground for a soft arrival when asked to perform a soft-field landing, but not touch down until halfway down the runway. Or they are zooming up to the aim point close to the ground for a short-field landing, then smashing the landing gear onto the runway. Although DPEs can’t teach during a checkride, when he sees problems, Cannon offers to go to the flight school and help educate the instructors. A Decent Wage Katherine Odland is founder and CEO of Myotis Aviation, a unique flight-training concept that upends the traditional approach, at least on the Part 61 side of the training industry that comprises smaller flight schools as well as independent instructors. Part 141 schools are FAA-approved pilot schools, featuring college and university programs as well as large flight academies and flight schools focused on training career pilots. Most flight schools charge a significant amount for flight instructor time and give a small fraction of that amount to the instructor. It is well understood that many instructors are teaching in order to log the flight time to reach the magic 1,500-hour level. This way of logging flight time is a result of strong airline hiring, which has encouraged people to pursue piloting careers, and the lack of job opportunities for low-time commercial pilots. There just aren’t that many parachute jumping, banner towing, aerial surveying, cargo carrying, or other non-airline opportunities for low-time pilots. Charter operations do offer some opportunities, but insurance requirements often are far higher than FAA minimums. The result is that many pilots aspiring to business aviation or airline jobs teach to gain hours, and they are willing to do this for very low pay. Odland doesn’t think this is a good way to develop high-quality, dedicated master instructors, so she has set up Myotis Aviation in a completely different structure. “The values I want are that you’re learning from a master,” she said, “and they love what they do. It’s not a means to an end [type of] job. The CFI job should not be the McDonald’s fast food worker of the aviation industry. We’re also on a mission to make the most hirable pilots anywhere.” Instead of buying or leasing a fleet of airplanes and hiring instructors on the cheap, she created Myotis as a network of training locations. If Myotis sees demand at an airport somewhere in the U.S., Odland will find an airplane—perhaps leasing it from a local owner—and a qualified CFI, who gets all of the money charged for flight instruction (many are making more than $100,000 a year), and then make training available at that airport. So far, Myotis has airplanes and instructors in 41 states, she said. And because of the simple structure, the local Myotis operation can provide quality training at about one-third to half the cost of competitors while compensating instructors properly. “We’ve removed the lobby overhead,” she said. “We don’t need a lobby; we need somebody who knows what they’re doing.” Odland is careful not to hire instructors who just want to build flight time, and she is wary of those who come from Part 141 schools. From banning Myotis airplanes from flying to certain airports that are clogged with large-school students to vetting instructors to find those who truly want to teach, Odland is determined to help people learn to manage risk and not be afraid to fly to a new airport, fly safely when the wind is gusting, log time at night beyond the FAA minimums, and expand their skills by flying in challenging locales such as Denver. As Odland sees it, not only is Myotis providing high-quality instruction, it is also helping underused airports gain flying activity. “I’m passionate about rebuilding the general aviation community. It’s dying, and we need to save it. I’m helping rebuild that and make it more accessible.” Shortage of Qualified Pilots Nick Sanderson is trying to fix the many problems that face aviation, including those surrounding training, and founded Unrestricted Airspace to tackle some of the industry’s biggest issues. These include “the FAA medical certification process and the growing mistrust surrounding deferrals; the 1,500-hour rule and whether it meaningfully improves safety or simply restricts access; insurance requirements quietly shaping hiring decisions and operational limits; the gap between training environments and real-world flying; and the economics of simply trying to operate in today’s system.” The 1,500-hour rule’s effect has been a renewed focus on teaching to gain flight hours, but this means that future professional pilots are “in a training bubble,” he explained. At these schools, he argued, “there is not a lot of room for them to fly in negligible weather or take risks.” The students and instructors fly to the same specific airports with tightly controlled minimums for weather and crosswinds. “How do you learn to fly in crosswinds if you can’t land in crosswinds?” he asked. “Nobody talks about it, but the first time they see hard IMC [instrument meteorological conditions] is in an airliner.” From Sanderson’s perspective, “We don’t have a shortage of pilots; we have a shortage of qualified pilots.” For new pilots to gain the experience they need, Sanderson has pitched the idea of “135 lite.” This would be a simpler way for people to start a small charter operation without the burdensome regulations and FAA approval delays that make the process extremely costly. This concept would put more fresh commercial pilots to work and enable underutilized airplanes and airports to thrive. “This would get general aviation airplanes flying, and people in and out of rural areas,” he said. Sanderson isn’t arguing for eliminating FAA oversight and regulation, just common-sense rules that would allow any commercial pilot