Flight Safety Information - November 09, 2026 No. 220 In This Issue : FAA Begins Replacing Floppy Disks in ATC Upgrade : Accident: Southwest B38M enroute on May 25th 2024, Dutch Roll : Investigators zero in on possible cause of Wisconsin plane crash that killed 6 : Incident: Southwest B737 at San Diego on Aug 11th 2023, cleared to line up then forgotten, overflown by Citation on short final : Fatal air ambulance crash exposes growing GPS danger facing US flights : Incident: Southwest B737 near Los Angeles on Nov 6th 2026, engine shut down in flight : NASA ASRS: What the Aviation Safety Reporting System Is and How to Search It : U.S. Private Jet Passenger Charter Flights Have Enviable Safety Record : How two passenger planes actually crashed over the Grand Canyon (Video) : Calendar of Events FAA Begins Replacing Floppy Disks in ATC Upgrade New information displays will replace four legacy systems at 435 FAA facilities by the end of 2028. Matt Ryan Thursday, November 05, 2026 at 01:30 PM ET Verified Edited By:Matt Ryan [Credit: George Wirt | Shutterstock] Key Takeaways: The FAA on Thursday announced the initial rollout of a new information display system that will replace decades-old air traffic control equipment, including technology that relies on floppy disks. The Enterprise Information Display System (E-IDS) will consolidate information currently handled by four separate systems, some dating back to the 1980s. Initial Installations Underway The first five locations receiving the upgrades include Atlantic City International Airport in New Jersey, Nashville International Airport in Tennessee and Greater Rochester International Airport in New York, along with data processing hubs in Atlanta and Salt Lake City. The FAA plans to deploy the system at 435 facilities nationwide by the end of 2028. E-IDS will provide controllers with access to weather information, equipment alerts, airspace restrictions and other operational data through a single digital platform. “E-IDS gives air traffic controllers the information they need to make timely decisions and keep the flying public safe,” FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford said in Thursday’s announcement. “We’re moving away from outdated, manual processes and replacing technology that once relied on floppy disks with a modern system that allows controllers to instantly share critical flight alerts, restricted airspace schedules and pilot reports across the National Airspace System.” Improving Information Sharing According to the FAA’s program overview, the system is also intended to improve the collection and distribution of pilot reports (PIREPs) and Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs). The agency has identified both PIREP capabilities and timely NOTAM distribution among its leading air traffic safety concerns. E-IDS will allow information to be exchanged across facilities and reduce the need for manual processes associated with the older equipment. The installations are part of the FAA’s broader ATC modernization effort, which includes upgrades to telecommunications infrastructure, radar, radios and surveillance equipment. In a September report, the Government Accountability Office found that the agency had not established a comprehensive lifecycle cost estimate or integrated master schedule for the overall program. The FAA is targeting completion of the first phase of modernization by December 2028. Accident: Southwest B38M enroute on May 25th 2024, Dutch Roll Note from the CLL/FSI editor: You can look up the complete docket files, investigative reports, and official documentation directly through the NTSB Docket Management System using the investigation number DCA24LA206 By Simon Hradecky, created Wednesday, Jun 12th 2024 17:25Z, last updated Friday, Nov 6th 2026 14:23Z A Southwest Airlines Boeing 737-8 MAX, registration N8825Q performing flight WN-746 from Phoenix,AZ to Oakland,CA (USA) with 175 passengers and 6 crew, was enroute at FL340 when the aircraft experienced Dutch Roll. The crew was able to regain control, descended the aircraft to FL320 and landed the aircraft on Oakland's runway 30 about 55 minutes later. The aircraft sustained substantial structural damage. The FAA reported: "AIRCRAFT EXPERIENCED A DUTCH ROLL, REGAINED CONTROL AND POST FLIGHT INSPECTION REVEALED DAMAGE TO THE STANDBY PCU, OAKLAND, CA." and stated the aircraft sustained substantial damage, the occurrence was rated an accident. The aircraft remained on the ground in Oakland until Jun 6th 2024, then positioned to Everett,WA (USA), ATS facilities, and is still on the ground in Everett 6 days later. Dutch Roll is a coupled out of phase movement of the aircraft as result of weakened directional stability (provided by the vertical tail and rudder), in which the aircraft oscillates around its vertical as well as longitudinal axis (coupled yaw and roll). The PCU is the power control unit, an actuator controlling the (vertical) rudder. On Jun 13th 2024 The Aviation Herald learned that two ribs, that the stand by PCU is being mounted to, were damaged as well as the mounts of the stand by actuator. A temporary repair was done in Oakland replacing the damaged PCU, the aircraft was then ferried to Everett to replace the damaged ribs. On Jun 14th 2024 the NTSB reported: The NTSB has opened an investigation into an inflight oscillation event on a Southwest Airlines B-737-MAX8. The event, which was described by the flight crew as a “Dutch roll,” occurred on May 25 at about 8 am PT at an altitude of 34,000 feet as Southwest flight 746 was enroute from Phoenix, Arizona (PHX), to Oakland, California (OAK). A Dutch roll is a coupled oscillation in an airplane’s yaw and roll axes, inherent to the flight dynamics of all conventional airplanes. None of the 175 passengers or crew of six aboard the flight were