to fly someone somewhere in good weather in a properly maintained airplane. The fact that light aircraft flight-sharing operations in Europe work safely supports the 135 lite concept, he said. “Airplanes [there] aren’t falling out of the sky.” Such flight experience would do far more to prepare pilots for professional pilot jobs, he explained. Under the current scheme, “They don’t learn go-/no-go decision-making until they get to the airlines. Decisions are always made for them; there are hard limits at the academies, imposed by insurance companies.” This lack of experience shows in airline new-hire washout rates, where the candidate fails to make it through the training process. “Airline washout rates are through the roof,” he said. ATP’s training fleet of 658 aircraft, based at 85 locations, logs more than 600,000 hours per year. Airline-oriented Safety ATP Flight School, probably the largest training academy, with 85 locations in the U.S. and 658 aircraft that fly more than 600,000 hours a year, graduates more than 2,000 pilots per year from its professional pilot training program. The company disagrees with critics who claim that low-experience instructors are just passing on their lack of knowledge to new pilots. In response to questions from AIN, ATP said, “Each ATP instructor must successfully complete an intensive instructor indoc program and evaluation, where they must demonstrate professionalism, proficiency, adherence to standard operating procedures, and uncompromising attention to safety-focused decision-making at all times. ATP graduates more CFIs than any other school in the nation and only hires those who meet the standards required to train the next generation of airline pilots.” According to ATP, 25% of all regional airline new-hire pilots are ATP graduates. “Further, ATP is the only school with formal agreements in place with all three major airlines—American, Delta, and United—meaning these airlines have independently vetted the quality of ATP’s training and instruction.” As for the issue of new commercial pilots gaining experience toward the 1,500 hours (or fewer, for a restricted ATP) needed for Part 121 jobs, “ATP partners with corporate and cargo carriers to provide alternate career opportunities and paths to the airlines. For the vast majority of graduates, however, flying as a flight instructor with ATP allows them to retain a high level of proficiency and a strong knowledge base in a structured, airline-oriented environment, while opening opportunities to participate in airline cadet programs.” The training academy’s flight operations are supported by “an airline-oriented safety management system, real-time ADS-B monitoring, data-driven safety enhancements, and 26 Tech Ops aircraft maintenance bases,” the company said. Part of the 1,500-hour rule requires that candidates take the ATP certification training program (ATP CTP) before the multi-engine ATP written exam. ATP’s ATP JETS division offers ATP CTP training and recently lowered the price to $2,995. The training must include advanced aerodynamics, meteorology, air carrier operations, and crew resource management, as well as time in a full-flight simulator. “Beyond the CTP course, ATP works directly with airline partners to develop specialized jet transition training programs,” the company said. “Leveraging the capabilities and full-motion simulators at ATP’s Part 142 airline training center, ATP JETS, these tailored, airline-specific courses transition pilots from general aviation flying to airline operations. “Further, ATP’s career services team works closely with airline partners to provide a continuous feedback loop with ATP’s flight standards team, incorporating airline feedback and areas of emphasis directly into students’ training.” Like many training academies, Spartan College of Aeronautics works with airlines to help students prepare for professional pilot careers. Higher Education At Spartan College of Aeronautics and Technology, teaching new pilots is not just about stick-and-rudder skills, according to Spartan Education Group CEO Rob Polston, but about preparing them for leadership roles. “We come from higher education,” he said, “and we’re applying those principles to the training of pilots, which nobody else does. We’re training people to be leaders in the cockpit.” To help prevent washout at the airline training level, Spartan partners with airlines such as Allegiant Air, which helps the school with student assessment, development of personal skills and leadership training, and invites students to interact with the airline’s management and flight operations personnel and spend time in its Airbus A320 simulators. “When you get your first job as a first officer in an A320, you’ll be more acclimated to that environment,” he said. Recently, Spartan and the airline announced an expansion of that program, the Allegiant Altitude Pilot Pathway, which expands “access to a structured pathway connecting flight training with potential professional pilot opportunities at Allegiant Air.” Spartan doesn’t have a quality problem with low-experience instructors, according to Polston. “That’s a problem that maybe affects smaller schools,” he said. “We have hundreds of graduates going through the program every year and becoming CFIs. That’s part of the journey: to go on to the airlines. We have the ability to have the best because we’re producing more CFIs than required for our classes.” This allows Spartan to hire instructors who are able to give their students the best training experience that meets Spartan’s standards. “If they’re not living up to that expectation, they don’t have a job at the school,” he said. “We’re also giving continuous feedback, and we’re watching their performance.” The Spartan student experience is enhanced with the application of technology, including further integration of Pilotbase’s flight operations and safety software platform. Pilotbase started as Flight Schedule Pro, which acquired LogTen logbook software company Coradine in 2022. Now Pilotbase helps Spartan students during their entire journey, from student loans to career matching, ensuring accurate flight time logging, and helping with resume preparation and job searching. On the operations side, Pilotbase provides safety features, visibility on aircraft availability, and real-time discrepancy reporting and management, according to Pilotbase CEO Nick Wegner. “AI has facilitated a lot of this,” he said. “We’ve integrated maintenance software with safety management systems and flight data monitoring. This allows us to create a whole picture from before the flight when the student is checking weather, filling out the flight-risk assessment, checking aircraft statuses, and doing the weight and balance. It’s all integrated into the flight operations system, and they’re getting a complete view of what’s going on from the weather to the mental and personal and aircraft perspective.” Instructors also get visibility into the student’s decision process and can intervene, if needed. Data recorded during the flight is analyzed in Pilotbase’s postflight debriefing tool, which provides 3D visualizations of maneuvers and shows exceedances of specified criteria—for example, generating an alert if a student lands two-thirds of the way along the runway. This isn’t meant to be a negative experience, Wegner emphasized, but an opportunity to teach the student how to improve. “It’s a big safety loop that continuously cranks,” he said. “This is about eliminating the friction of information to make real-time and postflight decisions. This puts together an information picture so we can enhance training.” CAE’s continuously optimized recurrent training is replacing the traditional box-checking exercises that have plagued simulator training. Competency-based Training Training organizations are moving into more modern protocols with the implementation of competency-based training and assessment (CBTA). Boeing has adopted CBTA, and recently the Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand became the first regulator to implement Boeing’s CBTA learning library in its national flight training system. According to Boeing, “CBTA focuses on observable, measurable competencies that reflect real-world performance.” Boeing has implemented CBTA in its initial and recurrent training programs. California Aeronautical University (CAU) is the first U.S. flight training organization to deploy Boeing’s CBTA learning library. According to CAU, “The Boeing CBTA learning library provides aviation students with access to learning resources designed to strengthen key pilot competencies, including decision-making, communication, leadership and teamwork, situational awareness, workload management, and threat-and-error management.” CAE—which operates ab initio flight academies, manufactures flight simulators, and provides simulator training—has also made a large investment in CBTA. The process is integrated into initial pilot training at CAE’s academies and in type rating and recurrent training at CAE simulator centers. “Today, CBTA is embedded across multiple phases of pilot development, helping ensure training is aligned with operational needs and focused on enhancing aviation safety,” according to the company. “CAE was also the first approved training organization to introduce a fully CBTA-based initial type rating program for the Embraer E2.” An example of the practical application of CBTA at CAE is its continuously optimized recurrent (CORe) training: “transforming recurrent training from an event-focused exercise into a competency-focused learning experience,” according to CAE. “CORe training goes beyond standard compliance; it identifies real-world risk factors and equips pilots with the skills needed to handle them effectively.” This includes using realistic scenarios to help pilots learn how “to manage a wide range of situations, including problem solving, situational awareness, communication, and workload management. By exposing pilots to relevant and contemporary operational scenarios before simulator training, CORe strengthens the link between classroom learning and operational performance, creating a more engaging and effective training experience that aligns with the principles of CBTA.” This approach is much different from the traditional focus on task completion, which has long been a complaint of business aviation pilots undergoing recurrent training that is repetitive and merely a “box-checking” exercise. CAE explained, “This gives instructors deeper insight into performance trends and allows training to be tailored to individual needs. The result is a more personalized learning experience that strengthens both technical skills and the non-technical competencies critical to safe and effective flight operations.” What this means for business aviation clients is “a more meaningful and operational training experience,” CAE said. “When combined with CAE’s CORe methodology and realistic scenario-based training, operators increasingly see recurrent training as an opportunity to strengthen pilot capabilities and enhance safety, rather than simply meet regulatory requirements.” CAE continues to develop CBTA and CORe. “The next phase of CBTA will focus on improving the consistency and value of competency assessments across training organizations. A key priority is ensuring instructors apply competency standards consistently while exercising appropriate professional judgment. As more competency data becomes available, organizations