injured in the event. Following the event, SWA performed maintenance on the airplane and discovered damage to structural components. SWA notified the NTSB of the event and damage on June 7. The NTSB’s Vehicle Recorder Laboratory in Washington has received data downloaded from the airplane’s digital flight data recorder. Data from the recorder will aid investigators in determining the length and severity of the event. The cockpit voice recorder, which is currently limited to two hours of audio, was overwritten and unavailable to investigators. A preliminary report is expected within 30 days of the date of the event. On JUl 9th 2024 the NTSB released their preliminary report stating for the history of flight: According to the flight crew, the captain was the pilot flying and the first officer (FO) was the pilot monitoring. The captain said that while reviewing the logbook before the flight, he noted a previously recorded yaw damper discrepancy described as “the yaw damper over-correcting in flight”. He recalled that the corrective action consisted of resetting a few stall management yaw damper computer codes. The preflight, pushback, and initial taxi segments of the flight were uneventful. However, when cleared for takeoff and while turning onto the runway, after transitioning to rudder pedal steering, the captain noticed momentary stiffness in the rudder pedals. Following departure, occasional light turbulence was encountered during an uneventful climb to the cruise altitude of 34,000 feet. The captain said that shortly after reaching their cruise altitude, and while flying through some light chop, the aircraft began to experience “a small amount of Dutch roll”. He stated that “the roll was stable, more noticeable in frequency, with only a slight amount of yaw.” The oscillations lasted a few seconds and the autopilot remained engaged throughout the event. The FO characterized the event as a “strange movement of the tail of the airplane back and forth, coupled with very slight rudder movement left and right. The tail movement was noticeable, but not excessive, and I remember my first thought being this is some odd light chop”. The flight crew discussed the event and noted that they felt the rudder pedals move during the oscillations. They deduced that the oscillations were not caused by the turbulence, as the rudder pedals should not move with the yaw damper system, but rather by the airplane. After coordinating with Air Traffic Control (ATC), they descended to 32,000 where they encountered similar flight conditions. The same type of aircraft movements was experienced a few more times during the cruise portion of the flight and the captain felt faint rudder pedal movement in phase with the oscillations. The yaw damper light did not illuminate and there were no master caution warnings for the duration of the flight. SWA maintenance control was notified by the flight crew of a yaw damper issue via the aircraft communication addressing and reporting system (ACARS) and the flight continued to OAK and landed without incident. However, after clearing the runway, the captain felt the same oscillations and rudder pedal stiffness observed earlier in the flight. After arriving at the gate, the aircraft was met by SWA maintenance, and the airpoance was removed from service. Post-incident troubleshooting and inspection of the airplane was accomplished by SWA maintenance. The examination revealed damage to the vertical stabilizer trailing edge ribs above and below the standby rudder power control unit (PCU). The damage to the stabilizer ribs adversely affects the structural strength of the fitting and is considered substantial damage. As part of the investigation, a timeline of events was created. With respect to the flight data the NTSB annotated: A review of the data also showed that the anomalous behavior of the rudder system began on the first flight after a scheduled maintenance on May 23, 2024. Before the maintenance, yaw damper commands did not correspond to rudder pedal movements. However, after scheduled maintenance was performed on the airplane, rudder pedal movements were noted when the yaw damper was engaged. All occurrences of these oscillations occurred with the yaw damper engaged; when the yaw damper was disengaged in-flight, or when the airplane was dispatched with the yaw damper on the minimum equipment list (MEL), the anomalous behavior was not observed. The NTSB also stated: "Part of the investigation will be determining when the structural damage to the rudder system occurred." On Nov 6th 2026 the NTSB released their final report concluding the probable causes of the accident were: Damage to the standby rudder power control unit connection to the vertical fin due to an extreme high wind event while the airplane was parked, which remained undetected and resulted in anomalous operation of the standby rudder power control unit. Contributing to the nondetection of the damage was 1) the improper accomplishment of the standby hydraulic system operational test by Southwest Airlines maintenance personnel; 2) the lack of a defined wind speed threshold, in the Boeing 737 aircraft maintenance manual, to perform the extreme high wind conditional inspection for parked and moored aircraft; and 3) the absence of an adequate process at Southwest Airlines to notify maintenance control when parked aircraft experience an extreme high wind event that may require the relevant conditional inspection. The NTSB analysed: Southwest Airlines (SWA) flight 746 experienced a rudder control system anomaly during flight between Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport (PHX), Phoenix, Arizona and Metro Oakland International Airport (OAK), Oakland, California. The captain stated, shortly after reaching their cruise altitude and while flying through light turbulence, the