will be able to use analytics to identify trends, support instructor calibration, and continuously improve training. “Looking ahead, the combination of competency data, analytics, and emerging technologies will enable more personalized training, advancing CBTA toward a truly data-driven approach to pilot development.” Is Training Working? Jessica Webster, a corporate pilot who flies the latest fly-by-wire Gulfstreams, is a behavioral scientist and founder of Hera Aviation Group, which helps women and primary caregivers with job retention issues in business aviation. Much of Hera’s work involves helping companies retain valuable personnel by helping them manage employees’ family and life issues that frequently lead to people leaving jobs. The same problems affect student pilots, and she worries that the industry is losing excellent candidates because no one is helping them. “I think what’s wrong with flight training is that we often put all our attention on whether the student meets the standard and too little on whether the training system is working,” she said. “The standard must remain high. But we should measure where students stall or leave, develop instructors as teachers, make feedback and evaluation consistent, and intervene before a student disappears from the pipeline. “Women are an important test of that system,” she added. “In the FAA’s 2025 snapshot, women were nearly 16% of student pilots but only about 9% of private pilots and 5.5% of ATPs. Those figures are not a graduation-rate calculation, but they should make us ask better questions. Hera’s own research found that barriers accumulate from initial training through the workplace. If we improve the experience and progression of people who face those barriers, we will build a stronger training system for everyone.” Managing Energy The topic of energy management was a key part of the Sept. 22, 2026 Sporty’s Pilot’s Discretion podcast featuring aerobatic champion and airshow pilot Mike Goulian. What he discussed with podcast host John Zimmerman seemed to close the loop on the aforementioned accidents, especially those involving excessively high speed on final approach. “I feel like we have lost the understanding of pitch, power, and performance,” Goulian said. “What we do see in all facets of general aviation is this energy management problem…it’s when all of the electronic protection is gone near the runway: takeoffs, landings, go-arounds. “For me, that all goes back to an understanding of pitch, power, and performance. So, where is my nose? What is my power setting? What is the desired result? How do I get there? And an understanding of all of those things. I think we just have lost that relationship. “We see airplanes running off the sides of runways, and overruns. I fly with a lot of people [who think] that if a little speed on final is good, more speed is better. Like, no, it’s not.” Goulian believes that training must start with the basics, especially understanding stalls, or as he puts it, “How much energy is left in the wing? And understanding the pitch of the airplane, the power that’s applied, the attitude that the airplane has, the position of the stick. How close am I to a stall? How much can I ask of this airplane in a turn, in a stall, in some bad weather, in anything that we might have? We’ve lost that.” Mike Goulian Aviation teaches aerobatics and tailwheel flying in Aviat Husky two-seat utility airplanes, showing pilots who have learned in modern, technologically advanced airplanes that they can fly with the airspeed indicator covered and with the stall horn blaring all the way to touchdown. “[We’re going to] try to land this airplane in 400 feet and understand how does my sink rate work. What is my pitch attitude? What does the backside of the power curve look like, and how do we control that? All of these little things that I think we have just forgotten. Today we’re probably a generation or two into people who never learned it properly in the first place. “It’s a great reminder that what gets passed down today becomes the flight instructors two years down the road, and before long, it’s easy for new habits and norms to get established, and you don’t realize it’s happened until it’s too late. “We’ve created a couple of generations of pilots that stare inside the airplane all the time, and I get it. But when we really need our skills, they’re not there.” At the same time, Goulian recognizes that people want to use their high-performance airplanes to travel, and the company also teaches in Cirrus airplanes, incorporating longer trips and the necessary risk management. “Traditional flight training, it’s about the ACS [airman certification standards], it’s about the checkride, it’s about maneuvers and stalls and steep turns and landings,” he said. “But once you get past that, you actually have to go out and use an airplane to go somewhere. “This is scenario-based training done in a real-world environment. The biggest difference for us is we try to implement decision-making skills from the very beginning, because they are going to go fly through a weather system if they’re gonna go 500 miles to the west or up north…we’re trying to give them the tools to make the right decision when they don’t have an instructor sitting next to them.” The Gulfstream G700 was being pushed back; jet lunged forward over running the tug Date:Saturday 24 October 2026 Time:c. 06:45 UTC Type:Gulfstream G700 Owner/operator:Flexjet Registration:N103FX MSN:87039 Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 9 Other fatalities:0 Aircraft damage:Substantial Category:Accident Location:Rome-Ciampino Airport (CIA/LIRA) - Italy Phase:Pushback / towing Nature:Passenger - Non-Scheduled/charter/Air Taxi Departure airport:Rome-Ciampino Airport (CIA/LIRA) Destination airport: Confidence Rating: Information is only available from news, social media or unofficial sources Narrative: The Gulfstream G700 was being pushed back under tow at Rome-Ciampino Airport (CIA), while the crew started an engine. The tow bar failed and the jet lunged forward over running the tug. The NTSB rated the occurrence an accident. Sources: NTSB GAA27WA019 https://registry.faa.gov/aircraftinquiry/Search/NNumberResult?NNumberTxt=103FX https://globe.adsbexchange.com/?icao=a0106c&lat=41.792&lon=12.592&zoom=13.2&showTrace=2026-10-24&trackLabels https://www.facebook.com/share/p/19bUcfavjQ/ With pics Gulfstream Lover Facebook https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/12246381 (Photo) Revision history: Date/time/Contributor/Updates 28-Oct-2026 23:26 UTC/Justanormalperson/Added 29-Oct-2026 06:22 UTC/obbreidUpdated /[Source, Narrative, ] 29-Oct-2026 06:24 UTC/ASNUpdated /[Phase, Departure airport, Narrative, ] 02-Nov-2026 02:13 UTC/JustanormalpersonUpdated/ [Time, Total occupants, ] Safety board recovers voice recorder from fatal air ambulance crash Crews recovered part of the cockpit and the voice recorder from the Oct. 3 Nantucket crash that killed four air ambulance employees By Shane Mercer 02 Nov. 2026 Share The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) said it has recovered the cockpit voice recorder, along with the upper third of the cockpit, from the Latitude Air Ambulance aircraft that crashed into the Atlantic Ocean off Nantucket, Massachusetts, on Oct. 3, killing four employees of the Hamilton, Ontario, company. In a statement, the TSB said it worked in coordination with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Coast Guard to retrieve the wreckage. Both the cockpit section and the recorder are being sent to the TSB’s engineering laboratory in Ottawa for examination. What happened to the flight The Gulfstream G100, operating as Heartbeat 104, departed St. George, Bermuda, carrying two pilots, two medical crew, a patient and the patient’s family escort. As it approached the Boston area, the crew reported electrical difficulties before the aircraft descended rapidly and lost contact with air traffic control south of Nantucket. All six people on board, including the four Canadian crew members, are presumed dead. The crew members were identified by Latitude Air Ambulance as Captain Philip Childerhose, First Officer Thomas Farquhar, flight nurse Sarah Paton and respiratory therapist Jolene Weir. “This is an unimaginable loss for our Latitude family and for everyone who loved the six people aboard Heartbeat 104,” said Peter Byl, president of Latitude Air Ambulance, in a statement. Why the cockpit voice recorder matters A cockpit voice recorder typically captures crew communications and cockpit sounds in the period before an occurrence, which investigators use alongside flight data to reconstruct the sequence of events. The TSB has not yet said when it expects to extract or publish any information from the device, and investigators have not determined a cause. For safety professionals, the case is a reminder that a fatal transportation occurrence involving employees on the job can trigger the same dual-track investigation process that follows a workplace death on the ground, even when a federal safety board rather than a provincial regulator holds primary jurisdiction. Because the aircraft was Canadian-registered, the TSB is leading the inquiry under international agreement, assisted by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) as an accredited representative. The full investigation is consistent with how long complex fatality investigations typically take to move from scene examination to final findings, and could take up to two years. A longstanding watchlist issue Flight crew fatigue and electrical or mechanical system failures are not new concerns for Canadian aviation. The TSB’s most recent transportation safety watchlist has repeatedly flagged safety management and regulatory oversight as persistent, multi-modal risks, a pattern employers in aviation and air medical services may want to revisit as this investigation unfolds. Dallas Love Field Runway 13L Closed After JSX Flight XE281 Rolls Off Runway on Landing Why It Matters Small scheduled-charter operators at single-airport bases depend on parallel runways to absorb a runway excursion, and removing an aircraft depends on federal clearance rather than on the operator's own timeline. Nov 1 What happened A JSX plane arriving from Houston Hobby Airport (HOU) rolled off the runway after landing at Dallas Love Field (DAL) on Sunday. JSX confirmed that Flight XE281 was involved in a runway excursion upon arrival. No injuries were reported, and authorities said the aircraft's landing gear remained intact. JSX is a charter carrier headquartered at Love Field that operates scheduled flights from the airport, using regional aircraft that each carry a maximum of 30 passengers. The company said all customers were safe and accounted for and had left the airport. It said the aircraft was cleared for relocation, the incident is under investigation, and JSX is cooperating fully with the relevant authorities. Dallas Fire-Rescue units were dispatched to Love Field at 2:52 p.m. A post from Love Field's X account at 4:15 p.m. said aircraft rescue and firefighting crews had cleared the scene and affected passengers were escorted from the airfield. Aviation officials are inspecting the aircraft and preparing to remove it from the runway area, which is subject to approval from the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Transportation Safety Board. Lauren Rounds, a spokesperson for the City of Dallas Department of Aviation, said runway 13L is closed while aircraft continue to depart and land on runway 13R. FlightAware showed Love Field with more than 170 delays as of 4:45 p.m.; it was unclear whether those delays resulted from the incident. Industry impact & what to watch An excursion at a two-runway airport tends to be absorbed rather than shut down: with 13R still handling arrivals and departures, the closure of 13L trims capacity instead of stopping operations. That is the practical value of parallel runways at a busy field, and it is why the delay count here is hard to attribute cleanly to a single event. For a scheduled-charter carrier based at the airport it uses, the aircraft's removal does not run on the operator's own clock. Clearing the wreckage from the runway area depends on sign-off from the FAA and the NTSB, so the length of the 13L closure is set by the investigators' access needs, not by how quickly the airline can recover the aircraft. The cause is under investigation, and nothing has been stated about it. The next markers are the reopening of runway 13L and any findings the NTSB or the FAA chooses to publish; until then the cause stays open. Outback chopper firm Fortescue Helicopters grounded over safety breaches • By Matt Garrick • Topic: • Air Transport Industry CASA found Fortescue Helicopters has been operating with "a deliberately and systemically non-compliant safety culture". (Supplied: Fortescue Helicopters) In short: The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) has grounded Sky High Helicopters for a series of serious safety breaches. CASA says the breaches included directing its pilots "not to accurately record the total time in service for aircraft operated by the company". The company's suspension comes a year after CASA warned the watchdog would crack down on helicopter pilots over safety regulations. An outback Australian helicopter company has had its fleet grounded and its air operator's certificate suspended immediately over a "serious and imminent risk to safety". Sky High Helicopters Pty Ltd, which trades as Fortescue Helicopters in Western Australia and Queensland, has been grounded by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA). In its findings published yesterday, CASA said the company had been operating with "a deliberately and systemically non-compliant safety culture". Fortescue Helicopters operates in Western Australia and Queensland. (Supplied: Fortescue Helicopters) Corporate documents show the chopper company was first registered in 2008, offering aerial mustering, charter flights and mining support from the Pilbara mining town of Newman. It also has other bases in Perth, Broome and Far North Queensland. Owned by WA cattle producer and pilot Weldon Percy, Fortescue Helicopters lists among its clients mining giants Fortescue Metals Group (FMG), Rio Tinto, Glencore and Hancock Prospecting. "Safety, for our pilots and clients is our number one priority," the company's website states. "We believe safety is a company culture, not just a practice." Fortescue Helicopters is not affiliated with the similarly named FMG, although it lists the company founded by billionaire Andrew "Twiggy" Forrest as "an important client of ours". It is not yet clear how long Fortescue Helicopters' suspension will last. (Supplied: Fortescue Helicopters) CASA said in its findings the company had committed a series of serious and systemic intentional safety breaches, including that its pilots had been "directed not to accurately record the total time in service for aircraft operated by the company". Other breaches detected by CASA included pilots being "directed not to record maintenance defects on aircraft maintenance releases" and operating "aircraft with outstanding maintenance requirements". It also said personnel at the company were being ordered to perform unauthorised maintenance activities and had failed to comply with the company's operations manual. CASA has previously pledged to crack down on safety compliance in the northern Australian chopper industry. (ABC News: Michael Parfitt) CASA also said "pilots' flight and duty time limits are regularly and deliberately exceeded" by the company. Mr Percy hung up when the ABC contacted him for comment. Fortescue Helicopters was also separately contacted but has not responded. It is unclear how long the suspension will be in place. Suspension follows safety crackdown pledge The grounding of Sky High Helicopters comes a year after CASA's chief executive Pip Spence warned the watchdog would crack down on helicopter pilots who tried to "game the system" over safety regulations. Wright trial exposes cowboy chopper culture The trial of celebrity crocodile wrangler Matt Wright unearthed a culture of helicopter maintenance and safety breaches by his company, which some say have been ongoing in Australia's north for decades. She made the comments in the aftermath of the month-long trial of celebrity crocodile wrangler and chopper pilot Matt Wright in the Northern Territory Supreme Court last year, in which he was sentenced to prison for five months. Wright's trial for attempting to pervert the course of justice heard accounts of frequent under-reporting of helicopter flying hours within the northern Australian aviation sector, with pilots regularly disconnecting the devices used to record their hours. Separate to his criminal trial, Wright's company, Helibrook, was grounded in late 2024 over numerous breaches, including failing to record accurate flight times, reckless operation of aircraft, and the falsification of maintenance records. Eastar Jet Wins Government Awards for Aviation Safety Work Honored at 46th Aviation Day Ceremony | Published 2026.11.02. 14:12:09 | Updated 2026.11.02. 