airplane began to experience “a small amount of Dutch roll.” The oscillations lasted a few seconds and the autopilot remained engaged throughout the event. The first officer (FO) characterized the event as a “strange movement of the tail of the airplane back and forth, coupled with very slight rudder movement left and right.” The flight crew discussed the event and noted that they felt the rudder pedals move during the oscillations. The flight crew deduced that the oscillations were not caused by turbulence but rather by the airplane. SWA flight 746 continued to OAK and landed without incident. Postlanding inspection found damage to include the vertical stabilizer trailing edge ribs, both above and below the standby rudder power control unit (PCU). On the evening of May 16, 2024, the accident airplane was parked overnight at Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport (MSY), New Orleans, Louisiana. Overnight, thunderstorms at MSY generated high winds with gusts up to 73 kts. The Boeing 737 rudder system does not incorporate a gust-lock function. It is likely that these high winds resulted in movement of the rudder that damaged the vertical stabilizer ribs to which the standby rudder PCU was connected. At the time of the accident, the Boeing 737 aircraft maintenance manual conditional inspection for parked or moored airplanes that experienced an extreme high wind event lacked a defined wind threshold for requiring the conditional inspection to be performed. Additionally, SWA did not have a process in place to notify maintenance control for when their parked aircraft may have experienced an extreme high wind event. Therefore, the conditional inspection for extreme high wind events, which could have detected structural damage to the vertical stabilizer, was not accomplished after the thunderstorms. The accident airplane resumed flying the next morning. Between May 17 to 23, 2024, the accident airplane flew a total of 38 flights with no reported anomalies of the rudder control system. Therefore, the damaged vertical stabilizer ribs remained undetected for these flights. The airplane underwent scheduled maintenance inspections on the evening of May 23, 2024. These inspections included an operational test of the standby hydraulic system. The damage to the vertical stabilizer trailing edge ribs, to which the standby rudder PCU was attached, that existed at the time of this operational test would have revealed itself as a rudder that would not return to its neutral position. However, contrary to the required procedure, SWA maintenance personnel did not visually confirm the rudder position during this operational test. Nonetheless, SWA maintenance signed off that the accident airplane passed the operational test of the standby hydraulic system, and the airplane was released for flight. As a result, the damage to the vertical stabilizer remained undetected. Investigators could not determine if the existing vertical stabilizer rib damage was further damaged during this maintenance activity. On May 24, 2024, during the accident airplane’s fourth flight of the day, the damaged vertical stabilizer ribs exhibited the first operational symptoms in which that flight crew believed the yaw damper had malfunctioned. The accident airplane subsequently flew another flight on May 24, 2024, with the yaw damper disabled. Flight 746 was the first flight the next day. https://flightaware.com/live/flight/SWA746/history/20240525/1425Z/KPHX/KOAK Investigators zero in on possible cause of Wisconsin plane crash that killed 6 FlightRadar24 data showed the Piper Malibu's airspeed nearly doubled to 340 mph as it plunged at 4,000 feet per minute By Stephen Sorace Fox New Published October 15, 2026 8:55am EDT Wisconsin plane crash kills 5 adults, child A small plane carrying five adults and a child crashed into a wooded area in Wisconsin on Tuesday night, killing everyone aboard. (Credit: WITI) A small plane that crashed in Wisconsin, killing six people, including a child, had plummeted toward the ground at a rate of up to 4,000 feet per minute after its pilot reported ice accumulating on the wings, according to newly released flight data and federal investigators. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) said the pilot of the Piper PA-46 Malibu was flying at 24,000 feet on Tuesday night when he alerted air traffic control to ice building up on the aircraft's wings and requested permission to descend. Air traffic controllers approved the request, but the plane entered a descending right turn that became increasingly sharp before communications and flight tracking data were lost, investigators said. First responders are seen at the scene of a small plane crash in the Town of Dellona in Sauk County, Wisconsin, on Tuesday, Oct. 13, 2026. (FOX6 Milwaukee WITI) Data from FlightRadar24 showed the plane's airspeed nearly doubled to 340 mph as it descended at a rate of up to 4,000 feet per minute, according to The Associated Press. "It has all the earmarks of an icing-related loss of control," aviation safety expert Jeff Guzzetti, a former investigator for both the NTSB and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), told the outlet. Ice accumulation poses a serious threat to aircraft because even a thin layer can disrupt airflow over the wings, reducing lift and making a plane more difficult to control. The six-seat, single-engine aircraft was traveling from Kenosha to Menomonie when it crashed shortly before 10 p.m. in a wooded area of Sauk County near Mirror Lake State Park, about 10 miles west of Wisconsin Dells, authorities said. A map shows Dellona, Wisconsin, where six perished in a plane crash on Tuesday, Oct. 13, 2026. (Fox News) Rain was falling as a thunderstorm moved through Dellona at the time of the crash. All six people aboard were killed. Authorities said no structures were damaged and no one on the ground was injured. The identities of the victims had not been publicly released. The Piper Malibu model has previously faced federal scrutiny over crashes involving icing conditions. Investigators are probing the aircraft's final communications with an air traffic control tower prior to the crash, authorities said. (FOX6 Milwaukee WITI) The NTSB conducted a special safety review of seven icing-related crashes involving Piper Malibu and Mirage aircraft between 1989 and 1991, several of which involved relatively inexperienced pilots unfamiliar with handling the sophisticated planes in icy conditions. The review prompted recommendations for changes to pilot training, aircraft checklists and operating manuals, as well as the addition of an indicator light for systems designed to prevent ice buildup in pitot tubes, which help provide accurate airspeed readings. The NTSB is leading the investigation into Tuesday's crash. Investigators have not determined an official cause. Incident: Southwest B737 at San Diego on Aug 11th 2023, cleared to line up then forgotten, overflown by Citation on short final By Simon Hradecky, created Sunday, Aug 13th 2023 18:24Z, last updated Friday, Nov 6th 2026 14:29Z A Southwest Airlines Boeing 737-700, registration N7734H performing flight WN-2493 from San Diego,CA to San Jose,CA (USA), was at holding point B1 and was instructed to line up runway 27 at 12:03L (19:03Z) and wait with the advice that landing traffic was 5nm out. The aircraft went onto the runway and stopped about 470 meters/1550 feet ahead of the displaced runway threshold. About 50 seconds prior to the instruction to line up and wait to WN-2493 Tower cleared a Citation to land on runway 27, traffic would be holding in position. About 2:10 minutes after the 737 had been instructed to line up runway 27 and wait the crew of the landing Citation queried, whether they were still cleared to land, in return tower instructed the Citation to go around, then instructed the 737 to vacate the runway via the next taxiway to the right, taxiway C2. The 737 queried for the reasoning, tower responded, there was traffic 2nm out behind them. The 737 crew complied and vacated the runway and subsequently went to holding point C1. The Citation positioned for another approach and landed safely about 14 minutes later. The 737 departed about 10 minutes after the go around of the Citation. ADS-B data suggest that the Citation was already over the runway about 150 meters/480 feet ahead of the displaced runway threshold having overflown the 737 at low height when it reached the lowest height of about 100 feet AGL starting to climb again. The FAA opened an investigation into the occurrence and stated: "The controller had previously cleared the Citation to land on Runway 27 and then instructed Southwest Flight 2493 to taxi onto that runway and wait for instructions to depart. The facility’s automated surface surveillance system alerted the controller about the developing situation." The NTSB announced: "NTSB investigating Aug. 11 runway incursion and overflight at San Diego Int’l Airport that occurred when a Cessna 560X was cleared to land on Runway 27 and conflicted with a Southwest Airlines Boeing 737 which was in a line up & wait on Runway 27. No injuries or damage reported." On Sep 30th 2025 the NTSB released their final report concluding the probable causes of the incident were: The local control controller’s poor judgment in duty prioritization which distracted them from monitoring arriving and departing traffic and resulted in a runway incursion and loss of same runway separation. Contributing was the operations supervisor’s decision to troubleshoot a faulty flight strip printer instead of maintaining direct supervision of the operation. The NTSB analysed: SAN was equipped with the Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model-X (ASDE-X) surface radar system. The system was operational and functioned as designed. It produced both aural and visual alerts that indicated that there was an aircraft [N564HV] landing with another aircraft [SWA2493] still in position on the same runway. The local control (LC) controller immediately reacted to the ASDE-X alerts, and issued instructions to resolve the conflict, but not before standard separation had been lost. The SAN Airport Traffic Control Tower (SAN ATCT) facility was equipped with two flight strip printers, one functioned as a primary device, and the second as a backup in case the first unit failed. In post incident interviews, the SAN ATCT personnel stated that they received no training on the use or troubleshooting of these printers. Prior to the incident, the primary printer jammed. During the postincident interview with the operations supervisor (OS), they stated that they chose to troubleshoot the primary printer rather than switching to the backup, and that this drew their attention away from the operation at the time of the incident. FAA Order JO 7110.65BB, Air Traffic Control, 2-10-3, Tower Team Position Responsibilities, states in part: a. Tower Team Concept and Intent: There are no absolute divisions of responsibilities regarding position operations. The tasks to be completed remain the same whether one, two, or three people are working positions within a facility/sector. The team, as a whole, has responsibility for the safe and efficient operation of that facility/sector. The LC controller noticed a flight strip at their workstation that indicated an initial altitude for an uninvolved departing aircraft that was not in accordance with facility directives and contacted Southern California Terminal Radar Approach Control (SCT TRACON) to coordinate an appropriate altitude. This diverted their attention from N564HV and SWA2493 momentarily. During the post-incident