23:47:39 By Shim Ki-moon door@sedaily.com Eastar Jet CEO Cho Joong-seok (center) poses with award recipients Lee Jeong (right), head of the maintenance division, and Kim Jae-won, cabin training team leader, at the 46th Aviation Day ceremony held at the Mayfield Hotel in Gangseo-gu, Seoul, on Oct. 30. Eastar Jet Eastar Jet received government commendations for its contributions to strengthening aviation safety at the 46th Aviation Day ceremony. The carrier said on the 2nd that Lee Jung, head of its maintenance division, and Kim Jae-won, leader of its cabin crew training team, received commendations from the prime minister and the land minister, respectively, for building aviation safety infrastructure. The ceremony was held on Oct. 30 at the Mayfield Hotel in Seoul's Gangseo district. Lee, who oversees the maintenance division, won the prime minister's commendation for building an integrated maintenance center of about 5,600 square meters at Gimpo International Airport, improving maintenance quality and laying the groundwork for bringing aircraft maintenance, repair and overhaul work in-house. The center was designed to consolidate operations that had previously been spread across separate sites, including parts management, aircraft inspections, repairs such as painting, and maintenance technology training. The consolidation has improved maintenance efficiency, quality and on-time performance. Kim received the commendation from the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport for overhauling safety training infrastructure for cabin crew. Working with Kyungin Women's University, Eastar Jet built its own crew training facility and training management system reflecting the characteristics of the B737 aircraft. The airline has also introduced physical fitness tests and situational response interviews into its cabin crew hiring process, strengthening practical training and selecting candidates with safety skills. "This award belongs to all of Eastar Jet's maintenance staff, who have supported accident-free operations through thorough inspections in the field," Lee said. "We will further strengthen preventive maintenance and proactive defect management to make the foundation for accident-free operations even more solid." Key aircraft incidents that reshaped aviation safety rules since 9/11 Sylvia Loehrmann, former school and culture minister of the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia, pays respect to the victims of the Germanwings 4U9525 plane crash, at the Joseph-Koenig Gymnasium during the 10th anniversary of the crash in Haltern am See, Germany, March 24, 2025. REUTERS/Stephan Nitschke Published Oct 06, 2026, 08:53 PMUpdated Oct 06, 2026, 09:04 PM Oct 6 - A flydubai co-pilot stabbed his captain with an emergency "crash axe" in what UAE prosecutors have called a terrorist attack, with the plane plunging 16,000 feet in 30 seconds before it was brought under control by passengers and a stand-by crew. It landed safely thanks to some heroics from the injured captain, with all on board surviving. The co-pilot is being questioned, with Israeli officials saying that he had planned the attack even before joining the airline. The incident on the flight bound for Tel Aviv from Dubai has once more put on-board security and pilot-screening procedures under scrutiny, after previous incidents from 9/11 to the 2015 Germanwings crash led to changes in safety protocols. Here is a timeline of some of the major commercial aviation incidents since 2001 and how they changed aviation security or cockpit access rules. 9/11 ATTACKS On September 11, 2001, al Qaeda hijackers took over four US passenger jets, crashing two into the World Trade Center in New York and one into the Pentagon outside Washington. Nearly 3,000 people were killed. The attacks reshaped aviation security, with US airport screening beefed up in November that year and the federal air marshal programme greatly expanded. US airlines had to install reinforced cockpit doors built to withstand forced entry and gunfire by April 2003. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) later made the doors a worldwide requirement. A US rule requiring a second barrier to protect the cockpit whenever the door is opened in flight took effect for new aircraft in August 2026. 'SHOE BOMBER' On December 22, 2001, British national Richard Reid tried to blow up an American Airlines jet flying from Paris to Miami with homemade explosives hidden in his shoes. Crew and passengers subdued him as he tried to detonate the bomb and the flight diverted safely to Boston. The foiled attack led US airport security to require passengers to remove their shoes at security screenings starting in 2006, a mandate that was lifted in 2025. MOZAMBIQUE AIRLINES An Embraer regional jet operated by Mozambique Airlines crashed in Namibia on November 29, 2013, after it began a sudden descent, killing 27 passengers and 6 crew members. Investigators found the aircraft started losing altitude after captain Herminio dos Santos manually changed the settings while his co-pilot had gone to the bathroom. Dos Santos locked the co-pilot out of the cockpit and brought the plane down after altering the plane's speed and altitude several times. In its final report, the Namibian agency investigating the incident recommended Mozambique regulators ensure two people are always in the flight deck and called on ICAO to create standards to stop authorized crew members from being locked out of the cockpit. GERMANWINGS CRASH An Airbus A320 operated by Lufthansa's low-cost carrier Germanwings crashed in the French Alps on March 24, 2015, after co-pilot Andreas Lubitz locked the captain out of the cockpit and deliberately flew the aircraft into a mountainside, killing 150 people. Investigators said Lubitz, whose death was ruled a suicide, had