interview conducted with the LC controller, they stated that they had used poor judgment in prioritizing their duties. This duty prioritization was not consistent with guidance contained in FAA Order JO 7110.65BB, Air Traffic Control, 2-1-1, ATC Service. On Nov 6th 2026 the NTSB released their final report and investigation docket concluding the probable causes of the incident were: The local control controller’s poor judgment in duty prioritization which distracted them from monitoring arriving and departing traffic and resulted in a runway incursion and loss of same runway separation. Contributing was the operations supervisor’s decision to troubleshoot a faulty flight strip printer instead of maintaining direct supervision of the operation. The NTSB analysed: SAN was equipped with the Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model-X (ASDE-X) surface radar system. The system was operational and functioned as designed. It produced both aural and visual alerts that indicated that there was an aircraft [N564HV] landing with another aircraft [SWA2493] still in position on the same runway. The local control (LC) controller immediately reacted to the ASDE-X alerts, and issued instructions to resolve the conflict, but not before standard separation had been lost. The SAN Airport Traffic Control Tower (SAN ATCT) facility was equipped with two flight strip printers, one functioned as a primary device, and the second as a backup in case the first unit failed. In post incident interviews, the SAN ATCT personnel stated that they received no training on the use or troubleshooting of these printers. Prior to the incident, the primary printer jammed. During the postincident interview with the operations supervisor (OS), they stated that they chose to troubleshoot the primary printer rather than switching to the backup, and that this drew their attention away from the operation at the time of the incident. FAA Order JO 7110.65BB, Air Traffic Control, 2-10-3, Tower Team Position Responsibilities, states in part: a. Tower Team Concept and Intent: There are no absolute divisions of responsibilities regarding position operations. The tasks to be completed remain the same whether one, two, or three people are working positions within a facility/sector. The team, as a whole, has responsibility for the safe and efficient operation of that facility/sector. The LC controller noticed a flight strip at their workstation that indicated an initial altitude for an uninvolved departing aircraft that was not in accordance with facility directives and contacted Southern California Terminal Radar Approach Control (SCT TRACON) to coordinate an appropriate altitude. This diverted their attention from N564HV and SWA2493 momentarily. During the post-incident interview conducted with the LC controller, they stated that they had used poor judgment in prioritizing their duties. This duty prioritization was not consistent with guidance contained in FAA Order JO 7110.65BB, Air Traffic Control, 2-1-1, ATC Service. Metars: KSAN 112051Z 27009KT 10SM BKN013 23/18 A3001 RMK AO2 SLP161 T02330183 58005= KSAN 111951Z 27007KT 240V310 10SM BKN013 BKN018 23/18 A3001 RMK AO2 SLP163 T02330183= KSAN 111851Z 25007KT 230V290 10SM BKN011 BKN018 BKN250 22/18 A3002 RMK AO2 SLP166 T02170183= KSAN 111751Z 22008KT 10SM BKN013 OVC018 22/19 A3002 RMK AO2 SLP166 T02220189 10222 20211 51005= KSAN 111700Z 22007KT 10SM BKN013 OVC018 22/18 A3003 RMK AO2 T02170183= KSAN 111651Z 26004KT 10SM OVC016 22/18 A3002 RMK AO2 SLP166 CIG 014V018 T02170183= KSAN 111625Z 27006KT 10SM OVC016 22/18 A3002 RMK AO2 T02170183= KSAN 111551Z 27005KT 10SM OVC014 22/18 A3002 RMK AO2 SLP164 T02170183= Aerodrome Chart San Diego (Graphics: FAA): Fatal air ambulance crash exposes growing GPS danger facing US flights A Beech King Air struck the Capitan Mountains after pilots lost GPS navigation on a medical flight in New Mexico By Morgan Phillips Fox News Published August 7, 2026 6:30am EDT Expert says fatal New Mexico crash highlights GPS jamming concerns University of Texas GPS expert Todd Humphreys says a fatal New Mexico medevac crash raises broader questions about aviation safety, outdated cockpit GPS technology and the growing threat of GPS jamming. Federal investigators say a fatal New Mexico air ambulance crash unfolded after the crew lost GPS navigation while the U.S. military was conducting a scheduled jamming exercise — a chain of events that is raising new questions about whether civilian aviation is prepared for an era of electronic warfare. The National Transportation Safety Board's preliminary report found the Beech King Air crew reported losing GPS capability minutes after departing Roswell, New Mexico, May 14 as the military conducted a planned GPS-denial exercise. Air traffic controllers twice asked officials to halt the jamming while assisting the flight, though investigators have not determined whether the interference caused or contributed to the crash. The crew took off from Roswell, New Mexico, shortly before midnight on an air ambulance flight to Ruidoso, New Mexico, according to the preliminary report. Before the flight, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had issued a notice to airmen warning that a scheduled military GPS jamming exercise could disrupt satellite navigation across a radius of hundreds of miles around White Sands Missile Range. Minutes after departure, the pilots reported losing GPS capability and requested assistance from air traffic controllers, who twice asked the military to suspend the jamming exercise. Three other aircraft in the area also reported GPS outages. Federal investigators are examining the causes of recent close calls between airliners and other safety issues. (Michael Dwyer, File/The Associated Press ) The crew later reported the airport in sight and requested a visual approach. After the military resumed the exercise, the aircraft descended toward the runway but struck the Capitan Mountains, killing both pilots and two flight nurses. The National Transportation Safety Board has not determined whether the GPS interference contributed to the crash. The crash comes as aviation authorities worldwide warn that GPS interference is becoming a growing operational hazard. The FAA now advises pilots to be prepared to fly without GPS because intentional jamming is "of greater and growing concern," while the U.N.'s aviation agency has warned that interference can affect aircraft far beyond conflict zones. In its 2026 guidance, the agency said the hazards associated with GPS jamming and spoofing have "rapidly spread" in recent years and cited industry data showing reports of GPS loss increased 65% in the first half of 2024 compared with the previous year. The agency warned that interference can cause pilots to deviate from assigned flight paths, misreport their position, lose situational awareness and struggle to transition safely to backup navigation. Todd Humphreys, director of the University of Texas' Radionavigation Laboratory, said the crash also raises questions about whether the navigation technology used in many civilian aircraft has kept pace with evolving GPS jamming threats. Humphreys said many FAA-certified cockpit GPS receivers rely on older technology that is more susceptible to jamming than newer commercially available systems. "The iPhone that the pilot carried was almost certainly a better GPS receiver inside than the FAA-certified receiver providing navigation guidance to the aircraft," Humphreys told Fox News Digital. Unlike illegal consumer GPS jammers, military electronic warfare systems are designed to deny satellite navigation across large operational areas so troops can train in conditions resembling combat. In the New Mexico exercise, the FAA warned GPS disruptions could extend hundreds of miles from White Sands Missile Range. Humphreys argued that while newer GPS technology has become more resilient to interference, aviation certification has moved too slowly to keep pace with the evolving threat from jamming and spoofing. Humphreys' concerns echo warnings from international aviation regulators. In March 2025, the International Civil Aviation Organization, along with the International Telecommunication Union and International Maritime Organization, warned of increasing GPS jamming and spoofing incidents that can affect aircraft "far beyond the immediate affected area," creating safety risks across multiple flight regions. Paul Deres, vice president of operations at the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association Air Safety Institute, said the focus should remain on pilot preparation and proficiency, noting that today's general aviation fleet includes a wide range of older and newer avionics designed to improve situational awareness. "Technology can always fail, and it does," Deres said. European regulators have repeatedly updated guidance for pilots and air traffic controllers in response to growing GPS interference, most recently in July after analyzing additional jamming and spoofing incidents. The FAA declined to comment on the ongoing investigation, but said it issues notices alerting pilots to planned GPS disruptions and maintains backup navigation systems to help aircraft navigate during satellite outages. Asked about Humphreys' criticism that FAA-certified GPS receivers have not kept pace with newer technology, the agency did not directly address the claim. GPS interference has become a growing challenge for commercial aviation in parts of Europe and the Middle East, where airlines routinely encounter jamming and spoofing linked to regional conflicts. "There are some in the community who believe that we have passed the point of peak safety in aviation, maybe four years ago," Humphreys said, pointing to the rise of GPS jamming, spoofing and other forms of hybrid warfare that can disrupt aircraft navigation. But it remains relatively uncommon in U.S. airspace outside of military testing. In March 2025, multiple commercial airliners approaching Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport near the nation's capital received false collision alerts that forced several crews to perform go-arounds. Congressional testimony later revealed the alerts were triggered by Secret Service and U.S. Navy counter-drone testing. Regardless of whether investigators ultimately link the GPS outage to the crash, the report documents how quickly a routine medical flight became a complex navigation emergency after the crew reported losing satellite guidance. The National Transportation Safety Board preliminary report describes a chain of events in which the crew lost GPS shortly after departure, requested assistance from air traffic control, and later opted to continue visually toward the airport before striking terrain. As drones become more prevalent, GPS jamming as a form of counter-drone operations only will become more common. "Nation states have woken up to the fact that this is one of the ways they can protect themselves from drones," he said. "We've got to move more quickly on the aviation side to build better systems, better receivers, better antennas to deal with this so that flights can be safer again." Humphreys said the United States has so far avoided the level of disruption seen in Europe, but argued regulators need to modernize aviation technology before GPS interference becomes a more routine operational challenge. "The FAA, I think they've just got to move faster. They've got to wake up and recognize that sticking to their old rules about you know, certification that takes years and millions and millions of dollars to get through is not at the service of safety anymore, because