shown symptoms consistent with a "psychotic depressive episode" months before the crash. Three days after the crash, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency issued a temporary recommendation that two people, one of them a pilot, remain in the cockpit at all times during flight. It later softened its position, leaving airlines to decide case by case, but tightened mental health rules, adding a mandatory psychological assessment for pilots. REUTERS FAA Safety Briefing Magazine The FAA Safety Policy Voice of General Aviation Future of Flight The Fall 2026 issue of FAA Safety Briefing magazine focuses on the future of flight in the national airspace system. Feature articles include a review of the FAA's eVTOL Integration Pilot Program, a status update on the nation's Brand New Air Traffic Control System, and a profile of Flight Standards' Emerging Technologies Division. We also take an in-depth look at the MOSAIC rule and its impact on the GA community. Download the Fall 2026 issue or use the links below to read each article on our blog. Cranfield University training to boost Mahama’s aviation hub agenda and strengthen aviation safety – AIB Ghana Commissioner Source: Jagri Boaz Binyinjom November 2, 2026 4:16 pm The Commissioner of the Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation and Prevention Bureau (AIB Ghana), John Wumboriti, says a one-week aircraft accident investigation training programme by Cranfield University will strengthen Ghana’s aviation safety systems and prepare the country for increased air traffic as President John Dramani Mahama pursues his vision of making Ghana an aviation hub. Speaking at the opening ceremony of the training programme in Accra, Mr Wumboriti said building the capacity of aircraft accident investigators was critical to ensuring the safety and sustainability of Ghana’s aviation industry. Speaking to Adom News on the sidelines of the ceremony, he described Cranfield University as a credible institution with the expertise to train aviation accident investigators, stressing the importance of continuous professional development in the sector. “For the safety of aviation, there is always a need for this kind of training. We must continually build the capacity of our investigators to ensure that they have the necessary knowledge and skills to handle aircraft accidents and incidents,” he said. He explained that the training was particularly important as Ghana prepares to attract increased air traffic under its ambition of becoming a major aviation hub. “As we prepare for the traffic that will come with Ghana becoming an aviation hub, there is a need for more rigorous work and adequate preparation, especially when it comes to accident investigation,” Mr Wumboriti stated. He disclosed that the programme, which is the second of its kind, would last one week and involve all staff of AIB Ghana, alongside participants from various security agencies. “This is the second time we are organising this programme, and it is a week-long training. All staff of AIB Ghana are involved because we want to ensure that our personnel are adequately equipped to undertake investigations whenever the need arises,” he said. According to him, involving all staff would strengthen the Bureau’s readiness to respond to aircraft accidents and incidents at any point in time. “There is a need for regular training because we must always be prepared. We cannot tell when an aircraft accident or incident will occur, so our investigators must have the requisite skills and knowledge to respond effectively,” he added. Mr Wumboriti said strengthening the Bureau’s investigative capacity would also improve aviation safety standards, prevent future accidents and build public confidence in Ghana’s aviation industry. He noted that a well-equipped accident investigation institution was essential to supporting the country’s ambition of becoming a competitive regional aviation centre. The Commissioner also urged air passengers to observe all airport safety regulations and adhere to established aviation protocols, emphasising that passengers have a responsibility to contribute to safe air travel. One of the facilitators, Jeremy Turner, reaffirmed Cranfield University’s commitment to sustaining the training programme, describing it as vital to strengthening Ghana’s aviation safety capacity. Meanwhile, Cranfield University Lecturer, Dr Abdul Abushalla, said the programme would help improve aviation safety, strengthen accident prevention measures and equip investigators with the technical expertise required to discharge their responsibilities effectively. The training forms part of efforts to strengthen Ghana’s aviation safety framework and ensure that the country has the skilled professionals and institutional capacity needed to support its ambition of becoming a leading aviation hub in the region. CALENDAR OF EVENTS . European Aviation Training Summit 3 – 5 November 2026 • Estoril Congress Centre, Cascais, Portugal . 79TH ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY SUMMIT MONTREAL | NOVEMBER 10-12, 2026. . Airlines 2026 conference - November 11, 2026 (London) . 2026 NBAA Business Aviation Convention & Exhibition (NBAA-BACE) Oct. 20-22, 2026 | Las Vegas, NV . Gulf Flight Safety Association (GFSA)conference Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on the 28th and 29th of October 2026 . Bombardier Safety Standdown (November 10–12, 2026 in Wichita, KS) . CHC Safety & Quality Summit - 11th – 13th November 2025 - Vancouver, BC Canada . Aircraft Fire Hazards, Protection, and Investigation17 to 19 November 2026, Woburn MA : Save The Date - February 11-12, 2027 - ProDIGIQ User Conference . 2027 ACSF Safety Symposium - April 6-8, 2027 - ERAU Daytona Beach, FL Curt Lewis