the environment has changed. " Incident: Southwest B737 near Los Angeles on Nov 6th 2026, engine shut down in flight By Simon Hradecky, created Saturday, Nov 7th 2026 17:10Z, last updated Saturday, Nov 7th 2026 17:10Z A Southwest Airlines Boeing 737-700, registration N281WN performing flight WN-3396 from Santa Ana,CA to San Jose,CA (USA) with 96 people on board, was climbing out of Santa Ana's runway 02L when the crew stopped the climb at FL200 reporting right hand engine (CFM56) problems and decided to divert to Los Angeles,CA (USA). The crew subsequently shut the engine down and continued for a safe landing on Los Angeles' runway 25L about 40 minutes after departure. The airline reported the crew received an engine maintenance indication. The FAA reported the crew reported engine issues. The aircraft is still on the ground in Los Angeles about 21 hours after landing. https://flightaware.com/live/flight/SWA3396/history/20261106/1945Z/KSNA/KSJC NASA ASRS: What the Aviation Safety Reporting System Is and How to Search It What NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System is, its confidentiality and immunity rules, how to search the database, and its limits for research. Written and maintained by CASRAI Editorial Boar Last updated 8 November 2026 NASA ASRS is the Aviation Safety Reporting System, a confidential, voluntary reporting program for aviation safety incidents. It is funded by the FAA and administered by NASA. This guide is for researchers, safety analysts and administrators who need to know what the system is, what protections reporters have, how its public database is searched, and what its data can and cannot support. Facts below come from NASA’s ASRS pages, read 7 November 2026. Answers draw on CASRAI's guides and dictionary plus the federal and funder documents we index: Federal Register, Grants.gov, Regulations.gov and UKRI. Answers are AI-generated and can be wrong, so check the linked sources before relying on one; your question is logged without personal data — never sold, never used to train a third-party model — to show us what CASRAI is missing, so please do not type personal or confidential details. How we use this → What NASA ASRS is ASRS collects safety reports that pilots, air traffic controllers and other aviation personnel submit voluntarily. NASA uses the reports to identify deficiencies in the aviation system, to issue alerts to the parties who can fix them, and to educate through its newsletter CALLBACK, its journal ASRS Directline and research studies. The design is a learning system rather than an enforcement one: reporters describe events in their own words, and the program removes identifying detail before anything is shared. It belongs in the same family of methods as the critical incident technique, in which reported events, rather than a measured sample, are the unit of analysis. Who runs it and what it covers ASRS operates under the FAA’s Aviation Safety Reporting Program, and NASA conducts its day-to-day operations under a Memorandum of Agreement with the FAA (FAA Advisory Circular 00-46F, as published on the ASRS immunity page). NASA, not the FAA, receives and de-identifies the reports, and the FAA receives nothing that reveals a reporter’s identity. Reports can be submitted through Electronic Report Submission (ERS) or on a downloadable form sent by US mail. Confidentiality NASA states that reports are held in strict confidence and that no reporter’s identity has ever been breached by the ASRS. Dates, times and related details that could be used to infer an identity are generalized or removed. Immunity conditions for reporters The FAA has committed not to use ASRS information against reporters in enforcement actions and, subject to limitations, waives fines and penalties for unintentional violations. Under paragraph 12 of Advisory Circular 00-46F, no civil penalty or certificate suspension is imposed when all of the following hold: • the violation was inadvertent; • it did not involve a criminal offense, an accident, or action under 49 U.S.C. 44709; • the person has no FAA enforcement finding of a violation in the previous 5 years; • a written report was delivered or mailed to NASA within 10 days of the violation, or of the date the person knew or should have known of it. This does not apply to controllers covered by the Air Traffic Safety Action Program (ATSAP). Separately, 14 CFR 91.25 bars the FAA from using ASRS reports, or information derived from them, in enforcement, except for criminal offenses or accidents. How to search the ASRS database NASA publishes the de-identified reports in the ASRS Database Online. The official pages support this workflow: 1. Open the ASRS Database Online page and select Start Search. NASA advises turning off pop-up blockers for best results. 2. Before building a query, review the ASRS Coding Taxonomy (PDF) and the ASRS Abbreviations (PDF), since reports are coded and narratives use abbreviations. 3. Use the search form at asrs.arc.nasa.gov/search/dbol.html to define your query. 4. Consult the supporting resources on the same page: New Users, Search Strategies, Sample Searches and About ASRS Data. 5. Export results to Word, Excel (.xls) or CSV. Each row is one incident record, and a single download is limited to 10,000 records. NASA also offers Database Report Sets and a Requesting ASRS Data route for material beyond the online search. For sign-in or submission, use the links on the ASRS site itself. Strengths and limits for research The following points combine NASA’s stated facts with editorial interpretation, marked as such. • Strength: narrative detail. Reports come from the people involved, so they capture context that mandatory counts do not (editorial interpretation). • Strength: structured coding and export. A published taxonomy and CSV export let analysts code and re-analyse records outside the website (sourced: taxonomy and export formats). • Limit: voluntary submission. Because reporting is voluntary, the database is not a census of events. Counts of reports should not be read as incidence rates (editorial interpretation of the voluntary design). • Limit: generalized dates and times. Confidentiality rules remove or generalize details that could identify a reporter, which constrains fine-grained temporal or locational analysis (editorial interpretation of the confidentiality policy). • Limit: download cap. The 10,000-record cap means large studies need segmented queries or a data request. U.S. Private Jet Passenger Charter Flights Have Enviable Safety Record Doug Gollan, Contributor Updated Sat, November 7, 2026 at 5:28 PM CST 3 min read National Transportation Safety Board Member Tom Chapman speaks during a press conference at the Emergency Operations Center on Monday, Nov. 2, 2026, in West Palm Beach, Fla. The press conference was held to talk about the crash of a Learjet 60 airplane in Greenacres, Fla. (Matias J. Ocner/Miami Herald/Tribune News Service via Getty Images)TNS More Fatal accidents involving U.S.-registered passenger private jet charters and fractional ownership flights have been rare, according to data tracking private aviation accidents. Since 2010, five accidents involving passenger charter jet flights, including the most recent tragedy involving a Learjet en route from Austin, Texas, to the Bahamas, have had fatalities. The charter jet crashed in Greenacres, Florida, shortly after the co-pilot told air traffic controllers the airplane was experiencing a buildup of ice amid turbulence as it navigated severe weather impacting South Florida at the time. Seven passengers and the two pilots all died in the accident. The aircraft, N722BD, was on the Part 135 D-085 charter certificate, a list published by the Federal Aviation Administration that lists aircraft available for charter flights. Fort Lauderdale-based Aurora Aviation, Inc. operated the flight under the Upper Jets banner. The FAA charter list has over 11,500 aircraft, including passenger jets, air ambulances, cargo jets, turboprops, piston airplanes, and helicopters. A 2021 report from Aviation International News found that between 2010 and 2020, there were just three fatal accidents involving passenger charter jet flights operating under Part 135 with U.S.-registered aircraft. The three fatal business jet accidents of N-registered tails included a 2012 Learjet 25 crash. The accident was on a flight between Monterrey and Toluca, Mexico. In 2015, a Hawker 700A crashed after departing Akron Regional Airport. The last fatality was in September 2018. A Falcon 50 ran off the runway in South Carolina. Since then, there have been just two more fatal accidents on the same basis: the recent Learjet crash and a Bombardier Challenger 604 business jet that crashed onto Interstate 75 near Naples, Florida, in February 2024 that killed both pilots. In that accident, a flight attendant and passengers survived. Part 91k, which covers aircraft operated by fractional ownership programs, has seen only one fatality based on tracking that dates to 2006, an accident earlier this year involving a Citation Latitude being flown by NetJets. One passenger died in that accident, although the crew and other passengers escaped when the airplane attempted to land on a highway short of the runway in El Paso, Texas, after engine failure. It was the first fatal accident for NetJets in its 60-year history. Various media stories about the "danger of flying private" following the Learjet fatal accident base those headlines on, including the likes of helicopters, air ambulances, and Part 91 flying, private flights that are non-commercial. The death of former NASCAR driver Greg Biffle in a crash of a private jet he owned in Statesville, North Carolina, last December was operated under the less stringent Part 91 requirements. The same is true of a Challenger 650 crash in Bangor, Maine, in January that killed all six passengers and crew. In that 2010 to 2020 period, AIN reported 31 Part 91 business jet accidents resulting in 114 fatalities. Part 135 and 91K both have more stringent crew training, medical, and rest requirements, as well as maintenance reporting and oversight of operators, than Part 91 operations. While the distinction and records may be apparent when one parses the data, the media reports are creating consternation for those in the charter jet industry. One poster in a private aviation industry group on Facebook shared a screenshot from The New York Post headline reading, "Learjet crash exposes danger of flying private — which is up to 80X more deadly than commercial airlines," and asked, "How should I respond to my clients who keep sending me this?" So far, charter brokers say that while they are getting many questions from customers about safety, they haven't seen a pullback in flying. This article was originally published on Forbes.com How two passenger planes actually crashed over the Grand Canyon (Video) In 1956, two planes collided in mid-air above the Grand Canyon, killing everyone on board. This video explores how the disaster happened and why it changed aviation forever.. CALENDAR OF EVENTS . 79TH ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY SUMMIT MONTREAL | NOVEMBER 10-12, 2026. . Airlines 2026 conference - November 11, 2026 (London) . Bombardier Safety Standdown (November 10–12, 2026 in Wichita, KS) . CHC Safety & Quality Summit - 11th – 13th November 2025 - Vancouver, BC Canada - AIN Corporate Aviation Leadership Summit (CALS) Mx November 16, 2026 Savannah, Georgia . Aircraft Fire Hazards, Protection, and Investigation 17 to 19 November 2026, Woburn MA . 2027 ACSF Safety Symposium - April 6-8, 2027 - ERAU Daytona Beach, FL Curt Lewis